18.133–138 Advaita acknowledges six means of knowledge (pramana). They are perception, inference, comparison, postulation, non-cognition and testimony. Does the Self require a pramana for its substantiation, like the non-Self? According to the opponent, a pramaṇa is required even though the Self is self-evident, and this would be so irrespective of whether ignorance is about the Self or something other than the Self.
Before responding, Sri Shankara analyses the meaning of the word ‘substantiation’ (siddhi). Does it mean ‘coming into existence’, ‘being known’, or something else?
If it means ‘coming into existence’, then no pramana can produce it, and all effort would be useless. A pot comes into existence through clay, the wheel, and the potter. Similarly, no means of knowledge can produce the Self. Knowledge reveals an already existing entity. A pramaṇa does not create the Self; it only removes ignorance regarding the Self.
Let us then take the meaning of siddhi to be ‘being known’. Here a distinction must be made between two kinds of knowledge. One is knowledge principle, i.e., Consciousness, the very nature of the Self. The other is mental cognition (vritti-jnana). The Self, being Consciousness, is self-evident and does not require any pramaṇa.
However, an ignorant person does not know the true nature of the Self. It is here that vṛtti-jnana is required, and for this a pramaṇa is necessary. Since the Self is not an object of perception or inference, the scriptures alone can remove ignorance and reveal the true nature of the Self as one’s real identity.
18.139–140
Another opponent argues that ‘being substantiated’ means that the agent, the object, and the act of knowing are clear and distinct. Sri Shankara replies that being clear and distinct should be to a conscious entity different from the triad. “A pot cannot be clear to a blind man who cannot see. If the agent, instrument and object of the act of knowledge are to be ‘clear’, there will have to be a seer beyond them to apprehend the fact (18.140).” [Translations by A J Alston]
The discussions on pramaṇa, which began with verse 123, concludes with verse 140.
18.141–151 are omitted as they pertain to the Buddhist theory of momentary consciousness and its refutation by Shankaracharya.
18.152–155
The Self is different from the non-Self. Whereas the Self is one, the non-Selves are many. Just as the perceiver is different from the objects perceived, such as colours, the knower, the Self, is different from the mental modifications. The Self is the witnessing consciousness that illumines the modifications, and they are thereby revealed, that is, cognized.
Is not illumination an act? If so, would it not mean that the Self undergoes change? It is clarified that this is a case of illumination without any change in the Self. The all-pervading Self pervades the mind. Because of its particular property, namely, subtlety, the mind and its modifications become sentient and are revealed. There is no action on the part of the Self. It is like the formation of the reflection of a face in a mirror without any action on the part of the face or by the mere presence of a lamp, the surrounding area is illumined.
18.156–158
Through the sense organs, the mind comes into contact with an object, pervades it, and assumes its form, just as the sun rays pervade and assume the form of an object. This gives rise to a modification (vṛtti) in the mind. The mind assumes the forms of different objects one after another. When a colour-vṛtti arises, there is no simultaneous formation of a sound-vṛtti. The vṛttis are pervaded by the Self and are thereby illumined or revealed.
Unlike the order and succession involved in the mind’s pervasion of objects, there is no order or succession in the pervasion by the Self, just as there is none in time and space. The illumination by the Self is continuous and without interruption.
18.159
When the teacher imparts the teaching, vṛttis arise in the student’s intellect and knowledge is gained.
“It is to the intellect and not to the Self, which is immutable, that the knowledge, ‘I am Brahman,’ belongs. Moreover, the Self is changeless because It has no other witness.”
— Upadesa Sahasri, translation by Swami Jagadananda
18.160–169
Shankaracharya revisits the question: To whom does liberation belong?
It cannot belong to the ego because, as the agent of action, it is affected by worldly affairs. Liberation apparently belongs to the Self (18.107–109). The opponent then asks: Why do people say, “I am happy” or “I am sad”?
Shankaracharya clarifies that pleasure and pain belong to the mind and body,but are attributed to the Self because of the erroneous identification of the Self with the mind and body. The Self has neither pleasure nor pain, for It is actionless and free from attributes. Just as touch and movement, which belong to the gross body, are falsely attributed to the Self, so too are mental pleasure and pain.
“One feels pain when one’s body gets burnt, cut or destroyed, because one identifies oneself with it. Otherwise, the Self, which is different from the body, is never pained. Owing to there being burns, etc., in one man, another is not pained. As I am not touched by anything and do not possess a body, I am never susceptible of being burnt. Pain arises from the wrong notion due to false identification with the body, just as the wrong notion of one being dead arises at the death of one’s son.”
— Upadesa Sahasri 18.163–164, translation by Swami Jagadananda
Wrong knowledge is negated by right knowledge, namely, the knowledge that one is pure consciousness, distinct from the mind and body. The erroneous notion, “I possess an earring, and one with it”, is removed by the understanding that the earring is merely a piece of gold having no intrinsic connection with the person. Similarly, the idea, “I am unhappy,” is falsified by the right knowledge, “I am the Self.”
It is relatively easy to negate the false notion, “I am the gross body,” compared with negating the false notion, “I am the mind.” Shankaracharya says that the notion, “I have mental pain,” should be negated by right knowledge in much the same way as the notions, “I have touch” and “I have movement,” which properly belong to the body. There is no experience of pain in deep sleep when the mind is at rest.
A question then arises: Why cannot wrong knowledge negate right knowledge? The answer is that, in that case, there would be only wrong knowledge, and nothing could ever be established as real. Moreover, even erroneous knowledge requires a real substratum.
Contd