In connection with my recent series of posts on the topic of whether ignorance is a separately existent entity or simply means ‘absence of knowledge’ (https://www.advaita-vision.org/ignorance-or-absence-of-knowledge/), I am posting the result of my further discussions with ChatGPT on the related topic of ‘pratiyogin’.
You may well never have heard the word before and my view is that this should not overly concern you! It probably means that you have never (attempted to) read anything written by Madhusūdana. The text for which he is probably best known is Advaita Siddhi, which I have mentioned in the Confusions books as being virtually incomprehensible. I recently purchased his commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā (called Gūḍhārtha Dīpikā) because he translates every word prior to his comments. And I was dismayed to find, as early as his commentary on 2.16, the opening:
The asat, unreal is that which is delimited by time (kāla), space (deśa) and matter (vastu); as for instance a pot, which is subject to origin and destruction, is delimited by the (two) times, the before and the after (of its period of existence), it (pot) being a counter-correlative of its antecedent nonexistence (prāgabhāva) and nonexistence after destruction (dhvaṃsābhāva). And so on…
At least Swami Gambhirananda has the grace to translate this translation:
That is to say, the pot does not exist before production and after destruction.
As I pointed out in the series, the topic of ignorance has been much in evidence on the Advaitin List for the past two months, and I happen to be writing about it (again) in my current book ‘Mining for the Truth’, which aims to look at the many ways that modern teachers misrepresent the teaching of Advaita. Accordingly, I thought I would look (a little) into the meaning and use of this word ‘pratiyogin’ – ‘counter-correlative’.
I asked a number of questions of ChatGPT, prompting it into the directions and purpose in which I was interested. Here is the essence of my aim, which I formulated after our initial discussions:
My aim is to show that the term and concept only became popular with post-Shankara writers who were trying to counter criticism from other philosophies. My contention is that Shankara himself was perfectly able to present the teaching without such unnecessary and irrelevant complication. So a reliable conclusion that Shankara did not use such ideas or the word itself would be good.
Chat GPT offered to ‘formulate the arguments into a structured project’. This sounded good so I readily accepted. Here is the result [note that I have added occasional comments in square brackets]:
The Absence of the Term and Concept of ‘Pratiyogin’ in Śaṅkara’s Works: A Structured Analysis
Introduction
The term pratiyogin (counter-correlate) plays a significant role in post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta and Indian philosophy in general, particularly in discussions involving absence (abhāva) and negation. However, a close analysis of Śaṅkara’s original works—his commentaries on the Prasthāna Traya (the Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā, and Brahma Sūtras)—reveals no explicit usage of this term. This observation underscores Śaṅkara’s ability to present Advaita Vedānta without resorting to the technicalities introduced by later writers to address critiques from rival schools. [Śaṅkara does in fact explicitly criticize other philosophies in many places, e.g. Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya and Māṇḍūkya Kārikā Bhāṣya.]
This document explores:
The meaning and philosophical relevance of pratiyogin.
The absence of the term in Śaṅkara’s writings.
The effectiveness of Śaṅkara’s teaching without the term.
The reasons for its later adoption by post-Śaṅkara Advaitins.
1. The Concept of ‘Pratiyogin’
The term pratiyogin refers to the counter-correlate in a relationship of negation or absence. It is primarily used in Indian logic (Nyāya) and later Advaita Vedānta [especially the writing of Madhusūdana] to:
Specify the object whose absence is being discussed.
Clarify logical distinctions between types of absence (abhāva), such as:
Prāgabhāva (prior non-existence): The absence of a pot before it is created.
Pradhvaṁsābhāva (posterior non-existence): The absence of a pot after it is destroyed.
Anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence): The pot is not the cloth.
Ātyantikābhāva (absolute non-existence): A rabbit’s horn, which has never existed.
In Advaita Vedānta, pratiyogin is often employed to address the nature of ignorance (avidyā) and illusion (mithyā), particularly in responses to rival schools like Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā.
