*** Read Part 4 ***

Tamas

‘Darkness’ is also used in the sense of the ‘primordial condition’ of the universe prior to creation. In this sense, it is not metaphorical but part of the ancient Hindu cosmology. It appears, for example, in Ṛg Veda 10.129: “In the beginning, there was darkness (tamas) hidden in darkness. All this was one undifferentiated water.” And the stage of pralaya, when the universe returns to unmanifest form, is sometimes described as darkness. A number of Puranic references could be quoted, e.g. the Vishnu Purana (Book 1 Chapter 1): “At the end of the previous kalpa, there was only one vast ocean, enveloped in darkness (tamas). The universe was in total dissolution, and nothing but the incomprehensible God, Vishnu, existed.” The darkness also symbolized the formlessness prior to creation.

This usage as an existent entity is not really the same as the metaphorical usage in which it symbolizes ignorance or ‘absence of knowledge’.

Darkness as Metaphor

In the context of discussions on ignorance, then, darkness is not intended to be considered as a real entity but as a metaphor for ignorance. We can see how this is both useful and potentially misleading. If we think of the common ‘concealing’ usage of the word – e.g. we could not see the stalactite in the cave because it was ‘covered by’ darkness – then we are in trouble. If we simply rephrase this to say that, because there was no light in the cave, we could not see the stalactite, there is no problem.

Sureśvara uses this metaphor in several places, in the sense that ignorance is removed by gaining Self-knowledge in the same way that darkness is dispelled by light. In Naiṣkarmya Siddhi 1.35, he says:

karmājñāna-samutthatvān nālaṃ mohāpanttaye samyag-jñānaṃ virodhy asyatāmisrasyāṃśumān iva

Since action is born out of ignorance, it is unable to remove ignorance [he is showing that karma cannot give mokṣa]. Perfect knowledge is the destroyer of this (ignorance) just as the sun (is the opposite) of darkness.

This verse appears to be a rephrasing of Ātmabodha 3, which is attributed to Śaṅkara. Both appear to be suggesting that darkness and ignorance are positively existing entities. But could this not simply be that words were naturally coined in Sanskrit, just as in other languages, to refer to commonly used concepts? Another example is in Sureśvara’s Vārttika on Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa (1368):

ajānaṃ saṃśayajānaṃ miśyājānamiti trikam
ajānaṃ kāraṇaṃ tatra kāryatvaṃ pariśiṣṭayoḥ

Ignorance, doubt-born knowledge, and mixed knowledge are the triad. Ignorance (ajñāna) is the cause there, while the other two (doubt-born knowledge and mixed knowledge) are effects.

More Language problems

To my mind at least, the first reference to ajñāna as the cause could equally well be translated as ‘lack of knowledge’ – and makes far more sense. Surely, lack of knowledge is what leads to confusion and all cognitive errors. Calling this ‘ignorance’ does not itself bring into existence a new entity or give a name to an already-existing one.

I should note here that Swami Dayananda also seems to have supported the idea of ignorance being an existent entity. In my ‘Jungle’ book, I recorded that:

Swami Dayananda uses the metaphor of light and darkness for Self- knowledge and Self-ignorance. He says: “Darkness cannot be removed by any action, but only by light. Similarly, ignorance cannot be removed by any action, because action is not opposed to ignorance; action is a product of ignorance… You cannot say darkness doesn’t exist. Until light comes, it exists. A thing that is non-existent cannot create problems, only a thing that exists can create problems. Ignorance of the self is something that exists; it creates problems, it creates error, and it creates a sense of limitation.”

The quotation is from Vol. 1 of his ‘Collection of Talks and Essays’.

But this, too, indicates a ‘delusion through language’. A ‘thing that is non-existent’ can indeed create problems, like the rope-snake on the dark path. But it is not really a ‘snake’ that causes our fright, nor something called ‘ignorance’; it is our ‘lack of knowledge’ that it is a rope.

Saying that the Self is ‘obscured’ or ‘veiled’ or ‘hidden’ by ignorance is just pandering to the notion that ‘ignorance’ is a real thing. But it makes more sense simply to admit that our problems are caused by ‘absence of knowledge’ of the Self. Moreover, it is in accord with the principle of parsimony (Occam’s Razor) not to invent another entity unnecessarily. The fact that, once we gain Self-knowledge, this ‘ignorance’ disappears, shows that it was not real. Ignorance of the rope ‘disappears’ without any effort at all, just by switching on the torch.

Traditional Advaita recognized the fact that, although not ‘unreal’, ignorance is also not ‘real’. It is categorized as anirvacanīya. If it were real, it would not be possible to bring it to an end; it cannot be totally unreal or there would be no saṃsāra. Essentially, it cannot be explained by reason. (Calling it ‘absence of Self-knowledge’ doesn’t suffer from all these problems!) (This is another of Rāmānuja’s ‘Untenables’, but he doesn’t offer any better explanation.) (Lots more on all of this in ‘Confusions’ Vol. 2.)

Also, just as Śaṅkara spoke of prāgabhāva, in the context of ‘prior non-existence’ of creation and pots, we can regard ‘ignorance’ as the prior non-existence of knowledge. In this state, ignorance has a sort of ‘functional’ existence but is still not a real entity.

Sureśvara’s Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya Vārttika 179 states that avidyā is not negative (abhāva), but something positive. He says that it should not be interpreted negatively as the prior non-existence of knowledge (jñāna-prāgabhāva). It is a positive entity which conceals the nature of the Self. He says that the relation between vidyā and avidyā is like that between mitra (friend) and amitra (enemy). But the use of friend and enemy (mitra and amitra) is not analogous, because both these are ontologically real (in a vyāvahārika sense). Knowledge and ignorance (vidyā and avidyā), however, are not like this because avidyā disappears when the teaching has been assimilated so was not really real. Śaṅkara’s stance is that avidyā is neither real nor unreal but anirvacanīya or mithyā.

To return to  Br.U.B. 1.2.1, my view is that all Śaṅkara is saying is that darkness is the word we use to refer to an absence of light. Since we all know what we mean when we speak of ‘darkness’, in that sense it can be considered to ‘exist’. One can certainly speak of the ‘presence of darkness’ and no one is any doubt as to what is meant. One might even say that there is darkness in the cave and others would know what was meant, even if they did think it was a strange way of putting it! But I suggest that everyone would understand it to mean that there was an absence of light.

Another example that occurs to me is the use of the word ‘famine’ in a country where there is no food. Food is obviously something we can hold, and even eat. Famine is a state whose consequences are evident, but it is not something that we can pick up and hold. And I agree that we would have to say that famine ‘exists’ in that country. Nevertheless, it exists because there is an absence of food! It is the way that we use language. Similarly, darkness exists because there is an absence of light. Just as it is food that it the actual ‘thing’ that we want in a state of famine, so it is with light and darkness.

***** Read Part 6 (final) *****