My two-part ‘Terms and Definition’ post on ‘Enlightenment and Liberation’ triggered considerable, sometimes ‘heated’ discussion. Part 1 had 11 comments and Part 2 so many that WordPress does not seem able to cope and does not provide the ‘speech bubble’ with number of comments against the title. (I believe it was around 35.) Since it would take a reader considerable time to work through all of these, I am providing here a summary of the discussion, constructed with the help of ChatGPT.
Towards the end of those discussions, Ramesam referred to the 3-part article by P. Neti on the topic of jīvanmukti. Ramesam posted this to Advaita Vision just over 3 years ago. It begins at https://www.advaita-vision.org/on-jivanmukti-shri-p-neti-1-3/. This article plays a part in subsequent comments (so even more for those interested to read!)
Herewith, then, is the AI-assisted summary of our discussions following the terms and definition posts. Following this summary, I am going to re-post the last of Ramesam’s comments on Part 2. This is because I closed comments before responding to that. Then I will post a further comment that Ramesam sent to me privately. Finally, I will post my overall comments on the P. Neti article and Ramesam’s two comments.
I hope you can follow all of that! To recap, there is this summary, two comments from Ramesam, posted by myself, and my response to everything so far. After that is anyone’s guess as comments will again be open to all.
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Summary of Discussion on Parts 1 and 2 of Definition
The discussion has centered on a fundamental interpretative issue in Advaita Vedānta: the relationship between Self-knowledge (jñāna) and liberation (mokṣa), and the correct understanding of Śaṅkara’s statements regarding the status of the body after realization.
At the outset, the position advanced was that liberation is nitya-siddha—ever accomplished—and that what is commonly called “enlightenment” refers to the arising of Self-knowledge in the intellect. This introduces a careful distinction between two domains:
- Ontological: the Self is always free, never bound.
- Epistemological: ignorance of this fact is removed through knowledge.
This distinction, though traditional in substance, has been challenged by disputants who either explicitly or implicitly equate the arising of knowledge with the attainment of liberation, without maintaining a clear conceptual differentiation.
The Central Problem
The entire debate has gradually narrowed to a very specific interpretative difficulty in Śaṅkara’s writings. Two types of statements appear to stand in tension:
- Śaṅkara describes liberation as “unembodiedness” (aśarīratva), even as “absolute separation from the body.”
- Śaṅkara also repeatedly affirms that the body continues after the rise of knowledge, due to prārabdha karma, often illustrated by the potter’s wheel analogy.
The question posed—repeatedly in these discussions, and never directly answered—is:
How can these two statements both be maintained without qualification?
Position of the Objectors
The disputants have taken several related positions, though not always consistently.
First, they have insisted that Śaṅkara’s statement that liberation is “absolute separation from the body” should be taken literally, not figuratively. In some formulations, this has been extended to the claim that, for the realized person, the body and world no longer appear at all.
Second, they have rejected the need for reconciliation altogether. One critic explicitly stated that assuming any contradiction requiring resolution reflects misunderstanding, rather than recognising a real interpretative problem.
Third, they have characterised the appeal to figurative interpretation, or to the distinction between vyāvahārika and pāramārthika standpoints, as a “fallback position”—suggesting that such moves are ad hoc rather than grounded in Śaṅkara’s method.
Finally, there has been some criticism of terminology—particularly the use of “enlightenment”—on the grounds that it may not align with traditional pedagogical categories.
Response and Core Argument
The response throughout has been consistent and rests on a simple but powerful logical point:
If “absolute separation from the body” is taken literally, it implies the absence of a functioning body-mind. But Śaṅkara explicitly affirms that the body continues after knowledge. Therefore, both statements cannot be literal in the same sense.
This is not a matter of interpretative preference but of internal consistency.
To reinforce this, attention has been drawn to Śaṅkara’s own descriptions of the living jñānī. In particular:
- In Bhagavad Gītā 5.8–9, the jñānī is described as seeing, hearing, touching, eating, and acting.
- Śaṅkara explicitly explains that the senses continue to function in relation to their objects, even while the knower understands “I do nothing.”
- In Gītā Bhāṣya 5.13, Śaṅkara further clarifies that the body continues due to past karma already in motion, and that knowledge arises while one is still embodied.
These passages clearly presuppose the continued operation of a body-mind complex in the case of the realized person.