2. The Absence of ‘Pratiyogin’ in Śaṅkara’s Works
A careful review of Śaṅkara’s principal texts reveals no explicit use of pratiyogin. The following points support this conclusion:
a. Key Texts Reviewed
Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya: Discussions of avidyā and mithyā (e.g., 2.1.9, 2.1.14, 2.1.16) do not use the term, even in contexts where absence or negation is central.
Upaniṣad Bhāṣya-s: In works such as the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara employs examples like the rope-snake analogy to illustrate illusion and ignorance without invoking pratiyogin.
Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya: The commentary emphasizes the non-dual Self and the unreality of the world without needing the technical framework of pratiyogin.
b. Śaṅkara’s Approach to Absence and Negation
Śaṅkara relies on intuitive and experiential examples to convey concepts of absence and illusion, such as:
The rope-snake analogy: The illusory snake vanishes when the underlying rope is known.
The mirage: Water appears but is ultimately unreal.
These examples effectively communicate the nature of avidyā and mithyā without requiring a term like pratiyogin to designate the counter-correlate.
3. The Effectiveness of Śaṅkara’s Teaching Without ‘Pratiyogin’
Śaṅkara’s expositions are characterized by clarity and simplicity, avoiding the unnecessary technicalities found in later Advaita writings. His method prioritizes:
Direct Realization: The goal is Self-knowledge, not intellectual categorization.
Illustrative Analogies: Real-world examples (e.g., rope-snake, mirage) are sufficient to explain ignorance and its removal.
Focus on Experience: Śaṅkara emphasizes that ignorance (avidyā) is removed through direct realization of the Self, making additional logical constructs redundant.
[This point is major. The whole purpose of the teaching is to persuade the seeker that ‘sarvam khalvidam brahma’ and ‘aham brahmāsmi’. Introducing the complexities of Nyāya logic diverts, complicates and confuses probably most seekers, excluding only the academic, who give their attention instead to matters that are really quite unnecessary.]
4. The Adoption of ‘Pratiyogin’ by Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins
Later Advaita philosophers such as Vidyāraṇya and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī adopted pratiyogin to:
Engage Rival Schools: Respond to Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, and other traditions on their own terms.
Defend Advaita: Provide logical rigor to defend concepts like avidyā and mithyā against critiques.
Expand the System: Develop a more technical vocabulary for Advaita Vedānta, accommodating detailed philosophical debates.
While this approach was useful for debate, it introduced a level of complexity that was absent in Śaṅkara’s original works.
Conclusion
The absence of the term pratiyogin in Śaṅkara’s works underscores his ability to present Advaita Vedānta without reliance on later technicalities. His teaching, rooted in direct realization and practical analogies, demonstrates that the term and its associated framework are unnecessary for understanding the core principles of non-duality. This simplicity is a hallmark of Śaṅkara’s brilliance and remains one of the reasons for the enduring appeal of his works.
Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins adopted pratiyogin to address critiques and engage in inter-school debates, but this added complexity arguably detracts from the experiential clarity emphasized by Śaṅkara. Thus, the contention that Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta is free from such unnecessary complications is well-founded.
AUM and Pranam Dennis, Chatgpt does not have access to primary Vedanta texts. Instead, it references open source, mostly secondary references. That a severe limitation.
I posted the following 2 comments on pratiyogi in response to Sudhanshu Shekarji,. fyi:
//The notion of absence as also the notion of presence are themselves superimpositions of Conscious Awareness which Itself is wholly free of presence and/or absence. So how does pratiyogi even apply? Sruti and Bhasyakara’s teaching is that Deep Sleep is not merely the absence of manifestation but the unalloyed Presence of Self. It is absence of objects from the waking state perspective only but in truth, from its own perspective, there is only nondual Self. //
//Alston offers two footnotes in SSSS’s Heart of Sri Samkara. The first depicts pratiyogin as confined to co-relation of objects but not to knowledge of the Self which stands Unrelated yet Self-Evident, and Always Present, thus known now by everyone but not recognized. Thus, the Self is the pratiyogi for its own ‘apparent’ absence. Simple.and astutely supported by Hegel’s reasoning in the second footnote.
