Tag Archives: pramana

Upadesa Sahasri (Part 33)

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Part 32

18.97–98
In the waking and dream states, there are experiences respectively of the external world and the internal world. This proves the existence of consciousness in these two states. In deep sleep, however, there is blankness. From this, one inference could be that consciousness does not exist during deep sleep. Another inference is that consciousness does exist, but there is nothing to experience.
In such a situation, when reason and experience are inconclusive, Sruti is the pramaṇa. Sruti (Br. Up. 4.3.9) discriminates between Consciousness (pure consciousness), the knowing principle, and mental modifications, that is, experiences. Consciousness is self-luminous, which means that its illuminating power never ceases (Br. Up. 4.3.23). In deep sleep, there is apparently no experience because the mind is dormant and there are no mental modifications to be illumined. As a result, there is the experience of nothingness which proves the existence of Consciousness.

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Parokṣa and Aparokṣa

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Bridging the Gap from Intellectual Understanding to Immediate Realization

In the pursuit of Advaita Vedānta, a seeker often grapples with a frustrating sense of distance. We read the great declarations of the Upaniṣads, we follow the rigorous logic of Ādi Śaṅkara, and we may even become ‘intellectually convinced’ that reality is non-dual. Yet, despite this conviction, we often feel as though we are standing on the outside looking in. This gap is technically defined by the distinction between two types of knowledge: parokṣa (mediate or indirect) and aparokṣa (immediate or direct).

Unravelling these terms is not just a matter of semantics; it is a vital step in clearing the ‘minefield’ of modern spiritual confusion. As I have argued in my series Confusions in Advaita Vedānta, many seekers are led astray by the belief that scriptural knowledge is ‘merely intellectual’ and must be transformed into something else through mystical experience. By looking at the original definitions and Śaṅkara’s own commentaries, we find a much more empowering truth: for the qualified seeker, the right means of knowledge (pramāṇa) can trigger immediate realization without the need for a secondary ‘mystical’ event.

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Pramāṇa

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The Gateway to Valid Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta

In the spiritual journey of Advaita Vedānta, the ultimate goal is the permanent eradication of Self-ignorance (avidyā), which is replaced by the liberating realization of our true nature. However, this realization is not a mystical occurrence or a random event; it is the specific result of Self-knowledge. For the seeker, a fundamental question arises: how do we acquire this knowledge? To answer this, we must understand the technical concept of pramāṇa, the vital intellectual framework that distinguishes between what we think we know and what is actually true.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 4)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (concluded)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 3)

Based on Śaṅkarācārya’s statements, the PSA formulated a rigorous exposition of the continuation of prārabdha karma—and avidyā—in a jīvanmukta. Nelson (1996) documents the different arguments advanced: Vimuktātman, for example, advocates for the existence of a tangible remnant of avidyā in the jivanmukta (IS 1.9, p. 75).43 Sarvajñātman employs a range of metaphorical constructs to describe the remnant of moha (ignorance) post-gnosis: scent (gandha), shadow (cchāyā), residue, impression (saṁskāra), and so on, (SŚ 4.42).44 Citsukha delineates three forms of ignorance and argues that knowledge destroys only two forms—the third persists post-gnosis; otherwise, he argues, it would result in the immediate cessation of the body, and not admit the experience of jīvanmukti (TP, p. 394ff).45 Prakāśātman writes that the mukta “slips into dualistic awareness (dvaita-darśana)” in his participation in the world (PPV, p. 786).46 Building on Citsukha’s arguments, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī— and his commentator Brahmānanda Sarasvatī—declare videhamukti as “paramamukti,” hierarchically superior to jīvanmukti (AS, p. 892ff). We see here that the PSA’s (seemingly innocuous) endeavour to elucidate the persistence of prārabdha karma in the jīvanmukta compromises and undermines the very notion of mokṣa, here and now. This is akin to severing the very branch upon which one is perched.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 3)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 2)

VI. Adhyāropāpavāda According to the PSA

For the PSA, “Brahman can only be shown, not described” (Murthy 1959, p. 57), albeit in a circuitous, approximate manner (“adūraviprakarṣeṇa”).27 The crux of this position lies in the contention that although brahman eludes direct descriptive elucidation (abhidhā), it retains a semblance of apprehensibility through indirect means (lakṣaṇā). Vācaspati Miśra illustrates with an example: in order to explain gold, we point to gold ornaments—earrings, bracelets, etc—and explain it as the substance that assumes these various shapes; it is that which remains when the shapes no longer do. In a similar manner, the śruti “points to” the world-appearances to “show” brahman as that which assumes these various appearances; it is also what remains when the appearances no longer do (Bhāmati 1.1.4).

