In Up Sah 18.44, the opponent (Purva Paksha-PP) asks a question. Who experiences the transmigratory existence? It cannot be the changeless Self. It cannot be the inert intellect, nor can it be the reflection (of the Self in the intellect) which is mithya. ShankarAchAryA gives a short reply. The transmigratory existence is a delusion because of non-discrimination between Self and non-Self. It has an apparent existence (and experienced) because of real existence of the changeless Self and appears to be belonging to It (Self).
Non-discrimination between Self and non-Self is Self-ignorance. It is the primal ignorance (PI). In a note to prose sambandha to verse 1 of Book 3 in the translation of Naiskarmya Siddhi (NS), A J Alston, the translator, notes that SuresvarAcharyA, the author and a direct disciple of ShankarA examines the locus and object of PI to counter Mandana Misra’s view that the locus is the jiva for according to MM, Brahman-Atman cannot be associated with ignorance in any way. PI is the cause of creation which is non-Self. The task is made easier because there are only two categories of entities, namely, Self and non-Self. He has four (inter-linked) arguments to show that non-Self is not the locus.
Argument 1 The non-Self is the product of PI and is essentially PI. In that case, it is wrong to say that non-Self is the locus for that would mean that PI is its own locus. Argument 2 Even if it is assumed that non-Self is the locus of PI, it does not serve any purpose. It cannot veil any knowledge because, non-Self being inert cannot acquire any knowledge. Argument 3 Since non-Self is the product of PI, it cannot support PI and be latter’s locus. Ornament is product of gold. Gold supports the ornament, and it is not the other way round. Argument 4 As PI exists prior to non-Self, non-Self cannot be the locus.
Thus, non-Self is not the locus of PI. It follows that Self is the locus. However, PI being a lower order reality and does not affect the Self.
Dear Bimal,
I’m afraid that I do not have much time for all these post-Śaṅkara discussions! Saguṇa Brahman is sarvajña (all-knowing) and nirguṇa Brahman is, well ‘nirguṇa’, without attributes. So how could Brahman be in any way ‘ignorant’?
Does it not make far more sense to say that the jīva initially does not have Self-knowledge and the Advaita teacher supplies this knowledge?
To quote from ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta: Ignorance and its Removal’ (hopefully available in a couple of months now!):
<<<< In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya 2.8, Śaṅkara explains: na pratyakṣatvāt vivekāvivekau rūpādivat pratyakṣau-upalabhyete antaḥkaraṇasthau No, vidyā and avidyā are not attributes of Ātmā (na), because they are experienced or known directly by us (pratyakṣatvāt). Knowledge (viveka) and ignorance (aviveka), like form, color, sound etc. (rūpādivat), are directly experienced (pratyakṣau-upalabhyete), by us in the antaḥkaraṇa only (antaḥkaraṇasthau). (Ref. 9) Both knowledge and ignorance are experienced ‘objects’ and therefore cannot be attributes of Ātman. If either were an attribute of Ātman, we could not ‘know’ it without objectifying it. As noted elsewhere, Brahman cannot ‘know’ Brahman. Therefore, both knowledge and ignorance have to be located in the mind. >>>>
After all, a-vidyā means ‘not knowledge’, not a thing in itself. And, when we ‘gain’ Self-knowledge, we are acquiring something new, not ‘destroying’ something called ‘ignorance’. Why this post-Śaṅkara obsession with complicating things?!
Best wishes,
Dennis