There is explicit reference here to a ‘pratiyogin” or contradictory_ The older Westem logic distinguished between a pair of contraries (white and black) and a pair or contradictories (white and not-white). Here, the existence and non-existence of the thing make up a pair of contradictories and mutually exclude one another.” fn36
The arguments about ‘I do not know’ here are parallel with a famous clash of views found in the history of western philosophy. Kant held that we could not know ‘things-in themselves’. Hegel ‘held that Kant’s assertion was self-contradictory. One would not have the right to say that one could not know things-in-themselves unless one already had some knowledge of them. In fact one cannot help having some knowledge of reality. It is the philosopher’s job to improve that knowledge. fn20
//
Hi MIchael,
Yes – I check the occasional post on Advaitin to see if the discussion is something that I can actually follow and that seems relevant. I have to say that most posts at present seem entirely academic and of no particular interest to the average seeker.
I do not understand Hegel’s objection. Isn’t the point about Kant’s ding-an-sich that what we perceive is something entirely in the mind (after the sense organs have transmitted electrical impulses to the brain) so that we cannot ever be sure that this provides knowledge about the source of the original perception? What we ‘know’ has to be about the ‘thing in the mind’. It cannot be about the ‘reality’. So what does Hegel’s objection mean?
Best wishes,
Dennis
“One would not have the right to say that one could not know things-in-themselves unless one already had some knowledge of them.”
I’m no Hegelian expert but my Vedanta bias would interpret the sentence that a pratiyogi. How could we question something if we don’t have a prior knowledge of its existence?
And of pratiyogi, I believe its origin in Vedanta must be in applying it to various definitions of mithya (scroll down),
“Madhusudana Sarasavati, in Advaitasiddhi text, has given 5 definitions of mithyā taken from the works of different Āchāryās
– 1. mithyetyanīrvacanīyatocyate
The first definition – given by Padmapāda in Pañcapadikā. Pañcapadikā is the commentary upon śārirakbhāṣya of śaṅkarācārya.
According to this defination Mithyā is the character of not being the locus of either being or non-being. The falsity is constituted by being different from Sat (being) and Asat (non-being). which is indescribable. Means which cannot be called as Sad (Existence) and Asad (Non–existence) and from also as Sad-Asad (Existence-Non–existence) both. So Mithyā is beyond these three categories. The example given is the illusory silver perceived on the shell. What is meant by Advaitins is that a Mithyā object has two properties: ‘the absolute negation of being’ and ‘the absolute negation of non-being’.
2. pratipannopādhāvapratiyogitvameva mithyātvaṃ nāma – The second definition – given by Prakāśātman in Vivaraṇa. Vivaraṇa is the commentary upon Pañcapadikā of Padmapāda.
The Mithyā of a thing consists in the thing being negated for all three periods of time in the locus in which it appears. The Mithyātva (falsity) consists in being the Pratiyogi (negatum) of a negation (niṣedha) which is traikālika (for all three periods of time – past, present and future) in a locus in which it appears. The illusory silver is false in the sense that it is negated for all three periods of time in the shell in which it is presented as an object of experience. This is based on the scriptural text, there is nothing else whatsoever. The world of multiplicity is eternally negated in the non-dual Brahman which is the locus of the appearance of the world and as such, the world is false. For example If one makes a statement such as: “There is no pot on this floor” or “A pot does not exist on this floor”, the pot is the counter-positive of its own non-existence and the floor is the substratum. A person sees a rope and thinks it is a snake. Afterwards he finds out that it is only a rope. Then he says, “There never was a snake here”. Another way of saying this is, “There is absolute non-existence of a snake here”. In this sentence the snake, whose non-existence is stated, is the counter-positive. The rope in front is the substratum. So we can say that the snake is the counterpositive of its own absolute non-existence in the rope which was the substratum on which it was seen, i.e. which was supposed to be its substratum. The expression “non-existence that abides in the substratum” means only “the nonexistence in the substratum”. Thus what the sentence quoted above means is: That which appeared to exist at a particular place, but was found later to be non-existent there is mithyā. The snake appeared to exist where the rope was, but later on it was found that it did not exist. So the snake is mithyā.
