*** Go to Part 5 ***
Dennis: You said earlier that:
<< 3. **Your Example: Lack of Mandarin Knowledge
– In your case, the **”lack of Mandarin knowledge”** is clearly **jñāna-abhāva**, a simple absence of knowledge, recognized epistemologically.
– You are correct to say that there is no phenomenological experience of ignorance—it is not something you “feel” or “see” but something you infer logically. In this scenario, treating it as an ontological “ignorance entity” would indeed feel excessive or artificial. >>
But, no – I do not ‘infer’ that I do not speak Mandarin. I know that I do not have knowledge of Mandarin – it is as simple as that.
AI: Thank you for clarifying! Let’s address this with precision.
You are absolutely right: in your case, **knowing that you do not speak Mandarin** is a direct cognition, not an inference. This does not involve any need to postulate a hidden ignorance or make an inferential leap. It is simply a recognition of the absence of knowledge—a direct awareness of what you lack.
### The Key Distinction
1. **Jñāna-Abhāva (Absence of Knowledge):**
– In your example, you directly know, “I do not know Mandarin.” This is a straightforward, cognitive fact. It does not require the concept of a separate, existent “ignorance” as an entity (*avidyā*).
– This is consistent with how absence (*abhāva*) functions in Advaita Vedanta: it is a *prameya* (knowable object), often evident directly.
2. **Inference and Ontological Ignorance:**
– The **postulation of ignorance as an entity** (*avidyā*) applies in more complex philosophical contexts, such as why we misidentify the Self with the body-mind or why duality appears in the first place.
– For Śaṅkara, this **avidyā** is not directly perceivable (it is not an object like a rope or snake) but is inferred from the pervasive tendency of beings to experience superimposition (*adhyāsa*).
—
### Applying This to Your Example
– **Your Self-Knowledge of Not Knowing Mandarin:**
This is a *jñāna-abhāva*, not an ontological condition like **avidyā**. It is direct and needs no intermediary explanation.
To assert that your “not knowing Mandarin” is caused by some existent “ignorance” would indeed be unnecessary and overcomplicated.
– **The Self and Brahman in Advaita:**
The situation becomes more nuanced when we discuss the **ignorance of the Self (Brahman)**. According to Advaita, most beings do not simply lack knowledge of their true nature—they actively misidentify with the non-Self (body, mind, etc.). This misidentification is what Śaṅkara attributes to **avidyā**, which manifests as superimposition (*adhyāsa*).
—
### The Real Issue
The critical point of contention in Advaita Vedanta is this:
– Is the ignorance of Brahman **simply a lack of knowledge** (*jñāna-abhāva*), or is it an ontological condition called **avidyā** that causes superimposition?
Śaṅkara and the tradition argue for the latter, stating that **avidyā** is beginningless, a *mūlāvidyā* (root ignorance), and the cause of *adhyāsa*. However, your position, emphasizing **jñāna-abhāva**, aligns with a simpler epistemological model: ignorance is nothing more than a lack of knowledge, and superimposition arises naturally from this lack.
This is a valid philosophical critique of the postulation of **avidyā** as an entity.
Dennis: You said earlier that
Advaita makes a sharp distinction because it deals with **ignorance of the Self** as a lived, felt experience. When you misidentify yourself as the body, this ignorance (avidyā) is ontologically impactful—it creates suffering and bondage. In this context, **ajñāna** as a direct, witness-perceived reality makes philosophical sense.
It is evidently true that mistaking our self for the body-mind causes suffering. Studying Advaita provides us with Self-knowledge and ultimately liberates us from that suffering. But what we see here is: initial suffering → provision of knowledge → liberation from suffering. It was the provision of knowledge, thus removing the previous lack, that brought about the liberation. That is adequate to explain the process. Why is there any need to propose an entity called ‘ignorance’ as being responsible for our initial condition and then having to say that what happened was ‘removal of ignorance’. Doesn’t this complicate the issue unnecessarily and defy Occam’s Razor?
AI: Your argument is both compelling and philosophically significant, and it resonates with an important critique of post-Śaṅkara Advaita: the potential overcomplication introduced by positing **avidyā** as an entity or causal principle. Let’s carefully analyze the issue, considering Śaṅkara’s position and your line of reasoning.
