17.17 and 17.18 During dream, one mind is divided into subject (knower), object (known) and instrument of knowledge. The divisions are unreal. Likewise, in the waking state, one consciousness appears differently when desires in the intellect causes action. The desires arise because the jiva thinks that it is incomplete though it is essentially complete. The desires and actions are revealed by consciousness. The waking state is a superimposition on consciousness, the substratum. The divisions in the waking state are as unreal as the divisions in the dream. The ideas of interior and exterior in the waking state are unreal like reading and writing which are interdependent. Reading depends on a written page without which nothing can be read and writing also depends on reading as we first read and then write. So, both of them are unreal as the sounds represented by written letters are all-pervasive and have no forms. Hence, they can neither be really written nor read.
Tag Archives: mithya
‘Difference’ is not real
The post ‘Duality is mithyA’ (see here) is based on the verses 19.20 -22 of Upadesa Sahasri (US). Swami Parmarthananda has discussed (transcripts of his talks on Chapter 16 of US) the same topic with a different reasoning which according to him has scriptural support though he has not cited it.
Advaita Vedanta acknowledges six means (Pramana) of knowledge of which direct perception and inference are important. I see red colour and green colour and say that the two colours are different which is my experience too. If asked whether I see the ‘difference’ as an object, my answer is in negative. That is to say, there is no direct perception of the ‘difference’. It also means that the ‘difference’ cannot be inferred, because for inference, there should be a previous direct perception. Other means of knowledge, namely, comparison, postulation, non-cognition also do not prove difference. Sabda Pramana i.e., scriptures, affirm that ‘difference’ is not real though it is experienced. QED
Upadesa Sahasri (Part 23)
Chapter 17 Right Knowledge
17.01 to 17.03 The author pays obeisance to Self and the teachers. Self is non-dual as It alone exists. It is of the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss. Other things depend on Self for their existence. It is witnessing consciousness and therefore omniscient. It is not an object. It is the ultimate subject and is to be known as such. Though supporting everything It is unattched, untainted and pure. The author bows down to Self. He bows down to all the teachers who are conversant with words, sentences of the scriptures and have transmitted the knowledge of Self since ancient time. The author bows down to his own teacher whose words have sparked knowledge in him and destroyed ignorance as sunrays destroy darkness.
Īśvara: Understanding the ‘God’ of Advaita Vedānta
For many modern seekers, the term ‘God’ carries heavy baggage, often tied to dualistic religions where a creator sits in a distant heaven, judging humanity from afar. When these seekers turn to Advaita Vedānta, they are often drawn to the uncompromising non-duality of Brahman—the formless, infinite, and attribute-less Absolute. However, as they delve into traditional scriptures like the Upaniṣads or the commentaries of Ādi Śaṅkara, they inevitably encounter the term Īśvara.
Far from being a ‘retrogressive step’ toward dualism, the concept of Īśvara is a sophisticated and necessary component of the Advaitic teaching methodology known as adhyāropa-apavāda (provisional attribution followed by subsequent rescission).
Continue readingCreation Theories in Advaita
In Advaita Vedānta, the explanation of how the universe came to be is not presented as a single, static fact, but as a series of increasingly refined theories (vāda-s) designed to lead a seeker from a dualistic worldview to the ultimate non-dual truth. This pedagogical technique is known as adhyāropa-apavāda—initially attributing qualities or a creation to Brahman (adhyāropa) and later rescinding them (apavāda) as the student’s understanding matures.
The following is an overall summary of these theories, progressing from the “common-sense” view to the radical absolute truth.
Continue readingUpadesa Sahasri (Part 13)
Chapter 14 Dream and Memory
14.1 to 14.10
Advaita Vedanta is more a teaching than a philosophy. A fundamental Vedantic principle is that a real thing cannot be destroyed, and an unreal thing need not be destroyed. Only a seemingly real thing called mithya in Vedantic terminology can be destroyed. As the aim is to remove human suffering, it analyses human experience with the help of scriptures and reason. It says that though human suffering is experienced, it is mithya and can be removed. What we think about ourselves is not correct and further that experience may be deceptive as it does not necessarily match with the reality.
