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From the standpoint of Pure Adi Śaṅkara Vedānta, the answer is no. The jñānī, as Paramātmā, does not see the world. More exactly, he does not become a seer of anything second to himself. Realization does not turn an individual into Brahman as a new state; it removes the false notion that the ever-free Self was ever bound, ignorant, or finite.[1]

Why is this so? Because seeing necessarily implies duality: a seer, an act of seeing, and an object seen. But the Upaniṣadic teaching, as understood by Śaṅkara, is that this entire triad belongs only to ignorance. When everything has become the Self, the question itself arises: by what could one see, and whom? Likewise, the Self is not something that can be objectified, for “the seer of seeing” can never itself become a seen object.[2] Hence Brahman cannot literally be a perceiver in the empirical sense.

This also explains why even the term “seer” must be used with caution. In Vedānta the Self is sometimes called the Seer or Witness, but only provisionally, for the sake of instruction. The purpose of this language is to separate the Self from body, senses, and mind, not to establish Brahman as a cosmic observer confronting a world. Satchidanandendra, following Śaṅkara, emphasizes that worldly seeing is only a modification of the mind falsely attributed to the Self. The Self is called “the Seer” only because it illumines these mental modes; in itself it does not perform an act of seeing.[3]

At this point one may object: if the jñānī does not see the world, why do texts and teachers sometimes say that the sage still sees plurality? Pure Śaṅkara Vedānta answers this by distinguishing the knower’s own standpoint from the worldly standpoint. From the knower’s standpoint there is no vision of duality at all. From the worldly standpoint, however, body, senses, and mental functioning may continue to appear, and thus onlookers still describe the sage in empirical language. Śaṅkara’s illustration is the appearance of two moons: even after the error is corrected, a sublated appearance may momentarily persist due to prior impressions. But this does not mean that real ignorance remains in the jñānī.[4]

This point is reinforced by Śaṅkara’s statement, cited by Satchidanandendra, that after realization there can be no continuing transaction of means of knowledge, knower, and object of knowledge. The final means of knowledge, the śruti itself, removes the very status of the Self as a knower in the empirical sense; after accomplishing this, it ceases to function as a pramāṇa, just as dream-pramāṇas lapse upon waking.[5] Therefore the jñānī cannot be described, in the strict sense, as one who knows or sees objects over against himself.

This is precisely where later Advaita formulations often become less exact than Śaṅkara. Some later theories speak as though a residue of avidyā remains in the liberated person in order to explain continuing empirical perception. But Satchidanandendra repeatedly rejects this as a post-Śaṅkara development. Knowledge destroys ignorance as ignorance. What may continue is only a powerless, already-sublated appearance, not a real remnant of bondage.[6]

The conclusion is therefore straightforward. The jñānī does not see the world as jñānī. Brahman cannot be a seer confronting an object, since that would reintroduce duality into the non-dual. At most, others may speak as though the sage sees, hears, or acts, but this is only empirical language applied to a sublated appearance. From the highest standpoint, there is no seer-seen relation at all. There is only Brahman.

Notes

1. On the point that realization does not newly produce Brahmanhood but reveals the ever-free Self, see Satchidanandendra’s statement that from the enlightened person’s own standpoint the Self “is, ever was, and ever will be free from Ignorance, desire and action.”

2. For the decisive Upaniṣadic basis, see Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4.5.15 (“when everything has become the Self, what can one see and with what?”) and Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3.4.2 (“you cannot see the seer of seeing”), as discussed in Satchidanandendra’s expositions.

3. On the distinction between worldly vision as mind-modification and the Self as only provisionally called “the Seer,” see The Method of the Vedanta, discussion of Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4.5.15 and 3.4.2.

4. On the continued empirical appearance of duality after knowledge, and Śaṅkara’s analogy of the two moons from Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya 4.1.15, see Satchidanandendra’s discussions in Viśuddhavedāntasāraḥ, Sugamā, and Articles and Thoughts on Vedanta.

5. On the cessation of pramāṇa–prameya transaction after realization, see the citation of Gītā Bhāṣya 2.69 in How to Recognize the Method of Vedānta and Dakṣiṇa BharataŚaṅkara Vedānta-Vidvadgoṣṭhi.

6. On the rejection of any real residual avidyā after knowledge, see Sugamā and Satchidanandendra’s critique of avidyā-leśa in Articles and Thoughts on Vedanta.