18.44–46
The opponent raises the question: Who experiences transmigratory existence (saṃsara)? Who is the saṃsari? The Self cannot be the experiencer of saṃsara because It is changeless. Nor can the reflection be the experiencer, since it is not ultimately real. The intellect too cannot be the experiencer because it is inert.
Sri Shankara agrees that saṃsara is indeed experienced, but he maintains that it is not real. It appears to belong to the Self, which serves as its substratum. The classic analogy is that of the rope and the snake. The snake exists only as a mental projection and is therefore unreal. Nevertheless, it is experienced because of the rope, the substratum upon which it is superimposed. Similarly, saṃsara is experienced because it is superimposed upon the Self.
18.47–50
The opponent rejects the theory of reflection. According to him, both the reflection and its locus are nothing but the Self. The Self undergoes modifications through its own cognitions, and the eternally existing Self experiences pleasure, pain, and other phenomena. He argues that this view should be preferred because it is simpler than the theory of reflection (18.47).
Sri Shankara refutes this position (18.48–50). The opponent’s view lacks scriptural support. The scriptures, the valid means of knowledge regarding the Self, unequivocally teaches that the Self is free from all modifications. The opponent’s theory is therefore mere speculation. Further, he fails to distinguish between the Self and the ego. Consequently, agency, enjoyment, pleasure, pain, and transmigratory existence become real attributes of the Self. If this were so, liberation would be impossible, since real bondage cannot be removed. It is therefore reasonable to accept the Vedantic theory of reflection. This theory preserves the scriptural teaching that the Self is pure consciousness, the principle of knowledge, and also explaining empirical cognition.
18.51–54
Citing grammatical rules and common usage, the opponent argues that the verbal root and its termination refer to the same subject. He therefore asks: Who is the knower? Is it the Self or the intellect? According to him, Vedanta fails to provide a satisfactory answer.
Sri Shankara explains that the Self cannot be the knower because knowing, in the ordinary sense, implies change, whereas the Self is immutable. Nor can the intellect be the knower because it is inert. The intellect becomes sentient only through the reflection of consciousness in it. Therefore, the sentient intellect—or, equivalently, the reflected consciousness, since the two are inseparable in empirical experience—is the knower.
Because the reflected consciousness and the intellect are not discriminated from the Self, the term “knower” is erroneously attributed to the Self.
18.55–56
According to grammar, “knower” is one of the derivatives of the verbal root “to know”. As shown above, the term “knower” cannot properly apply to the Self. The other principal derivatives of the root are likewise inapplicable to the Self. The second derivative, “knowledge” in the sense of the act of knowing, is ruled out because the Self is actionless. The third derivative, namely the instrument of knowing, refers to the intellect. If the Self were an instrument, a second Self would be required to function as the agent, which is untenable. The fourth derivative, namely the knowable object, also cannot apply to the Self because the Self is never an object of knowledge and is free from all attributes.
18.57–69
Part 29 discussed the topic of the use of words with reference to Brahman. The opponent advances a counterargument.
A secondary meaning of a word is possible only when its primary meaning is first established. For example, in the statement “Devadatta is a lion,” Devadatta is understood to be strong because the primary meaning of the word “lion” refers to a strong animal. If the primary meaning of the word “know” does not apply to anything at all, then its secondary application to the Self would also become impossible. In that case, the authority of the Vedas would be undermined.
Sri Shankara replies that the opponent faces a dilemma.
When an ordinary, ignorant person says, “I know,” the word “I” refers to the body-mind complex. This position is essentially that of the materialist, with whom the opponent would not wish to associate. On the other hand, if a learned person takes “I” to refer directly to the Self, difficulties arise because, as shown earlier, the Self cannot properly be described as a knower.
At the same time, the Vedantic position that the Self is the true referent of “I” cannot be denied. Therefore, it becomes necessary to posit a third factor—the reflection of consciousness in the intellect—as the empirical knower. Owing to the failure to discriminate between them, consciousness belonging to the Self is transferred to the intellect, making the intellect conscious and capable of knowing. Conversely, the agency belonging to the intellect is transferred to the Self, making the Self appear to be a knower and agent.
Thus, the Self is spoken of as a knower in the same way that the body is identified with the ego. In reality, however, the Self is pure consciousness, the very principle of knowledge. It is never produced, never modified, and is eternal.
18.70–71
Sri Shankara illustrates the mechanism of this error through familiar examples.
A defect in the mirror, such as a dark spot, may appear in the reflected image but is mistakenly attributed to the face itself. Similarly, attributes of the intellect, such as agency, are assumed by the reflected consciousness and subsequently attributed to the Self.
Again, a torch appears to possess the power of burning, although the power actually belongs to the fire within it. Likewise, because the modifications of the intellect are illumined by reflected consciousness, the intellect appears to possess the powers of perception, cognition, and action, even though consciousness properly belongs only to the Self. In this manner, distinction among Self, reflected consciousness, intellect and the empirical knower is maintained.
Contd