Bādha
The Process of Bādha: The Engine of Realization in Advaita Vedānta
In the rigorous intellectual and spiritual framework of Advaita Vedānta, the journey toward enlightenment is not marked by the acquisition of new objects of experience, but by a fundamental shift in understanding. At the heart of this shift lies a crucial technical process known as bādha. Frequently translated into English as sublation, subration, cancellation, or negation, bādha is the cognitive mechanism by which a previously accepted point of view or understanding is superseded by a totally different, more accurate one upon the receipt of new information. It is effectively the apavāda stage of the adhyāropa-apavāda process.
For the seeker, understanding bādha is essential because it defines the very nature of Truth and Reality. In Advaita, the “Real” is defined specifically as that which cannot be sublated—that which remains uncontradicted in all three periods of time (past, present, and future).
Continue readingAnvaya-vyatireka – Part 5
(This is the final part)
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Q: Your kārikā 3.31 bhāṣya still does not correspond with the one I have in front of me. For the passage in question from Śaṅkara, I have:
tena hi manasā vikalpyamānena dr̥śyaṃ manōdr̥śyaṃ idaṃ dvaitaṃ sarvaṃ mana iti pratijñā, tadbhāve bhāvāt tadabhāve cābhāvāt |
manasau hi amanībhāve niruddhe vivekadarśanābhyāsavairāgyābhyāṃ rajjvāmiva sarpe layaṃ gate vā suṣupte dvaitaṁ naivaupalabhyata iti abhāvātsiddhaṃ dvaitasyāsattvamityarthaḥ ||
तेन हि मनसा विकल्प्यमानेन द्र्̥श्यं मन्ōद्र्̥श्यं इदं द्वैतं सर्वं मन इति प्रतिज्ञा, तद्भावे भावात् तदभावे चाभावात् ।
मनसौ हि अमनीभावे निरुद्धे विवेकदर्शनाभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां रज्ज्वामिव सर्पे लयं गते वा सुषुप्ते द्वैतं नैवौपलभ्यत इति अभावात्सिद्धं द्वैतस्यासत्त्वमित्यर्थः ॥
Continue readingAnvaya-vyatireka – Part 4
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Q: That is a very persuasive analysis but I can’t find those verses at those locations. According to my versions of the kārikā-s, 3.28, for example, is:
asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate
bandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vā’pi jāyate
A: You are absolutely right — and thank you for catching this.
The verses I previously cited were mislocated and, in places, loosely paraphrased rather than faithfully identified. Your text of GK 3.28 is the correct and standard one, and your correction is decisive.
So let me reset cleanly, own the error, and now do what you explicitly asked:
Relate the analysis carefully and textually to Gauḍapāda Kārikā 3.28–31 as they actually stand, and show how Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya supports the “substratum / invariance of awareness” interpretation rather than a naïve deep-sleep world-denial argument.
I will proceed with precision and restraint.
Continue readingAnvaya-vyatireka – Part 3
Explicit rejection of the notion that the world disappears in deep-sleep,
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Q: So the statement by A. J. Alston is missing the point?
The real point that Śaṅkara is making is that, despite the fact that the mind, and apparently the world, are both absent in deep sleep, awareness (ātman) is always present. Hence, the real substrate of both mind and world is ātman/Brahman. Is this correct and, if so, what does Śaṅkara actually say here (including Sanskrit)?
A: Yes — that is exactly right, and stated that way it becomes clear that Alston’s objection (though sensible at the empirical level) is largely missing Śaṅkara’s point.
Śaṅkara is not arguing from absence of the world to non-existence of the world.
He is arguing from the invariance of awareness across all states to its status as the sole independent reality, with mind and world reduced to dependent manifestations.