Tag Archives: vyavahara

Traditional versus Neo-Advaita (Part 3)

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*** Read Part 2 *** *** Go to Part 1 ***

Advaita refers to the unchanging reality by the Sanskrit term paramārtha and to the constantly changing appearance by vyavahāra. Within this phenomenal realm, separate individuals and objects are recognized and a creator-god, Īśvara, uses the power of māyā to obscure the truth and project the apparent world. It thus affirms that our experience does not tally with its non-dual claims. It acknowledges an appearance of duality, which is at odds with the reality. It also states that we can never directly know the reality. Accordingly, its effective teaching strategy is to successively negate the appearance. That which ‘remains’ and cannot be negated must be the reality. Once the reality is thus effectively (but not literally) known, then it is also realized that the appearance, too, is that same reality.

This process inevitably takes time, from the vantage point of the seeker who is still mired at the level of appearance. The ignorance that prevents the immediate apprehension of reality is effectively in the mind and it is at the level of the mind that this ignorance must be removed. Knowledge must be introduced in such a way that the mind can accept it, using reason and experience. Just as a student is unable to appreciate the subtleties of quantum physics without having the preliminary grounding in mathematics and science, so the seeker is unable to assimilate the ‘bottom-line’ truth of Advaita since it is so contrary to his everyday experience.

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Traditional versus Neo-Advaita (Part 2)

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There are also two significant dangers regarding the Neo-Advaita ‘movement’. Firstly, there is the clear possibility of charlatans who, having read a little or heard the fundamental elements of ‘descriptions’ of reality, can devise a few ‘routines’ of their own and then advertise themselves on the circuit. Providing that they are good speakers/actors, it is certainly possible to make a living from deceiving ‘seekers’ in such a way, without ever giving away their true lack of knowledge or the fact that they are no nearer any ‘realization’ than their disciples.

Secondly, seekers themselves may be deluded into a belief that some specious realization has been obtained when, in fact, all that has happened is that they have come to terms with some psychological problem that had been making life difficult. The ending of such suffering could well be seen as a ‘liberation’. Of course, such a thing would not be at all bad – it simply would have nothing to do with enlightenment. Indeed, such people might well go on to become teachers in their own right, not charlatans in the true sense of the word, since they genuinely believe that ‘realization’ has taken place.

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Traditional versus Neo-Advaita

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This will be a multi-part post, triggered in part by Ramesam’s recent post ‘Liberation is Disembodiment’, following which I promised a separate post. First of all, I will repost an article on the subject from advaita.org.uk, with which readers may not be familiar. Secondly, I will post an article on the subject that I apparently wrote in 2006 but do not seem ever to have published. Finally, I will add a new section and make a radical suggestion (as promised in my comment).

The word ‘neo’ means ‘new’ so that ‘Neo-Advaita’ is an impossibility. Advaita means ‘not two’, referring to the non-dual reality that always was, is and will be – unchanging because change would necessarily be from one thing into another, which would be contradictory. There cannot, therefore, be an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ Advaita, only the one truth.

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Dṛṣṭi- sṛṣṭi-vāda

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There has just been a brief discussion on the Advaitin List under the heading of ‘Quotes from samkshepa shaareeraka’. This was effectively on the perceived consequences of accepting the theory of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda – the creation theory that claims that the world is the mental imagination of the jīva; a theory equating to the Western belief of solipsism. Sri ‘Sudhanshu Shekhar’ made the original post and Sri ‘Bhaskar YR’ represented the objections (with which I agree). Rather than joining in, I thought I would ask ChatGPT for an ‘opinion’ and its response seems to me to be very reasonable. (I even find myself more disposed to DSV than I was before!) Here is the exchange:

Q: How do Advaita believers in dṛṣṭi- sṛṣṭi-vāda explain how they can discuss the topic with other believers and non-believers?