Accordingly, for the PSA, adhyāropāpavāda is one method to “show” brahman.28 Consider the stock example of Bhagavadgītā 13.14–15. In the verse 13.14, brahman is said to possess karmendriyas (hands, feet, etc.) and jñānendriyas (eyes, etc.). According to the PSA, this is an adhyāropa that is useful in drawing attention to the existence of brahman as that which permeates everything—including the human body and the sensory organs— and allows movement/perception to occur: ‘immanent’ brahman (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165). Ānandagiri writes, “The faculties of the body are a function of the consciousness that enlivens them; through them, the presence of brahman (as consciousness) can be recognized.”29 The śruti, thus, ‘points’ to brahman with the help of the attributes in accordance with the arundhati darśana nyāya. This is adhyāropa. In the verse immediately following this, brahman is said to be “without senses” and “devoid of qualities.” This is an apavāda that contradicts the preceding adhyāropa to point to brahman’s ‘transcendent’ nature (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165).30

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 2)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 1)

  1. Levels of Deliberated Attribution in the Prasthānatraya Texts

According to SSS, deliberated attribution occurs on three distinct levels in the texts of the prasthānatraya:16 words, sentences, and methodological procedures or prakriyās employed to articulate the inquiry.17 Each of these levels can be illustrated with examples. Consider the level of words. It is notable that most words themselves can be categorized as adhyāropas. Indeed, even a term as fundamental as ‘ātman’ is itself an adhyāropa. In the CUB 7.1.3, Śaṅkarācārya writes:

The term ‘ātman’ serves as a means of identifying it in contradistinction to the corporeal vehicle it inhabits. Moreover, the term is extended to convey the referent which persists after the repudiation of the body and other non-self entities as illusory. Finally, the word is used to reveal what is inexpressible by words.18

The term “ātman” is an adhyāropa; the aim of invoking the term is not its designation per se, but rather to draw attention to its distinctiveness from the nonself entities, to discriminate it from the nonself referents (body, mind, etc.). Loundo writes, “[Understanding it as an adhyāropa] prevents the reification of ātman and, concomitantly, of its negatum, in the process of distinguishing the former from the latter (body, etc.)” (Loundo 2015, p. 72). Similarly, the term “brahman,” derived from the verbal root “bṛḥ, expansion,” is an adhyāropa that seeks to invalidate the potential limitations associated with “ātman” (BUB 2.3.6). Most words of the prasthānatraya texts—including jīva, īśvara, jagat, avidyā, māyā, bandha, mokṣa, and so on—are adhyāropas.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda

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Over the next 5 – 6 weeks, I will be posting a paper on this topic by Manjushree Hegde. Martin drew my attention to this and initially contacted her. She forwarded the paper to me and, having read it, my comment was that “it is without doubt one of the most important/authoritative/well-reasoned/persuasive documents on Advaita that I have ever read”. She has kindly agreed for me to post it to the site.

Given the title, it will be no surprise that it is a support for the teaching of Swami Satchidanandendra, but to my mind it goes further than he did in explaining the traditional method for the teaching of Advaita and in criticizing post-Śaṅkara authors for their unjustified distortion of that teaching. (Or at least she brings it out much more clearly for me.) It is an academic paper but suffers much less than most as regards its readability. I would urge any serious seeker to read it if they want to understand the sometimes seemingly contradictory aspects of prasthāna traya and, occasionally, Śaṅkara himself.

ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS

Manjushree Hegde
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

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Eight Upanishads (Topic-wise) Part 2

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Part 1

Chapter 1 General Introduction

1-2 PramAna  VedAnta accepts six sources of knowledge called PramAna. Direct perception: Sense organs directly perceive and give information. Inference: It is an indirect knowledge of something not in the range of direct perception. There is knowledge of fire when smoke is seen. Presumption: Knowledge about something in the past by directly perceiving something different in the present. On seeing a wet street in the morning, there is knowledge of rain in the night. Comparison: It is knowledge of something derived by comparison. There is knowledge of a wild buffalo in the forest because it resembles the buffalo seen in the village. Non-cognition: Knowledge of the absence of something by non-cognition. Seeing a chair in a room gives the knowledge of the absence of an elephant in the room. Testimony: It is knowledge derived from written or spoken words. I read a Physics book Physics to get the knowledge of laws of motion.

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Fire Is Cold:

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The impossibility of ‘Fire being Cold’ is invoked by Shankara at least four times to my knowledge in his bhAShya-s on prasthana trayi. It is not seldom do I find that participants use those words of his in their discussions on Advaita fora on topics concerned with the pramANatva of shruti vAkya. However, either they misquote or partially quote Shankara to bolster their own arguments.

Hence, I propose to gather below the four instances where bhAShyakAra invokes the example of ‘Fire is cold’ and indicates the actual purpose, in his own words, when he cites it.

My general impression is that Shankara would never like to compromise on the ‘supremacy’ of the shruti being the highest pramANa even if its word sounds odd for us, the ajnAni-s. Its word is unquestionably supreme when it reveals something apUrva, not known before, that is something not experienced; maybe the exception being in purely loukika issues within empirical transactions (i.e. “matters lying within the range of pratyaksha” –  प्रत्यक्षादिविषये ).

In short, as he says at 3.3.1, BUB, “The authority of the Vedas being inviolable, a Vedic passage must be taken exactly in the sense that it is tested to bear, and NOT according to the ingenuity of the human mind.”
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Q.475 Witness-Consciousness

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Q: Can you help me to clear the following doubts?

  1. What part of the body is referred to as the mind?
  2. Why cannot the witness consciousness be a 5th part of the mind, Ego (changing subject), Emotion, Reasoning, Memory and the witness (unchanging subject)? In other words why cant the witness Atman be limited?
  3. Why cannot there be multiple witness consciousness or multiple Atman’s.
  4. Can each Mithya have different Satyam? To me it is quite a big jump to say Satyam of everything is one and the same. I can get that everything can be reduced to atoms and particles but beyond that it is difficult to conclude that there is one Satyam?

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