*** Go to Part 5 ***

Dennis: You said earlier that:

<< 3. **Your Example: Lack of Mandarin Knowledge

   – In your case, the **”lack of Mandarin knowledge”** is clearly **jñāna-abhāva**, a simple absence of knowledge, recognized epistemologically. 

   – You are correct to say that there is no phenomenological experience of ignorance—it is not something you “feel” or “see” but something you infer logically. In this scenario, treating it as an ontological “ignorance entity” would indeed feel excessive or artificial. >>

But, no – I do not ‘infer’ that I do not speak Mandarin. I know that I do not have knowledge of Mandarin – it is as simple as that.

AI: Thank you for clarifying! Let’s address this with precision.

You are absolutely right: in your case, **knowing that you do not speak Mandarin** is a direct cognition, not an inference. This does not involve any need to postulate a hidden ignorance or make an inferential leap. It is simply a recognition of the absence of knowledge—a direct awareness of what you lack.