The Role of Interpretation
Given this, the conclusion follows that the term “unembodiedness” cannot mean the literal absence of a body. Rather, it must indicate the absence of identification with the body—that is, the cessation of adhyāsa.
This is not an arbitrary reinterpretation but a necessary one. Without it, Śaṅkara’s own teaching becomes internally contradictory.
The appeal to interpretative context is further justified by Śaṅkara’s known method of teaching, which employs:
- Adhyāropa–apavāda (superimposition and subsequent negation)
- Context-sensitive language
- Multiple standpoints (empirical and absolute)
Since non-duality cannot be directly expressed in inherently dualistic language, some degree of non-literal or pedagogical expression is unavoidable.
On the “No Appearance” Claim
One of the more sophisticated objections advanced was that, from the highest standpoint, the body and world do not appear at all for the jñānī. While this is a recognisable strand within Advaita interpretation, it raises a serious difficulty:
Śaṅkara himself continues to describe the experience and conduct of the jñānī, including perception, action, and the exhaustion of prārabdha karma.
If no body or world appears in any sense, these descriptions become unintelligible. The burden therefore falls on the objector to explain how such passages are to be understood.
No such explanation has been provided.
Clarifications Made
During the discussion, some clarifications were introduced to avoid misunderstanding:
- The jīva is effectively a (metaphorical) “mixture” of ātman and intellect – the Self associated with limiting adjuncts (upādhi). (This is explained in the long series of posts from ‘Confusions 1’ on the topic of pratibandha-s, beginning https://www.advaita-vision.org/pratibandha-s-part-1-of-6/.)
- The continued functioning of the body does not imply continued identification with it.
- The distinction between enlightenment and liberation is not metaphysical dualism, but a distinction between knowledge and the recognition of what always is.
Conduct of the Exchange
A notable feature of the discussion has been that, when pressed on the central issue, the disputants have tended to:
- shift to broader metaphysical assertions
- reject the need for reconciliation
- introduce new criticisms
- or disengage from the specific question
What has not occurred is a direct and sustained attempt to answer the core problem.
Unresolved Questions
Despite the length and intensity of the exchange, the two original questions remain unanswered:
(a)
How can Śaṅkara’s statements that:
- liberation is “unembodiedness”, and
- the body continues after the rise of knowledge due to prārabdha
be reconciled without interpreting “unembodiedness” in a non-literal (i.e. non-physical) sense?
(b)
How can the explicit descriptions of the jñānī in Bhagavad Gītā 5.8–9, together with Śaṅkara’s commentary in 5.13—which clearly presuppose a functioning body-mind—be reconciled with the claim that no body or world appears for the jñānī?
Conclusion
The discussion has shown that a strictly literal reading of all of Śaṅkara’s statements leads to contradiction. A consistent interpretation requires attention to context, standpoint, and pedagogical method.
The distinction between enlightenment (as the arising of knowledge) and liberation (as the ever-accomplished nature of the Self) remains coherent and defensible within Śaṅkara’s framework.
Most importantly, the central interpretative problem has not been resolved by the disputants, who have yet to provide a clear and consistent reconciliation of the relevant texts.
Here are Ramesam’s comments from Part 2 ot the original ‘Terms and Definition’ post:
I get the impression that Dennis is reiterating the same questions, despite the fact that they have already been addressed.
In my view, the crucial words to be properly appreciated, understood, and assimilated from Bhagavad Gītā 5.13 are: *naiva kurvan na kārayan*.
Śaṅkara explains their significance toward the end of his commentary on this verse. It would also be helpful to read Bhagavad Gītā 5.14 in continuation. So, it is not correct to stop midway in the translation of Swami Gambhirananda and raise questions.
Similarly, the full and correct purport of Bhagavad Gītā 5.8–9 does not appear to have been understood.
Bhagavad Gītā 5.8–9 states:
“Remaining absorbed in the Self, the knower of Reality should think, ‘I do nothing at all,’ even while seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, eating, moving, sleeping, breathing, speaking, releasing, grasping, opening and closing the eyes—recognizing that the organs function in relation to their respective objects.”
Shri P. Neti Ji comments:
“Where should our focus lie when reading these verses? Is it on the notion that ‘the jñāni sees,’ ‘the jñāni smells,’ and so on?
Certainly not.
