Tag Archives: ignorance

Traditional versus Neo-Advaita (Part 3)

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*** Read Part 2 *** *** Go to Part 1 ***

Advaita refers to the unchanging reality by the Sanskrit term paramārtha and to the constantly changing appearance by vyavahāra. Within this phenomenal realm, separate individuals and objects are recognized and a creator-god, Īśvara, uses the power of māyā to obscure the truth and project the apparent world. It thus affirms that our experience does not tally with its non-dual claims. It acknowledges an appearance of duality, which is at odds with the reality. It also states that we can never directly know the reality. Accordingly, its effective teaching strategy is to successively negate the appearance. That which ‘remains’ and cannot be negated must be the reality. Once the reality is thus effectively (but not literally) known, then it is also realized that the appearance, too, is that same reality.

This process inevitably takes time, from the vantage point of the seeker who is still mired at the level of appearance. The ignorance that prevents the immediate apprehension of reality is effectively in the mind and it is at the level of the mind that this ignorance must be removed. Knowledge must be introduced in such a way that the mind can accept it, using reason and experience. Just as a student is unable to appreciate the subtleties of quantum physics without having the preliminary grounding in mathematics and science, so the seeker is unable to assimilate the ‘bottom-line’ truth of Advaita since it is so contrary to his everyday experience.

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Traditional versus Neo-Advaita (Part 2)

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There are also two significant dangers regarding the Neo-Advaita ‘movement’. Firstly, there is the clear possibility of charlatans who, having read a little or heard the fundamental elements of ‘descriptions’ of reality, can devise a few ‘routines’ of their own and then advertise themselves on the circuit. Providing that they are good speakers/actors, it is certainly possible to make a living from deceiving ‘seekers’ in such a way, without ever giving away their true lack of knowledge or the fact that they are no nearer any ‘realization’ than their disciples.

Secondly, seekers themselves may be deluded into a belief that some specious realization has been obtained when, in fact, all that has happened is that they have come to terms with some psychological problem that had been making life difficult. The ending of such suffering could well be seen as a ‘liberation’. Of course, such a thing would not be at all bad – it simply would have nothing to do with enlightenment. Indeed, such people might well go on to become teachers in their own right, not charlatans in the true sense of the word, since they genuinely believe that ‘realization’ has taken place.

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Dṛṣṭi- sṛṣṭi-vāda

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There has just been a brief discussion on the Advaitin List under the heading of ‘Quotes from samkshepa shaareeraka’. This was effectively on the perceived consequences of accepting the theory of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda – the creation theory that claims that the world is the mental imagination of the jīva; a theory equating to the Western belief of solipsism. Sri ‘Sudhanshu Shekhar’ made the original post and Sri ‘Bhaskar YR’ represented the objections (with which I agree). Rather than joining in, I thought I would ask ChatGPT for an ‘opinion’ and its response seems to me to be very reasonable. (I even find myself more disposed to DSV than I was before!) Here is the exchange:

Q: How do Advaita believers in dṛṣṭi- sṛṣṭi-vāda explain how they can discuss the topic with other believers and non-believers?

A: In Advaita Vedānta, particularly within the framework of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda (the doctrine that perception precedes creation), explaining and discussing the philosophy with others presents an interesting challenge. Since dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda asserts that the world arises in accordance with the perceiver’s experience, the question arises: how can multiple individuals engage in a discussion if each person’s world is subjectively projected?

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Being: the bottom line (Conclusion)

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(Read Part 1)

Another misleading claim is that “there’s no one bound and therefore no liberation from bondage.” This sounds very clever and obvious and is very likely to be accepted without question by the listener, adding still more to the ammunition against the traditional Advaitin position. But everything should be questioned! Advaita is a supremely logical and scientific philosophy if followed correctly and glib statements such as the above must be looked at carefully. (And it is acknowledged that ‘glib’ here is a ‘loaded epithet’!) Traditional Advaita does not, in fact, claim that there can be liberation from bondage. In fact, it is stated openly that there is not actually anyone bound. What is said is that there can be the realisation that there is no one who is bound – and that is liberation.

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Being: the bottom line

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Since I am busy writing my next book (for a change), I have been looking through the past 25 years of written essays and reviews, looking for material that is not currently available anywhere. And there does seem likely to be quite a bit. So I will be (re-)publishing some of this over the next few months. The first of these is a two-part (quite long!) review of the book by Nathan Gill (who sadly died some years ago), I wrote the review back in 2006 but it is still relevant – possibly more so.

A Review of the book “Being: the bottom line” by Nathan Gill and a critique of Neo-Advaita.

This is a courageous book in that it openly tackles some of the most difficult questions that neo-Advaita has to answer and it doesn’t shy away from those that are phrased in the most challenging ways. It is also a dangerous book, in that it appears, superficially, to be providing satisfactory answers. Nevertheless it is a valuable book, albeit not perhaps for the reasons the author intended, in that there are some very searching questions and Nathan’s attempts to answer them expose the vulnerability of the neo-Advaitin position.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 3)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 2)

VI. Adhyāropāpavāda According to the PSA

For the PSA, “Brahman can only be shown, not described” (Murthy 1959, p. 57), albeit in a circuitous, approximate manner (“adūraviprakarṣeṇa”).27 The crux of this position lies in the contention that although brahman eludes direct descriptive elucidation (abhidhā), it retains a semblance of apprehensibility through indirect means (lakṣaṇā). Vācaspati Miśra illustrates with an example: in order to explain gold, we point to gold ornaments—earrings, bracelets, etc—and explain it as the substance that assumes these various shapes; it is that which remains when the shapes no longer do. In a similar manner, the śruti “points to” the world-appearances to “show” brahman as that which assumes these various appearances; it is also what remains when the appearances no longer do (Bhāmati 1.1.4).