A: In Advaita Vedānta, particularly within the framework of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda (the doctrine that perception precedes creation), explaining and discussing the philosophy with others presents an interesting challenge. Since dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda asserts that the world arises in accordance with the perceiver’s experience, the question arises: how can multiple individuals engage in a discussion if each person’s world is subjectively projected?

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 4)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (concluded)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 3)

Based on Śaṅkarācārya’s statements, the PSA formulated a rigorous exposition of the continuation of prārabdha karma—and avidyā—in a jīvanmukta. Nelson (1996) documents the different arguments advanced: Vimuktātman, for example, advocates for the existence of a tangible remnant of avidyā in the jivanmukta (IS 1.9, p. 75).43 Sarvajñātman employs a range of metaphorical constructs to describe the remnant of moha (ignorance) post-gnosis: scent (gandha), shadow (cchāyā), residue, impression (saṁskāra), and so on, (SŚ 4.42).44 Citsukha delineates three forms of ignorance and argues that knowledge destroys only two forms—the third persists post-gnosis; otherwise, he argues, it would result in the immediate cessation of the body, and not admit the experience of jīvanmukti (TP, p. 394ff).45 Prakāśātman writes that the mukta “slips into dualistic awareness (dvaita-darśana)” in his participation in the world (PPV, p. 786).46 Building on Citsukha’s arguments, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī— and his commentator Brahmānanda Sarasvatī—declare videhamukti as “paramamukti,” hierarchically superior to jīvanmukti (AS, p. 892ff). We see here that the PSA’s (seemingly innocuous) endeavour to elucidate the persistence of prārabdha karma in the jīvanmukta compromises and undermines the very notion of mokṣa, here and now. This is akin to severing the very branch upon which one is perched.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 3)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 2)

VI. Adhyāropāpavāda According to the PSA

For the PSA, “Brahman can only be shown, not described” (Murthy 1959, p. 57), albeit in a circuitous, approximate manner (“adūraviprakarṣeṇa”).27 The crux of this position lies in the contention that although brahman eludes direct descriptive elucidation (abhidhā), it retains a semblance of apprehensibility through indirect means (lakṣaṇā). Vācaspati Miśra illustrates with an example: in order to explain gold, we point to gold ornaments—earrings, bracelets, etc—and explain it as the substance that assumes these various shapes; it is that which remains when the shapes no longer do. In a similar manner, the śruti “points to” the world-appearances to “show” brahman as that which assumes these various appearances; it is also what remains when the appearances no longer do (Bhāmati 1.1.4).

Accordingly, for the PSA, adhyāropāpavāda is one method to “show” brahman.28 Consider the stock example of Bhagavadgītā 13.14–15. In the verse 13.14, brahman is said to possess karmendriyas (hands, feet, etc.) and jñānendriyas (eyes, etc.). According to the PSA, this is an adhyāropa that is useful in drawing attention to the existence of brahman as that which permeates everything—including the human body and the sensory organs— and allows movement/perception to occur: ‘immanent’ brahman (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165). Ānandagiri writes, “The faculties of the body are a function of the consciousness that enlivens them; through them, the presence of brahman (as consciousness) can be recognized.”29 The śruti, thus, ‘points’ to brahman with the help of the attributes in accordance with the arundhati darśana nyāya. This is adhyāropa. In the verse immediately following this, brahman is said to be “without senses” and “devoid of qualities.” This is an apavāda that contradicts the preceding adhyāropa to point to brahman’s ‘transcendent’ nature (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165).30

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 2)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 1)

  1. Levels of Deliberated Attribution in the Prasthānatraya Texts

According to SSS, deliberated attribution occurs on three distinct levels in the texts of the prasthānatraya:16 words, sentences, and methodological procedures or prakriyās employed to articulate the inquiry.17 Each of these levels can be illustrated with examples. Consider the level of words. It is notable that most words themselves can be categorized as adhyāropas. Indeed, even a term as fundamental as ‘ātman’ is itself an adhyāropa. In the CUB 7.1.3, Śaṅkarācārya writes:

The term ‘ātman’ serves as a means of identifying it in contradistinction to the corporeal vehicle it inhabits. Moreover, the term is extended to convey the referent which persists after the repudiation of the body and other non-self entities as illusory. Finally, the word is used to reveal what is inexpressible by words.18

The term “ātman” is an adhyāropa; the aim of invoking the term is not its designation per se, but rather to draw attention to its distinctiveness from the nonself entities, to discriminate it from the nonself referents (body, mind, etc.). Loundo writes, “[Understanding it as an adhyāropa] prevents the reification of ātman and, concomitantly, of its negatum, in the process of distinguishing the former from the latter (body, etc.)” (Loundo 2015, p. 72). Similarly, the term “brahman,” derived from the verbal root “bṛḥ, expansion,” is an adhyāropa that seeks to invalidate the potential limitations associated with “ātman” (BUB 2.3.6). Most words of the prasthānatraya texts—including jīva, īśvara, jagat, avidyā, māyā, bandha, mokṣa, and so on—are adhyāropas.

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Q. 556 Unmanifest

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Q: I am trying to understand what is meant by ‘unmanifest’. Is it:

  1. an upādhi like deep sleep; i.e. a ‘state’ or a ‘subtle object’? Or, if it is not an upādhi, then presumably
  2. it is pure Brahman, with a label ‘māyā’ for the purpose of discussing creation. i.e. it is not a state or subtle object.

I think it’s #2, but I have heard that deep sleep can be equated with māyā upādhi (at the micro level) or the unmanifest. This seems a bit confusing to me as I view the deep-sleep experience as an occurrence within manifestation.

I believe the Gīta says something like… When Brahma-ji awakes it is manifestation and when he sleeps it is un-manifestation. This makes me think maybe it is like deep sleep. If this is the case, then what about before Brahma-ji? This would indicate that there is something other than or standalone from the unmanifest or prior to the unmanifest (Brahma-ji’s sleep state).

Some clarification would be greatly appreciated!

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The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 2)

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Brahmasūtra 2.2.28

Darkness as a Physical Entity

It is true that it is possible to conclude that Śaṅkara regarded darkness as an actual entity. One of the passages in support of this is his bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 2.2.28. As already noted, he is arguing with the Buddhists and talking about ‘creation’ and the existence of the world. At one point he says:  

tamaso darśanāt, prāgabhāva iva tamaso darśanaṁ dṛṣṭi-pratyakṣatvāt.

Because of the perception of darkness, it is like the perception of prior non-existence, as darkness is perceived by the sense of sight.

Here, the ‘perception’ of darkness is not, in the empirical sense, like seeing a table in the room but in a metaphorical sense, as in the way the carpenter might visualize the table before setting about making it. Thus, just as we might say that ‘darkness prevents us from seeing the table in the room’ (after it has been made!), we say that ‘ignorance prevents us from realizing that we are Brahman’. But the truth of the situation is that there is no light in the room, and no one has put the knowledge into our mind.

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Q.550 – Alzheimer’s and Self-knowledge

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Q: I read your answer to a previous question on this topic but am still not clear. What would be the state of all the knowledge of Advaita that I have acquired? E.g. I know now that I am not the doer and I should surrender the fruits of all my actions. But how can I still know this if I wake up with Alzheimer’s?

A: As I intimated in the answer to Q. 383, you have to differentiate between paramārtha and vyavahāra. In reality, there is only Brahman. There is only the appearance of people and world. They are mithyā. Their real substrate is Brahman.

We appear to have a body-mind and that body-mind is subject to disease, decay and death. This applies equally to the body-mind of the jñānī. The difference between the jñānī and the ajñānī is that the former knows that the body-mind is mithyā, while the latter doesn’t. Just as the body may suffer disease or even lose parts through accident, so the brain also is subject to illness and deterioration. Since the mind is associated with the brain, if the brain suffers loss, the mind will also. The memory may deteriorate or fail completely. This is the case irrespective of whether the jīva had previously gained Self-knowledge.

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