Then where should the focus be? It should be on the fact that Ātman is entirely unrelated to seeing, smelling, hearing, etc. There is no real seeing, smelling, or hearing in Ātman. That is the teaching. The method is one of negation, not of positive description.
Everyone says, ‘I see.’ That is ignorance. In Brahman, there is no real seeing; and since the knower of Brahman is none other than Brahman, there is no real seeing even in the so-called seeing of a jñāni. That is the intended teaching.
Some may think that such negation implies total non-existence, but that is not so. The absence of objectified seeing does not imply the absence of seeing altogether. There is no objectified hearing, yet there is Hearing—pure Consciousness. There is no objectified seeing, yet there is Seeing—pure Consciousness. Moreover, there is no distinction whatsoever between Hearing and Seeing at that level. All such objectified experiences resolve into one undifferentiated stream of pure Consciousness, which is the Reality indicated even in deep sleep. That indeed is the highest truth.”
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.23 declares:
*“Though seeing, It does not see; for there is no cessation of the seer’s seeing, since It is indestructible. But there is no second thing distinct from It that It could see.”*
Also: *brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati* (the knower of Brahman is Brahman); *ekam eva advitīyam brahma* (Brahman is one without a second); *ayam ātmā brahma* (this Self is Brahman).
Therefore, quoting śruti to remove misconceptions is entirely appropriate and preserves its validity as a pramāṇa. Using śruti to negate empirical notions in the context of Brahman is fully in keeping with the sampradāyic method.”
I also note certain fallacies in the initial understandings. Maybe Grace help overcome such obstacles.
For example, I believe one must banish the notion: “I am ALWAYS free because the Self is ALWAYS free.” The empirical ‘I’— the individual with a specific identity, attributes such as date of birth, address, expertise, family, and so on — is not the pure Self. Śaṅkara clearly affirms this in both the Taittirīya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka bhāṣyas. Until one truly realizes “I am free” by completely shedding identification with all limiting adjuncts, the ‘I’ of our normal parlance is not free.
If further elaboration (spoon feeding) is expected, I must respectfully step back. Apart from my own limitations of time and energy, I feel that an earnest seeker must cultivate an intense desire to understand, driven by the question, “Where might I be going wrong?” rather than approaching the discussion in a purely challenging spirit.
And here is Ramesam’s further comment to me in a private post (posted here with his permission):
Regarding the deletion and reposting of my comment at your new “Summary” article:
While I have no objection in principle, I feel concerned that my observations may lose their relevance in a new context. A casual reader might find it difficult to link my original points to the updated post.
The intent of my comment was not to make a grand declaration, but rather to clarify my perspective in response to your specific remarks.
As far as I am concerned, if the core of my argument was noted by “you,” its purpose was served. My emphasis remains on three key issues specifically addressing your views/doubts:
1. The Disembodiment Gap: One need not force a link between Shankara’s stance on “disembodiment” and the physical continuity of the body post-Gnosis. I am afraid that it would be a futile attempt like trying to build a bridge between the waking state and deep sleep. (See below for more clarity).
2. Textual Precision: A correct understanding of Bhagavad Gita Bhashya 5.13–14 and 5.8–9 is essential. Misinterpreting these verses leads to fruitless conceptual errors and wasted labor on non-issues.
3. Model Integrity: It is vital to follow any alternate “model” proposed by fellow-discussants with an open mind, rather than conflating it with concepts from a different framework and raising questions.
Next, you made a reference to the Comments on Shri Neti’s articles: His first post had only three general comments.
Part 2 had thirty, though many were exchanges between you and Michael, and others are on terminological clarifications sought by Shri Chandramouli.
Part 3 which is relevant for us now, had only fourteen Comments.
They are mostly appreciations or technical queries. Crucially, none of these fundamentally opposed Shri Neti’s thesis.
Finally, I want to address the “Double Jeopardy” I mentioned previously. I believe this is the “ghost” haunting your insistence on reconciling Shankara’s apparently contradictory statements on disembodiment and the appearance of a body.
Briefly:
When we discuss the “disappearance of the world,” we typically view it from the frame of the perceived world—an ensemble of finite objects external to a “me.”
This is a flawed approach because it inadvertently assumes the finite perceiver (pramAtR) continues to exist after Self-realization. We must remember that the “me” is part of the world; the perceiver and the perceived appear and disappear together.