3. jñānanivartyaṃ vā mithyātvam26 – The third definition – this is given by Madhusūdan Sarsvati.
The false is what gets canceled by cognition. This is based on the scriptural text; The enlightened is freed of names and forms. The illusory snake is false in the sense that it is canceled by the cognition of rope as rope. The world is false in the sense that it it is canceled by the knowledge of Brahman.
According to prakāśātman cancelation by knowledge is the really definition of Mithyā – bādhakajñānasiddhasya pratipannabādhāvabhāvapratiyogitva lakṣaṇasya mithyātvasya punaḥ svaśabdena parāmarśacca bādhaviṣayo mithyātvamiti.
4. sarveṣāmapibhāvānāṃ svāśrayatvena saṃmate pratiyogitvamatyantābhāvaṃ prati mṛṣātmatā
The fourth definition – given by Citsukhācārya in Tattvapradipikā,
The Mithyā (falsity) of anything positive is its character of its being the pratiyogin (counterpart) of the absolute negation that resides in what appears to be its own substratum. The shell silver is something positive and it is false. Why is it false? It is false because it is eternally negated in the very shell that appears to be its locus. The objects of the world are also false in the same sense. For example, a cloth is a positive object and it appears to reside in the threads which constitute it. But in those very threads the cloth is eternally negated. The cloth is therefore false.
5. vivādapadaṃ mithyā dṛśyatvāt
The fifth definition – given by Ānandabodhbhattārak in Nyayadipavali.
What is different from the real (sat), i.e., that is, other than the real, is false. According to Advaita Vedanta, Brahman alone is real (sat); the objects of the world, like a pot or cloth, are different from Brahman. They are, therefore, false.”
from: https://csu-prayagraj.res.in/pdf/Journal%20of%20the%20ganganath%20jha%20campus%20volume75-76..pdf?fbclid=IwY2xjawH2gJtleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHeb8fUNwS8t7jK6VkdZC2RdDnc9Q0cXKazpMdgsOdVE9mFh_-zl2A2zzdA_aem_YPs6LYEqMki1bHm8A1hIxQ#page=116
Thanks for those definitions of mithyA, Michael – I have not encountered such logical detail before. I will probably stick with the ‘simplistic’ explanations but it is certainly useful to have these to hand!
The of attention that is given to the concept of the pratiyogin in the Vedanta Paribhasa is required for an advaitic response to the problem of a wrong understanding of superimposition. (pg.62)
When superimposition is taken as an analogy for the taking of the self to be the mind/body/intellect combination that is one facet of the problem. The other facet is a diversion from this general condition of avidya to the technical consideration of how empirical as opposed to metaphysical superimposition takes place. Mixing up the two brings the extraordinary claim that perceptual error will only cease on realisation.
“according to the view that it (error) is an effect of the primal nescience, since the latter is only destroyed by the realisation of Brahman”
The pratiyogin concept is an empirical one – you can only have an illusion of something if there is a real something that it is the illusion of.
Now comes the fantastic claim that while the silver which is superimposed upon the nacre is being seen it exists in an ontological i.e. real sense. No says V.P. negating or asserting that silver is not affecting the counterpositive. You are dealing with ‘conventional reality’ in which in the case of illusion of silver (silverhoodness) is “abiding in a different substratum from its own(vyadhikarana)”. The attribute (silverhoodness) has been misplaced.
I do have a memory of your regard for Vedanta Paribhasa from years ago, Michael. I seem to recall that you recommended Forsthoefel’s ‘Knowing Beyond Knowledge’ to me but I didn’t have much success at reading that either… (Or was it Bina Gupta’s ‘Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta’?) I’m afraid all these books are too close to Madhusudana’s approach to Advaita for my liking. I still maintain that the necessary ideas can be expressed in terms that seekers untrained in NyAya or its modern equivalents can understand.