There has just been a brief discussion on the Advaitin List under the heading of ‘Quotes from samkshepa shaareeraka’. This was effectively on the perceived consequences of accepting the theory of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda – the creation theory that claims that the world is the mental imagination of the jīva; a theory equating to the Western belief of solipsism. Sri ‘Sudhanshu Shekhar’ made the original post and Sri ‘Bhaskar YR’ represented the objections (with which I agree). Rather than joining in, I thought I would ask ChatGPT for an ‘opinion’ and its response seems to me to be very reasonable. (I even find myself more disposed to DSV than I was before!) Here is the exchange:

Q: How do Advaita believers in dṛṣṭi- sṛṣṭi-vāda explain how they can discuss the topic with other believers and non-believers?

A: In Advaita Vedānta, particularly within the framework of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda (the doctrine that perception precedes creation), explaining and discussing the philosophy with others presents an interesting challenge. Since dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda asserts that the world arises in accordance with the perceiver’s experience, the question arises: how can multiple individuals engage in a discussion if each person’s world is subjectively projected?

Possible Explanations:

    Shared Empirical Reality for Practical Purposes (Vyāvahārika Sattā)

    Even within dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, most proponents acknowledge the need for vyavahāra (practical engagement). While the world may be ultimately unreal (mithyā), interactions occur within a framework that is experientially consistent. Thus, discussions and debates are part of the vyāvahārika domain, where a seemingly shared reality operates according to the rules of experience.

    Jīva’s Subjectivity and the Role of Māyā

    According to dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, each jīva (individual) experiences their own projection. However, the appearance of others as fellow discussants is itself part of that projection. The discussion is thus a dialogue with one’s own mental constructs, which appear as external interlocutors.

    Pratibimba-Vāda and the Illusory Other

    Some interpreters use the analogy of reflections (pratibimba-vāda). Just as a dreamer can interact with dream characters, an individual engaging in a philosophical debate is essentially interacting with their own mental projections. Other people appear as though they are independent entities, but they are aspects of the perceiver’s experience.

    Ishvara’s Role in Synchronizing Experiences

    Some thinkers incorporate Īśvara (the cosmic order) as a means of explaining why different jīvas seem to experience a coherent world. While the world may be dreamlike, Īśvara ensures that individual experiences align in a way that allows for communication and debate.

    Gradations of Reality and the Need for Teaching

    Even if dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi is ultimately true, most Advaita teachers operate from a pragmatic standpoint when teaching. They acknowledge a provisional acceptance of sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭi-vāda (creation precedes perception) when addressing seekers who are not yet ready to grasp the subtler non-dual truth.

Thus, discussions about dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda itself are possible because they occur within the realm of vyavahāra, even though from the highest standpoint (pāramārthika) there is no second entity to discuss anything with.

Q: So believers in this theory are effectively schizophrenic, since they actually argue with ‘opponents’ and seek to defeat their arguments?

A: From a purely vyāvahārika (empirical) standpoint, it might seem paradoxical that proponents of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda engage in debate, given that their worldview implies that the opponents they argue with are part of their own projection. However, equating this with schizophrenia—where an individual experiences hallucinations they cannot distinguish from reality—is not an accurate comparison.

Why This Is Not Schizophrenia:

    Deliberate Engagement in Vyavahāra

    dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda adherents knowingly participate in discussions within the empirical realm, much like a dream character in a lucid dream engaging with other dream characters while being aware of the dream-like nature of the experience. They do not suffer from an inability to distinguish levels of reality but rather use vyāvahārika means to lead others (who are part of their projection) toward pāramārthika truth.

    Logical Consistency Within the Framework

    Even if the opponent is a projection, the jīva (individual self) still experiences duality until realization. The debates serve the purpose of refining understanding, much like how a teacher corrects a student’s misunderstanding even though both exist in a mithyā reality.

    Māyā’s Role in Enabling Interaction

    Māyā ensures that the world appears real at the empirical level, allowing for consistent experiences. A dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda adherent debates not because they mistakenly believe in an independent opponent, but because, within their experience, logical engagement remains a valid means (pramāṇa) to dispel ignorance.