The second error is using the visible gross body of the mukta as a proxy for the mukta himself. This creates a double jeopardy:
• First, the gross body is perishable and cannot “attain” liberation. It is, therefore, foolhardy to think or argue as if the gross body is really the mukta!
• Second, the mukta could not retain individual identity, having merged with the infinite Brahman. The mukta is Brahman. The body only appears to act because of prakrti and past momentum—much like a pianist’s hands moving by reflex. The Self isn’t directing the show or perceiving an “outside.” It is the body which out of habit, much like Pavlov’s dog, responds to the call of its name. It doesn’t mean that the mukta is answering your call!
However, this conventional representation helps us understand how actions continue in the world of which the body is a part. In BG 5.13, Lord Krishna explains that the mukta neither acts nor causes action, despite residing in the “city of nine gates.” Just as the body of a trained athlete or musician performs through long-established habit, the mukta’s body moves via the forces of prakrti until the causal forces (prarabdha) are exhausted.
The Indwelling Self neither cognizes an external world nor directs the body. Therefore, the “disappearance of the world” is not about an external world vanishing, but about the disappearance of the finite “me” (the finite ‘seer’).
Shankara reinforces this in the Upadesasahasri: the world is a projection of the mind, and the mind itself perceives what it projects.
In closing, I believe our discussions would be greatly enriched if we strive to understand the “model” another party advocates—seeking clarification within that framework rather than approaching it with a confrontational “you are wrong” attitude.
And, finally, here are my comments on the P. Neti article and Ramesam’s two comments above. Apologies for the length of this!
I want to retain the distinction between knowledge and liberation. You (the disputant) can regard them as identical if you like but the onus is then on you to show why that is so.
Thus, we are agreed that there is ‘no real liberation’. Since there is only Brahman in reality, despite initially thinking otherwise, who-I-really-am is already free. The concept of ‘attaining’ or ‘merging’ in Brahman is meaningless in reality. Liberation is nitya siddha.
Despite this, it is an empirical fact that the jīva does not initially believe this to be so. We are now talking vyavahāra, not paramārtha! It is pointless trying to say that there is no vyavahāra in reality! In order to come to this understanding, the jīva needs the teaching of Advaita. When he has got this and assimilated the knowledge, he knows that he is Brahman and that there is no world in reality – it is name and form of Brahman. The change is that, before he did not know this; after he does know it. I.e. Self-knowledge has arisen in the intellect.
Why should anything else change? Relevant metaphors are that we still see the sun ‘rise’ even though we know the earth is rotating; we still see the earth as stationary even though it is travelling around the sun at a rate of knots, and the entire system is speeding around the galaxy. We still see the water in the mirage. We have the correct understanding (knowledge) of the truth of all of these but it does not affect our perception. Why should seeing the world of objects be any different after we learn that there is no world in reality? There still needs to be an epistemological versus ontological distinction.
Śaṅkara repeatedly distinguishes between the sublation of reality (bādhā) and the persistence of appearance (anubhava). Just as the illusion of silver is sublated while the perception of nacre remains, so too the world continues to appear after knowledge, even though it is now known to be Brahman. Your belief that no world appears for the jñānī is not argued but merely stated. Unless it can be shown how this claim accommodates Śaṅkara’s explicit descriptions of perception, action, and prārabdha, it remains entirely unsupported as well as entirely unreasonable. Resorting to pāramārthika explanations can never be acceptable if it entails a complete denial of our vyāvahārika experience and reason.
With this understanding, there then also remains a distinction between a jñānī and a jīvanmukta. While Śaṅkara equates knowledge with liberation, it is reasonable within vyavahāra to distinguish between the immediate rise of knowledge and its full assimilation (niṣṭhā), as reflected in the persistence or absence of habitual reactions.
I prefer not to speak of ‘mokṣa’ because its meaning in any given context is ambiguous. It is true that the Self is already free but the seeker has to acquire certain knowledge of this fact before he can benefit from it. The ‘liberation’ is always true and does not have to be acquired. ‘Self-knowledge’ is NOT always the case; it DOES have to be acquired. Acquiring it is what I am calling ‘enlightenment’. Consequently, these are NOT the same. If you attempt to claim that there is no jīva and the Self does not need to acquire knowledge, this risks collapsing the teaching into an immediate absolutism that bypasses the role of śāstra and instruction for the seeker. Apart from being totally alien to all of our experience, this does not work for the seeker!!
