*** Go to Part 2 ***
Dennis: You say that treating ignorance as a term of convenience for lack of knowledge “may not fully capture the nuances of traditional Advaita”. Did Śaṅkara make a clear distinction?
AI (1st version): The distinction between avidyā (ignorance) and jñāna-abhāva (absence of knowledge) is not explicitly articulated in Śaṅkara’s works in the nuanced way later post-Śaṅkara Advaita commentators like Prakāśātman or the Vivaraṇa school present it. Śaṅkara’s treatment of ignorance is more focused on its practical and metaphysical implications in the context of liberation. Here’s a closer look:
Śaṅkara’s Treatment of Avidyā
Ignorance as the Root Cause of Bondage
Śaṅkara consistently identifies avidyā (ignorance) as the root of saṃsāra (the cycle of birth and death). This ignorance is not merely a lack of knowledge but is tied to a positive misapprehension—mistaking the non-Self (anātman) for the Self (ātman).
For example, in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra (1.1.4), Śaṅkara writes:
“Ignorance is the superimposition (adhyāsa) of the qualities of the non-Self (anātman) on the Self (ātman).”
Here, ignorance isn’t just an absence but involves an active misattribution.
Is Ignorance Ontological?
Śaṅkara does not treat avidyā as absolutely real (sat) or absolutely unreal (asat). It is mithyā, meaning it exists only as long as it is experienced, much like a dream.
For Śaṅkara, ignorance does not have an independent existence. It is sublated (negated) by knowledge, just as darkness is dispelled by light. This is more a functional (prakriya) treatment than an ontological assertion.
Śaṅkara’s Focus: Practical Over Technical
Śaṅkara’s writings are primarily aimed at guiding seekers to liberation. He is less concerned with differentiating jñāna-abhāva (absence of knowledge) from avidyā and more concerned with showing how Brahman is realized by removing ignorance through self-inquiry and śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana (listening, reflection, meditation).
Post-Śaṅkara Distinctions
Emergence of Epistemological Refinements
Later Advaita schools, especially the Vivaraṇa tradition, developed more nuanced distinctions between ajñāna and jñāna-abhāva. This was partly due to their engagement with rival schools like Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, which demanded finer logical clarity.
The distinction hinges on how avidyā is seen as an experiential problem (directly felt by the sākṣī) versus jñāna-abhāva, which is understood through inference or reasoning.
Śaṅkara’s Silence on the Distinction
There is no evidence in Śaṅkara’s major works—commentaries on the Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā, or Brahma Sūtra—that he explicitly differentiates these two terms. His use of avidyā seems closer to a broader, practical understanding of ignorance as a condition to be removed, rather than a finely categorized epistemological concept.
Is This Post-Śaṅkara Development Inconsistent with Śaṅkara?
Not necessarily. The post-Śaṅkara elaborations aim to clarify and systematize points that Śaṅkara implied but did not explicitly analyze in detail. For example:
Śaṅkara assumes the experiential reality of ignorance in misapprehension, which aligns with ajñāna as sākṣī-bhāsya (directly experienced ignorance).
His acknowledgment of the role of inference and reasoning in understanding knowledge’s absence aligns with jñāna-abhāva as parokṣa.
Summary
- Did Śaṅkara make the distinction?
No, Śaṅkara does not explicitly distinguish between ajñāna (ignorance) and jñāna-abhāva (absence of knowledge). His focus is practical—on ignorance as the root of misapprehension and suffering.
- Is the distinction consistent with Śaṅkara’s teachings?
Yes, the distinction made by post-Śaṅkara Advaitins is consistent with Śaṅkara’s framework but represents a later epistemological refinement responding to logical challenges from other schools.
- What does Śaṅkara emphasize?
Ignorance is the cause of superimposition (adhyāsa), and its removal through direct self-knowledge leads to liberation. He does not delve into technical subdivisions like later commentators do.
*** This point will be challenged later ***
In conclusion, your view—that ignorance could be seen as a simple “lack of knowledge”—is not alien to Śaṅkara’s Advaita but reflects a streamlined, seeker-oriented approach that avoids post-Śaṅkara complexities.
