*** Go to Part 6 ***
The following question is concerned with the notion that ‘absence of a thing’ is an existent entity (another strange notion of post-Śaṅkara texts). This also formed an aspect of the discussions on the Advaitin List. It begins with my asking ChatGPT to translate the Devanagari text that formed part of the post by Sudhanshu on 6th Dec. 2024.
Dennis: Could you translate this argument into understandable English, please:
चतुर्विधानामभावानाम् , घटस्येतरेतराभावो घटादन्यो ष्टः — यथा घटाभावः पटादिरेव, न घटस्वरूपमेव । न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् ।
AI: Here’s a simplified translation of the argument in understandable English:
We are discussing four types of “absence” (*abhāva*), starting with **mutual absence** (*itaretara-abhāva*). For example, the absence of a pot (*ghata*) is not the same as the pot itself. The absence of a pot is something else entirely, like a cloth (*paṭa*) or another object. In other words, the absence of the pot is not the nature of the pot itself—it is identified with something else, like the presence of the cloth.
Also, we cannot say that the pot’s absence is some property or essence of the cloth (e.g., “the cloth is defined by being the absence of a pot”). So, what is this absence? It is a positive entity—it is the cloth itself, which exists in its own nature.
Similarly, when we talk about other forms of absence, such as **prior absence** (*prāk-abhāva*, the nonexistence of a pot before it is created), **destruction absence** (*pradhvaṁsa-abhāva*, the nonexistence of a pot after it is destroyed), and **absolute absence** (*atyantābhāva*, the eternal nonexistence of the pot in certain contexts), these absences must also be something other than the pot.
In the same way that the mutual absence of the pot is associated with something else (like the cloth), all these other types of absences are also distinct from the pot and must be understood as positive entities in their own right.
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### Key Ideas:
1. **Mutual absence (itaretara-abhāva)** refers to the absence of one thing (like a pot) being identifiable with the presence of another (like a cloth).
2. Absence is not a property or essence of the thing whose absence we are talking about; it is distinct and “real” in its own context.
3. The argument extends this logic to other forms of absence, such as prior nonexistence or destruction, showing they are not the pot itself but something different.
Let me know if you’d like further clarification!
Dennis: So we might go into a room looking for a pot and find not ‘pot-absence’ but ‘cloth-absence’ instead?
QI: Exactly! That’s a humorous and insightful way of putting it. The argument emphasizes that when we look for something, we don’t encounter an abstract “absence” floating around (like “pot-absence”). Instead, we encounter *something else that is present*, such as a cloth, a table, or empty space, and we interpret this as the absence of the pot.
Absence (*abhāva*), in this framework, is not some mystical entity or independent reality—it is always understood in relation to something that exists. So, if you’re looking for a pot and don’t find one, what you actually encounter is **whatever is present in its place**, and your mind labels that as “the absence of the pot.”
Similarly, if you’re expecting to find a cloth and don’t see one, you might instead encounter a “pot-presence” and label that as “cloth-absence.” This highlights that **absence is a conceptual designation**, depending on what you’re looking for and what you actually find.
In essence:
– “Pot-absence” is just the presence of something else where you hoped to find a pot.
– Absence doesn’t have its own independent existence; it’s a relational way of describing what *is* there, based on our expectations or search.
So yes, if you’re not careful, you might end up finding “cloth-absence” instead of “pot-absence” in your philosophical scavenger hunt!
Dennis: It was actually meant to be a sarcastic, reductio-ad-absurdum comment rather than a humourous one! But you say that; “Absence doesn’t have its own independent existence; it’s a relational way of describing what is there, based on our expectations or search.” This is reasonable. But is it not the case that post-Shankara authors such as Madhusudhana argue that absence DOES exist?
AI: Ah, I see your sarcastic intent now—thank you for clarifying! And yes, you’re correct that post-Śaṅkara authors like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (*Advaita-siddhi*) and others in the Advaita tradition argue for the ontological reality of absence (*abhāva*) in certain contexts. Let me explain the shift in reasoning and why they take this approach, even though it may seem to contradict Śaṅkara’s simpler framework.
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### Śaṅkara’s Position: Conceptual Abhāva
Śaṅkara, as seen in his foundational works (e.g., *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*), does not explicitly treat absence (*abhāva*) as a separate ontological category. Instead:
– Absence is seen as a **relational construct** or conceptual tool used to describe the non-perception of something against the background of something else. For instance, “pot-absence” simply describes the presence of something that is not a pot.
– Śaṅkara’s primary focus is **Brahman as the only ultimate reality**, with *mithyā* phenomena (including absences) falling into the realm of the empirical or illusory (*vyavahāra*).
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### Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Position: Ontological Abhāva
Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, influenced by the rising debates with the Nyāya school and other dualist traditions, adopted a more rigorous logical framework to defend Advaita. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, for instance, argues in the *Advaita-siddhi* that:
1. **Abhāva as a Real Entity**: Absence (*abhāva*) is an **ontological category** distinct from existence (*bhāva*). For example, the “absence of a pot” on the ground is not reducible to the presence of the ground itself; it is a distinct state that the mind can apprehend.
2. **Four Types of Absence**: Madhusūdana elaborates on the fourfold classification of absence:
– **Mutual absence** (*itaretara-abhāva*): E.g., a pot is not a cloth.