    Analogies from Dream and Magic

    Classical Advaitins often use the dream analogy: just as a dreamer may argue with figures in their dream, a jīva under ignorance engages in debate. Another analogy is that of a magician who creates an illusion but momentarily interacts with it to guide others toward seeing through it.

Why Debate Still Matters:

Even within dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, self-ignorance persists until realization. Thus, correcting erroneous views—even if the opponent is a projection—serves the pedagogical function of dissolving avidyā. A teacher may argue with a student to remove ignorance, despite knowing that both are ultimately unreal.

The Ultimate Irony:

From the highest standpoint (pāramārthika), there is no debate, no teacher, no student, and no need for correction. However, until that realization dawns, discussions continue—because from the perspective of an unenlightened jīva, they remain necessary.

Thus, rather than schizophrenia, it is more like an actor knowingly playing a role, aware that the drama is illusory but engaging fully until the play ends.

Q: Does Śaṅkara explain this anywhere in his bhāṣya-s? If not, which post-Śaṅkara teacher(s) explains it in the simple manner that you have done? And what is the reference?

A: Śaṅkara does not explicitly articulate dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda in his bhāṣya-s. His primary stance aligns more closely with sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭi-vāda—the idea that the world is created first (through māyā) and then perceived by the jīva. However, elements of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi can be traced in later Advaitic developments, especially in post-Śaṅkara teachers influenced by pratibimba-vāda (the reflection theory) and vivarta-vāda (illusory appearance).

Did Śaṅkara Address This Issue?

In his bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtras, Upaniṣads, and Bhagavad Gītā, Śaṅkara consistently teaches that the world is mithyā (neither real nor absolutely unreal) and that knowledge (jñāna) alone dissolves it. However, he typically assumes a provisional acceptance of the world for practical purposes (vyavahāra). Key passages that indirectly align with dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda include:

    Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya (2.4.12)

        Śaṅkara describes the world as arising due to ignorance, much like a dream (svapnavat). This suggests a subjective element to perception, but he does not take it to the extreme of full dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi.

    Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Kārikā Bhāṣya (Gauḍapāda’s Ajāta-vāda)

        Here, the notion of the world being entirely non-originated (ajāta) is discussed, which is sometimes aligned with dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda in later traditions.

    Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya (2.2.28-29)

        Śaṅkara refutes Vijñānavāda Buddhism, which claims that only momentary perceptions exist, but he still affirms that the world is only mithyā.

Thus, while Śaṅkara acknowledges the illusory nature of perception, he does not explicitly propose that the world is created only at the moment of perception.

Which Post-Śaṅkara Teacher(s) Explain It Clearly?

The clear formulation of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda arises in later Advaita works, particularly in texts influenced by the yogavāsiṣṭha tradition and later Tamil Advaita.

    Prakāśānanda Sarasvatī (16th century, Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī)

        He explicitly argues that perception itself produces the world. His work systematically presents dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda as the highest teaching, differing from Śaṅkara’s more traditional stance.

    Reference:

        Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī (Verses on dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda)

        “The world arises in the mind alone, just as a dream appears to a sleeping man.”

    Appaya Dīkṣita (16th century, Siddhāntaleśa)

        He discusses different Advaita views and acknowledges dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda as an extreme non-dualistic stance.

    Reference:

        Siddhāntaleśa, where he categorizes different Advaitic interpretations.

    Śrīharsha (12th century, Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)

        While primarily a dialectician, he implicitly aligns with dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda by rejecting independent external reality.

    Reference:

        Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (Arguments on perception and reality).

    Modern Tamil Advaita Teachers (e.g., Śrī Sadānanda, later South Indian commentators)

        The Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi doctrine is found in some Tamil Advaita texts but is not universally accepted.

Final Thoughts

While Śaṅkara does not explicitly propose dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, later Advaitins, particularly Prakāśānanda, provide systematic arguments for it. If you are looking for a simple yet traditional exposition, Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī is a key text. However, if you want to stay within Śaṅkara’s framework, his bhāṣya-s do not fully support this view.