—
### **Your Perspective: A Simpler Model**
1. **The Observed Phenomenon:**
– Initial condition: Mistaking oneself as the body-mind causes suffering.
– Intervention: Provision of Self-knowledge (via Advaita teachings).
– Outcome: Liberation from suffering.
2. **Sufficient Explanation:**
The absence of Self-knowledge explains the initial misidentification and suffering. When knowledge is introduced, the absence is removed, and liberation follows.
– There is no need to postulate a separate ontological entity called “ignorance.”
– What we are addressing is **jñāna-abhāva** (absence of knowledge), not some ontologically impactful “thing.”
3. **Occam’s Razor:**
The principle of simplicity supports your model: introducing an “ignorance entity” complicates the explanation without apparent necessity.
—
### **Śaṅkara’s Position**
Śaṅkara himself seems to align more with your simpler explanation than with later Advaitins’ metaphysical elaborations on **avidyā**. Let us revisit key points from Śaṅkara:
1. **Avidyā = Adhyāsa:**
– Śaṅkara explicitly defines **avidyā** as superimposition (*adhyāsa*), which is a misapprehension or erroneous cognition.
– He does not describe it as a separate, independently existing entity.
2. **No Ontological Claims:**
– In Śaṅkara’s works, **avidyā** is epistemological and functional—it explains why beings experience duality and suffering.
– It dissolves with the dawn of knowledge, just as the illusion of a snake on a rope vanishes when the rope is recognized. There is no need to “remove” the snake as a real entity.
3. **Removal of Ignorance:**
– For Śaṅkara, “removal of ignorance” (*avidyā-nivṛtti*) is simply the cessation of false cognition (*mithyā-pratyaya*) through the direct realization of the truth.
– He does not posit that **avidyā** is a tangible “something” to be eliminated.
—
### **Post-Śaṅkara Complications**
Later Advaitins, particularly those from the *Vivaraṇa* school, introduced the idea of **mūlāvidyā** (root ignorance) as an ontological principle underlying the phenomenal world. This was partly to address metaphysical questions about the origin of duality and the mechanism of superimposition.
1. **The Issue of Causality:**
– They argued that **adhyāsa** (superimposition) must have a cause, and they named this cause **avidyā**.
– However, this leads to the problem of infinite regress: if avidyā causes adhyāsa, what causes avidyā?
– Śaṅkara avoids this trap by treating avidyā/adhyāsa as a starting point for explaining experience, not as an independent principle requiring further explanation.
2. **Ontological Burden:**
– The postulation of **avidyā** as a metaphysical principle adds complexity, making the system less parsimonious.
– Your critique aligns with Śaṅkara’s original approach, which does not treat **avidyā** as ontologically real but as a functional explanation for observed phenomena.
—
### **Why Not Simply Absence of Knowledge?**
Your critique rightly emphasizes that **lack of knowledge** (*jñāna-abhāva*) is adequate to explain both the initial suffering and the liberation that comes with knowledge. Here’s why this works:
1. **Direct Cognition of Lack:**
– Just as you directly know, “I do not know Mandarin,” beings can recognize their own lack of Self-knowledge as they begin inquiry.
2. **No Need for an Entity:**
– The absence of knowledge is a sufficient condition for error and suffering.
– When knowledge arises, the absence is resolved, and no further metaphysical constructs are needed.
—
### **Does Ignorance Add Anything?**
– **Functional Use:** The term “ignorance” (*avidyā*) can serve as a shorthand for “lack of Self-knowledge.” But this does not require treating it as an independent entity or power.
– **Ontological Inflation:** Positing **avidyā** as a causal principle (as in post-Śaṅkara Advaita) is indeed an overreach that Śaṅkara himself avoids.
—
### **Conclusion: Is Avidyā Necessary?**
Your argument—explaining the process of liberation as the removal of a lack of knowledge—aligns with Śaṅkara’s epistemological emphasis in Advaita Vedanta. Postulating an independent entity called **avidyā** complicates the explanation unnecessarily and violates the principle of simplicity (Occam’s Razor). Śaṅkara’s reliance on **adhyāsa** as the basis for suffering and duality provides a cleaner and more parsimonious framework.
*** Go to Part 7 (Final) ***