Accordingly, for the PSA, adhyāropāpavāda is one method to “show” brahman.28 Consider the stock example of Bhagavadgītā 13.14–15. In the verse 13.14, brahman is said to possess karmendriyas (hands, feet, etc.) and jñānendriyas (eyes, etc.). According to the PSA, this is an adhyāropa that is useful in drawing attention to the existence of brahman as that which permeates everything—including the human body and the sensory organs— and allows movement/perception to occur: ‘immanent’ brahman (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165). Ānandagiri writes, “The faculties of the body are a function of the consciousness that enlivens them; through them, the presence of brahman (as consciousness) can be recognized.”29 The śruti, thus, ‘points’ to brahman with the help of the attributes in accordance with the arundhati darśana nyāya. This is adhyāropa. In the verse immediately following this, brahman is said to be “without senses” and “devoid of qualities.” This is an apavāda that contradicts the preceding adhyāropa to point to brahman’s ‘transcendent’ nature (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165).30

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 2)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 1)

  1. Levels of Deliberated Attribution in the Prasthānatraya Texts

According to SSS, deliberated attribution occurs on three distinct levels in the texts of the prasthānatraya:16 words, sentences, and methodological procedures or prakriyās employed to articulate the inquiry.17 Each of these levels can be illustrated with examples. Consider the level of words. It is notable that most words themselves can be categorized as adhyāropas. Indeed, even a term as fundamental as ‘ātman’ is itself an adhyāropa. In the CUB 7.1.3, Śaṅkarācārya writes:

The term ‘ātman’ serves as a means of identifying it in contradistinction to the corporeal vehicle it inhabits. Moreover, the term is extended to convey the referent which persists after the repudiation of the body and other non-self entities as illusory. Finally, the word is used to reveal what is inexpressible by words.18

The term “ātman” is an adhyāropa; the aim of invoking the term is not its designation per se, but rather to draw attention to its distinctiveness from the nonself entities, to discriminate it from the nonself referents (body, mind, etc.). Loundo writes, “[Understanding it as an adhyāropa] prevents the reification of ātman and, concomitantly, of its negatum, in the process of distinguishing the former from the latter (body, etc.)” (Loundo 2015, p. 72). Similarly, the term “brahman,” derived from the verbal root “bṛḥ, expansion,” is an adhyāropa that seeks to invalidate the potential limitations associated with “ātman” (BUB 2.3.6). Most words of the prasthānatraya texts—including jīva, īśvara, jagat, avidyā, māyā, bandha, mokṣa, and so on—are adhyāropas.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda

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Over the next 5 – 6 weeks, I will be posting a paper on this topic by Manjushree Hegde. Martin drew my attention to this and initially contacted her. She forwarded the paper to me and, having read it, my comment was that “it is without doubt one of the most important/authoritative/well-reasoned/persuasive documents on Advaita that I have ever read”. She has kindly agreed for me to post it to the site.

Given the title, it will be no surprise that it is a support for the teaching of Swami Satchidanandendra, but to my mind it goes further than he did in explaining the traditional method for the teaching of Advaita and in criticizing post-Śaṅkara authors for their unjustified distortion of that teaching. (Or at least she brings it out much more clearly for me.) It is an academic paper but suffers much less than most as regards its readability. I would urge any serious seeker to read it if they want to understand the sometimes seemingly contradictory aspects of prasthāna traya and, occasionally, Śaṅkara himself.

ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS

Manjushree Hegde
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

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Pratiyogin

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In connection with my recent series of posts on the topic of whether ignorance is a separately existent entity or simply means ‘absence of knowledge’ (https://www.advaita-vision.org/ignorance-or-absence-of-knowledge/), I am posting the result of my further discussions with ChatGPT on the related topic of ‘pratiyogin’.

You may well never have heard the word before and my view is that this should not overly concern you! It probably means that you have never (attempted to) read anything written by Madhusūdana. The text for which he is probably best known is Advaita Siddhi, which I have mentioned in the Confusions books as being virtually incomprehensible. I recently purchased his commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā (called Gūḍhārtha Dīpikā) because he translates every word prior to his comments. And I was dismayed to find, as early as his commentary on 2.16, the opening:

The asat, unreal is that which is delimited by time (kāla), space (deśa) and matter (vastu); as for instance a pot, which is subject to origin and destruction, is delimited by the (two) times, the before and the after (of its period of existence), it (pot) being a counter-correlative of its antecedent nonexistence (prāgabhāva) and nonexistence after destruction (dhvaṃsābhāva). And so on…

At least Swami Gambhirananda has the grace to translate this translation:

That is to say, the pot does not exist before production and after destruction.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 7 (Final)

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*** Go to Part 6 ***

The following question is concerned with the notion that ‘absence of a thing’ is an existent entity (another strange notion of post-Śaṅkara texts). This also formed an aspect of the discussions on the Advaitin List. It begins with my asking ChatGPT to translate the Devanagari text that formed part of the post by Sudhanshu on 6th Dec. 2024.

Dennis: Could you translate this argument into understandable English, please:

चतुर्विधानामभावानाम् , घटस्येतरेतराभावो घटादन्यो ष्टः — यथा घटाभावः पटादिरेव, न घटस्वरूपमेव । न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् ।

AI: Here’s a simplified translation of the argument in understandable English:

We are discussing four types of “absence” (*abhāva*), starting with **mutual absence** (*itaretara-abhāva*). For example, the absence of a pot (*ghata*) is not the same as the pot itself. The absence of a pot is something else entirely, like a cloth (*paṭa*) or another object. In other words, the absence of the pot is not the nature of the pot itself—it is identified with something else, like the presence of the cloth.

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