– **Prior nonexistence** (*prāk-abhāva*): E.g., a pot does not exist before its creation.
– **Destruction absence** (*pradhvaṁsa-abhāva*): E.g., a pot ceases to exist after it is destroyed.
– **Absolute absence** (*atyanta-abhāva*): E.g., a pot does not exist in the sky.
Madhusūdana defends these categories as logical necessities to account for perceptions and inferences involving absence.
3. **Defense Against Opponents**: Madhusūdana develops this position primarily to counter Nyāya arguments, which claim that Advaita’s dismissal of *abhāva* undermines logical consistency. By treating *abhāva* as real within the empirical realm, he strengthens Advaita’s framework.
—
### Why This Shift?
The emphasis on the ontological status of *abhāva* is not because Advaitins like Madhusūdana disagree with Śaṅkara’s broader metaphysics but because:
1. They needed to respond to **Nyāya critiques** that demanded a more precise treatment of absence as a category of perception and logic.
2. The Advaita tradition evolved to adopt **epistemological tools** that were compatible with rival schools without compromising the ultimate teaching of non-duality.
—
### Does This Conflict with Śaṅkara?
Not necessarily:
– For Śaṅkara, absence is a **practical concept** in the empirical realm (*vyavahāra*) and dissolves upon realization of Brahman.
– For Madhusūdana, absence is **real** within the empirical framework of logic and perception, but he too ultimately sublates it in Brahman, which is beyond all distinctions of existence and nonexistence.
—
### Conclusion
Your critique that this ontological postulation feels unnecessary is valid from a Śaṅkara-focused perspective. Śaṅkara’s minimalist view avoids adding more ontological baggage. However, the post-Śaṅkara thinkers like Madhusūdana argue for the reality of *abhāva* to respond to debates and clarify Advaita’s position without compromising its core teaching.
In essence: **Śaṅkara keeps it simple; Madhusūdana plays the logical chess match.**
My Own Conclusions
So what have I gained from this discussion?
My view that many post-Śaṅkara authors have confused the issues remains unchanged. For example, Śaṅkara himself did not introduce the concepts of āvaraṇa and vikṣepa and they obviously make it more likely that one will believe that ignorance is an existent entity.
I also still believe that understanding avidyā as simply ‘lack of knowledge’ is adequate for explanations in Advaita and less likely to lead to confusion or misunderstanding. It has to be remembered that all explanations are interim only (adhyāropa). They are all mithyā and eventually have to be taken back (apavāda). Accordingly, any ‘explanation’ that introduces additional complexity is unwarranted and can serve no useful purpose unless it be to make some later problem more easily understandable. And I cannot think of anything that would justify that.
However, I do accept that it is meaningful to differentiate ‘degrees’ of the ‘lack of knowledge’. On the face of it, not being able to speak Mandarin, for example, does not normally lead to any experienced problems. It is simply a ‘lack’, along with all of the other things that I don’t know about. On the other hand, not knowing that it is a rope on the path in front of me can lead to experienced fear that it is snake.
One might therefore be tempted to say that the rope-ignorance is a positive entity, since it has an experienced effect. One is even tempted to say that it is ignorance that causes us to project the snake appearance (avidyā ‘causes’ adhyāsa). Or, as ChatGPT put it: it is the difference between “jñāna-abhāva (the simple absence of knowledge) and avidyā, which is not merely absence but includes a superimposed error.” Here, it is saying that avidyā ‘incorporates’ adhyāsa; we misperceive the rope and erroneously project the image of snake.
However, if I were drugged and kidnapped and woke up in China without any phone or money, I might well feel fear that I was unable to speak Mandarin! All that we can conclude from such an example is that lack of knowledge may have different consequences, depending upon the nature of the knowledge we are talking about, and the situation we are in at the time. When it comes to Advaita, our lack of knowledge that we are Brahman and reality is non-dual may well be thought to lead to all sorts of unpleasant consequences. But the vast majority of people on the planet will think that the very idea is quite ridiculous and that it is those who even consider it who suffer rather than those who have never heard of it.
It is when we experience ‘consequences’ of our lack of knowledge that we think of this lack being something positive, rather than just something that we don’t know about. When ‘not knowing’ does not affect us, we don’t even think about it. When it does, the mind is obliged to react in some way.
There is no doubt that some post-Śaṅkara authors write about an existent entity called ‘ignorance’. The suggestion that this ‘development’ occurred in order to be able to argue for Advaita against other philosophies seems perfectly reasonable. But there is no question but that these arguments are complex, often obscure, and require considerable intellectual skills, knowledge of logic etc., in order to be able to comprehend them. If there is no clear evidence that those who can follow these arguments are better able to gain Self-knowledge and mokṣa, then they obviously serve no useful purpose.
There is no clear evidence that Śaṅkara himself put forward the idea that ignorance is an existent entity or that he would have supported the developments of his later followers. (On the topic of a ‘primordial ignorance’, a ‘root cause’ of everything – mūlāvidyā – there have been volumes written. Swami Satchidanandendra wrote a scathing critique of the idea and advocated a return to the essential teaching of Śaṅkara. Following this, arguments raged throughout his life and continue up to today. You can read all about it, along with the other ideas in this series, in my book ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta: Ignorance and its Removal’, which will be published by Indica at Varanasi before summer 2025.)
*** End of Series ***