Over the next 5 – 6 weeks, I will be posting a paper on this topic by Manjushree Hegde. Martin drew my attention to this and initially contacted her. She forwarded the paper to me and, having read it, my comment was that “it is without doubt one of the most important/authoritative/well-reasoned/persuasive documents on Advaita that I have ever read”. She has kindly agreed for me to post it to the site.
Given the title, it will be no surprise that it is a support for the teaching of Swami Satchidanandendra, but to my mind it goes further than he did in explaining the traditional method for the teaching of Advaita and in criticizing post-Śaṅkara authors for their unjustified distortion of that teaching. (Or at least she brings it out much more clearly for me.) It is an academic paper but suffers much less than most as regards its readability. I would urge any serious seeker to read it if they want to understand the sometimes seemingly contradictory aspects of prasthāna traya and, occasionally, Śaṅkara himself.
ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS

Manjushree Hegde
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras
I. Introduction
That śruti (Upaniṣads) is the instrument/means (pramāṇa) to know brahman is well established.1 Its function as a pramāṇa lies not in the communication of an unknown/unattained entity; it lies in the elimination of the wrong ideas about the ever attained, immediately intuited—yet, misconstrued—brahman (Rambachan 1991, p. 39ff). Like an archaeologist sifting through dust—slowly, carefully, and deliberately eliminating extraneous material to uncover the artefact underneath—the task of śruti is negative: not on account of the inadequacy of words to positively describe brahman but on account of the nature of the problem that necessitates it. The nuance is significant.
Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī (SSS), a prolific scholar monk of the twentieth century, argues that the śruti, in order to conform to this uniquely negative task, employs—invariably and unfailingly—an unprecedented pedagogical method called adhyāropāpavāda. Adhyāropāpavāda is a strategy that consists of two complementary operations: (1) adhyāropa and (2) apavāda. Adhyāropa is to impute—temporarily, deliberately, and strategically—attributes to the attribute-less brahman. The deliberated (but false) attributes serve to counter certain specific undeliberated (and erroneous) ideas about brahman. Apavāda is to rescind the deliberated attributions to avoid their ultimate reification. According to SSS, the two work together to form a singular pedagogical method to eliminate erroneous conceptualizations about brahman. Their culmination lies in the ‘light bulb moment’ of the cognition/realization of brahman as one’s own self.
In contradistinction to SSS, the commentarial tradition of Advaita Vedānta—the post-Śaṅkarādvaitins (PSA)2—argue that the śruti employs a variety of oblique methods—including adhyāropāpavāda, lakṣaṇā, and netivāda—to somehow (kathaṃcit) ‘indicate’ brahman. Ultimately, it is the mahāvākyas—the ‘great’ Vedāntic statements—that generate an impartite modal knowledge (akhaṇḍākāravṛttijñāna) which obliterates ignorance and engenders the direct perception of brahman. This, per the PSA, is how śruti dispels ignorance.
While SSS and the PSA concur that the task of śruti is to eradicate ignorance—not elucidate brahman—a fundamental distinction in their exegeses lies in their discordant understandings of how śruti “accomplishes the accomplished” (Rambachan 1991). For SSS, adhyāropāpavāda is the sole method to refute ignorance;3 for the PSA, on the other hand, it is one of the methods to “lead” attention to the existence of brahman; it does not directly refute/ negate ignorance.4
The ramifications of this difference are profound. When a śruti-vākya is construed as an adhyāropa, the focus shifts from the (explicit) content of the statement to the erroneous ideas annulled through its articulation. Because the adhyāropa itself stands negated in due course, the method forestalls the potential reification of the constructs. If, on the other hand, a śruti-vākya is not construed as an adhyāropa, then its primary connotation assumes a “positive” assertion of the constructs—temporary or otherwise. This leads to two problematic repercussions: (a) it fosters the reification of the constructs and (b) it contradicts the premise on which the validity of śruti, as a pramāṇa, stands: negation (nivartakatva). In the words of Comans (2000, p. 257), “[it] is not just a theoretical exercise; it is important because of its soteriological consequences.”
SSS denounces the PSA—with the sole exception of Sureśvarācārya—for not recognizing adhyāropāpavāda as the chief pedagogical method of Advaita Vedānta. According to SSS, the failure to correctly understand the method has led to the reification of concepts like avidyā (ignorance); this, in turn, has undermined the central tenets of Advaita Vedānta. While avidyā—its nature, locus, etc—has engendered considerable discussions in academia,5 the method of adhyāropāpavāda itself has not been subject to critical examination.6 The pedagogic method, therefore, warrants scrutiny.