You cannot meaningfully deny the category of ‘jñānī’ without making all of the scriptural descriptions of the knower of the Self unintelligible. If, for example, you try to claim that BG 5.8-9 and Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on 5.13 are only figurative, then you are doing precisely what I was accused of doing earlier, namely selecting which aspects to construe as literal and which to construe as figurative, according to which fit in with your pre-existing beliefs! These references clearly show that the jñānī still sees a world and his body continues due to prārabdha. Resorting to Gauḍapāda’s ajāti vāda does not resolve this issue, since it is clearly a fundamental aspect of the adhyāropa-apavāda teaching.
The conclusion has to be that the jñānī is entirely a meaningful distinction in vyavahāra. Even though we all accept that, in reality, there is no creation and therefore no world or jñānī, it is still the case that there appear to be seekers who need teaching to gain Self-knowledge in order to realize this. Shankara has no problem dealing with both of these aspects. Neti’s paper does not provide any reconciliation.
Possibly the single most important point that might be made is that ‘aśarīratva’ must be interpreted as ‘absence of identification with the body’ rather than a literal ‘absence of a body’. Otherwise, Śaṅkara’s differing positions become unintelligible. If ‘aśarīratva’ is taken literally as the absence of a body, then his repeated references to the continued functioning of the body due to prārabdha become unintelligible. If, on the other hand, those references are accepted as literal, then ‘aśarīratva’ must be understood in a non-physical sense. There is no third option.
In my previous responses on the E & L part 2 thread, I kept ‘reiterating the same questions’ because the answers to them are crucial. I reiterate them now because you have neither acknowledged my interpretation nor offered any other explanation. Here they are for the nth time:
How can Śaṅkara’s statements that:
• liberation is “unembodiedness”, and
• the body continues after the rise of knowledge due to prārabdha
be reconciled without interpreting “unembodiedness” in a non-literal (i.e. non-physical) sense?
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How can the explicit descriptions of the jñānī in Bhagavad Gītā 5.8–9, together with Śaṅkara’s commentary in 5.13—which clearly presuppose a functioning body-mind—be reconciled with the claim that no body or world appears for the jñānī?
You (Ramesam) say that one should not say that ‘I am free because the Self is always free’ because this is confusing empirical with absolute. But this realization is that of the one who has gained Self-knowledge. Knowing that ‘I am Brahman’, saying ‘I’ is referring to Brahman. It must be true; it is not a mere ‘notion’. Why should one ‘banish’ it, having realized it??
You say: “If further elaboration (spoon feeding) is expected, I must respectfully step back.” Not sure what you mean here. ‘Elaboration’ is needed to explain statements that do not add up. And I suggest that ‘spoon feeding’ does not tally with ‘respectfully’! And who is the ‘earnest seeker’ and who the one explaining where the thinking is going wrong?
Regarding the points in your private post:
1. The Disembodiment Gap: Since there is clearly disagreement about the nature of Śaṅkara’s commentaries, it DOES seem to be necessary to reconcile what appear to be contradictory statements if both are taken literally.
2. Textual Precision: I entirely agree. But which of us is the one misinterpreting BG 5.8-9 and BGB 5.13?
3. Model Integrity: This surely does not apply when all parties are claiming to be following Advaita as taught by Śaṅkara?
As regards your ‘double jeopardy’accusation, I really do not understand. You say that we “inadvertently assume the finite perceiver continues to exist after Self-realization’. My assumption of this is not inadvertent, it is quite deliberate. How do you explain BG 5.8-9 if that is not the case? It explicitly says that seeing, hearing etc. continue for the jñānī, even though he now knows he is the Self and not doing anything.
Of course the body-mind is not liberated; it is inert. But the jñānī still effectively (empirically) retains ‘individual identity’ because the body-mind continues to function in the presence of Consciousness, as before, due to prārabdha.
The issue is not whether, at the highest level, there is no bondage, no world, and no jñānī—this is accepted. The issue is how Śaṅkara consistently accounts for the empirical appearance of a knower who continues to perceive and act after the rise of knowledge. Unless this is explained, appeals to the absolute standpoint merely bypass the problem rather than resolving it.
Best wishes,
Dennis