AI (2nd version): Yes, Śaṅkara himself does make a distinction between avidyā (ignorance) and the mere absence of knowledge (jñāna-abhāva), and it plays a foundational role in his philosophy. However, the way he articulates this distinction might be less elaborate or systematized compared to later Advaita thinkers like Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, and Vācaspati Miśra, who expanded on his ideas.
Śaṅkara’s Understanding of Avidyā
Śaṅkara’s writings indicate that avidyā is more than a simple “lack of knowledge.” It has a functional role in the superimposition (adhyāsa) process, which he considers the root cause of bondage. Here are some key points:
Avidyā as Adhyāsa (Superimposition):
In his introduction to the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, Śaṅkara defines adhyāsa as the mistaken superimposition of the non-Self (anātman) onto the Self (ātman). This superimposition occurs due to avidyā.
Avidyā here is not a passive absence of knowledge but an active misapprehension—e.g., mistaking the body or mind for the Self.
Avidyā is Experiential:
Śaṅkara often describes avidyā as an apparent but experientially real phenomenon (mithyā). It is not a total absence of knowledge but a mix of partial knowledge and error. For instance, in the rope-snake analogy:
The rope is misapprehended as a snake due to a lack of correct perception, combined with a mistaken projection.
Similarly, ignorance of the Self involves both a lack of direct realization and an erroneous identification with the non-Self.
Avidyā and Jñāna-Abhāva:
Śaṅkara distinguishes between jñāna-abhāva (the simple absence of knowledge) and avidyā, which is not merely absence but includes a superimposed error.
Example: “Not knowing a pot exists” (jñāna-abhāva) is different from “mistaking the pot for something else” (avidyā). Avidyā is more than absence—it involves an active misapprehension.
Post-Śaṅkara Developments
Later Advaitins elaborated on Śaṅkara’s ideas to address subtle epistemological questions:
Padmapāda (Vivaraṇa School):
He emphasized the role of avidyā as having two aspects: āvaraṇa (veiling of the Self) and vikṣepa (projecting the non-Self). This dual function distinguishes avidyā from mere absence of knowledge.
Vācaspati Miśra (Bhāmatī School):
Vācaspati introduced nuanced discussions on whether ignorance is a positive entity (bhāva-rūpa) or merely a negation (abhāva-rūpa). While Śaṅkara’s view tends toward negation, later debates made this explicit.
Post-Śaṅkara Tensions:
Later Advaitins sometimes over-systematized Śaṅkara’s ideas, leading to interpretations that may seem more intricate than necessary. Your skepticism about whether these distinctions are overstatements applies more to these later developments.
Did Śaṅkara Require the Distinction?
Yes, Śaṅkara required this distinction because:
Avidyā is the Root Cause of Bondage:
For Śaṅkara, liberation (mokṣa) comes not just from introducing knowledge (as a gap-filler) but from actively dispelling the error caused by ignorance. This makes avidyā more significant than a simple lack of teaching.
Direct Experience of Ignorance:
Śaṅkara’s approach often emphasizes that avidyā is an aparokṣa viṣaya—something experientially apparent in our mistaken identification with the body-mind. A mere “lack of knowledge” does not explain why we actively identify with limitations.
Scriptural Authority:
Śaṅkara aligns this distinction with scriptural passages that address ignorance as something to be removed (e.g., “avidyā is destroyed by jñāna”).
Your Simplification vs. Śaṅkara’s View
While your view—that ignorance is simply a lack of knowledge—is clear and practical, Śaṅkara’s distinction serves a specific purpose:
- To explain why knowledge of Advaita is transformative (it doesn’t just add knowledge but removes an error).
- To highlight the experiential reality of bondage, which is more than a passive lack; it feels real and must be addressed through inquiry.
If we reduce avidyā to a simple “lack of teaching,” Śaṅkara might argue that this misses the active, felt nature of the problem, which requires more than intellectual instruction—it demands a deep internal realization.
*** Go to Part 4 ***