II. Śruti Pramāṇa: A Negative Function
Pramāṇa is the specific cause of a veridical cognition. Of the six pramāṇas, śabda/śruti is employed in Advaita Vedānta. Śaṅkarācārya declares in unequivocal terms and in innumerable instances that brahman cannot be known without the aid of śruti. For example, he writes, “It is inconceivable to (even) conjecture about brahman without the aid of the āgama [śruti]” (BSB 2.1.11);7 “That brahman—which is omniscient, omnipotent, the origin of the world and the cause of permanence and destruction [of it]—is known only through the Veda” (BSB 1.1.4),8 and so on. Elsewhere, however, it is asserted that the ātman cannot be known/established through instruments of knowledge because (1) it cannot be objectified, and (2) it is prior to and outside their realm: it is only after the ātman stands—under the sway of avidyā—as an embodied knower (pramātṛ) that the pramāṇas come into play. Furthermore, it is also avowed that it is unnecessary to know/establish the ātman through pramāṇas because it is self-evident (svataḥ siddhaḥ): it is already known intimately to each of us as our own self.9
These statements beget a question: how does śruti aid the realization of the ātman/brahman? Does it describe/define brahman like it does “dharma” and “svarga” (deemed incomprehensible without śruti)? Does it inform us of its existence, and its identity with ātman? An answer to this is found in Śaṅkarācārya’s commentary on the Bhagavadgītā 2.18. In this section of the text, ātman is described as “aprameya.” “Aprameya,” literally, is “that which cannot be known/established by instruments of knowledge [like perception, etc.].” To an objection raised by the hypothetical opponent (pūrvapakṣin) that ātman cannot be termed “aprameya” because it is, indeed, known by śruti (if not perception, etc.), Śaṅkarācārya writes,
No … śruti is called the ‘ultimate pramāṇa’ (antyaṃ pramāṇam) for ātman not because it makes known an unknown entity; rather, because it clears (away) the erroneous ideas about ātman (and then itself becomes dispensable). [Therefore, it is not incorrect to term ātman as ‘aprameya’].10
In no unclear terms, Śaṅkarācārya delineates the function of śruti as negative: it does not/cannot directly or positively communicate the ātman. The problem is not to know the ātman; it is to expunge the wrong ideas that we entertain about it. Therefore, the validity of śruti as a pramāṇa lies exclusively in its negation of the false understandings about ātman/brahman.11
- Adhyāropāpavāda According to SSS
According to SSS, the śruti exclusively employs the method of adhyāropāpavāda to dispel ignorance. Adhyāropāpavāda consists of two complementary procedures: (1) adhyāropa and (2) apavāda. The word “adhyāropa” is often used in the commentarial tradition of Advaita Vedānta as a synonym for “adhyāsa,” succinctly defined by Śaṅkarācārya as atasmin tadbuddhiḥ: to (erroneously) grasp non-x as x (and vice versa).12 However, the word “adhyāropa” of the compound “adhyāropāpavāda” is different; in this context, it is to ascribe—temporarily and strategically—false attributes to the ātman/brahman. The false—yet, mediated—attributes counter certain specific unexamined (“natural”) ideas that we entertain about the ātman/ brahman. Adhyāropa is thus (1) inherent (naisargika) or (2) intentional (śāstrakṛta).13 Intentional/deliberated adhyāropas consent, albeit temporarily, to certain natural/unexamined imputations. By provisionally acquiescing to certain instinctive impositions, they seek to invalidate other instinctive impositions that are incompatible with them (Saraswati 1964, Ⅲ.21, p. 29). Apavāda is to (subsequently) contradict the deliberated false attributions to deny them ultimate validity.
According to SSS, each sentence of the Upaniṣads is either an adhyāropa or an apavāda;14 it negates either a natural attribution or a deliberated one. Loundo writes: “The method of adhyāropa-apavāda constitutes a kind of linguistic game where each and every sentence of the Upaniṣads is epistemologically relevant, not on account of what it intrinsically refers to, but on account of what it implicitly negates” (Loundo 2015, p. 74).15
*** Go to Part 2 ***