ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (concluded)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 3)

Based on Śaṅkarācārya’s statements, the PSA formulated a rigorous exposition of the continuation of prārabdha karma—and avidyā—in a jīvanmukta. Nelson (1996) documents the different arguments advanced: Vimuktātman, for example, advocates for the existence of a tangible remnant of avidyā in the jivanmukta (IS 1.9, p. 75).⁴³ Sarvajñātman employs a range of metaphorical constructs to describe the remnant of moha (ignorance) post-gnosis: scent (gandha), shadow (cchāyā), residue, impression (saṁskāra), and so on, (SŚ 4.42).⁴⁴ Citsukha delineates three forms of ignorance and argues that knowledge destroys only two forms—the third persists post-gnosis; otherwise, he argues, it would result in the immediate cessation of the body, and not admit the experience of jīvanmukti (TP, p. 394ff).⁴⁵ Prakāśātman writes that the mukta “slips into dualistic awareness (dvaita-darśana)” in his participation in the world (PPV, p. 786).⁴⁶ Building on Citsukha’s arguments, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī— and his commentator Brahmānanda Sarasvatī—declare videhamukti as “paramamukti,” hierarchically superior to jīvanmukti (AS, p. 892ff). We see here that the PSA’s (seemingly innocuous) endeavour to elucidate the persistence of prārabdha karma in the jīvanmukta compromises and undermines the very notion of mokṣa, here and now. This is akin to severing the very branch upon which one is perched.

Nelson writes,

Most important, these ideas are not relativized by shifts in ontological perspective— phenomenal ‘truth’ to absolute Truth, vyāvahārika to pāramārthika… Rather, they are taken quite seriously…. (Nelson 1996, p. 31)

He continues,

Despite protestations to the contrary, Advaita winds up with a vision of jīvanmukti that is not all that different from the Sāṃkhya position, that is, a waiting for the passing away of the world with a view to eternal, absolute “isolation” in spirit. The tradition thus loses sight of and even seems to qualify its most central doctrine: that knowledge has the radical power to neutralize ignorance and bondage irrespective of embodiedness or the lack thereof. (Nelson 1996, p. 38)

This is precisely what SSS opposes. He writes,

… some of the sub-commentators have ventured to proclaim that according to Śaṅkara, Videha-mukti (Release after death) is the only release in the primary sense and that Jīvanmukti (freedom while the knower of Brahman is alive), can be only secondary release since he has the body to sustain which a little portion or residue of avidyā continues to be till the fructifying karmas are quite exhausted! (Saraswati [1973] 1998, pp. 42–43)

According to SSS, BSB 4.1.15 (BSB 4.1.19, etc.) does not teach that the jīvanmukta does, in fact, retain a physical body and engage in ordinary/customary conduct post-gnosis, or that a “trace” of avidyā remains operative post-gnosis, etc.; it does not teach the existence of [only] certain individuals who have “achieved” mokṣa. According to SSS, Śaṅkarācārya’s argument is an adhyāropa from the vyāvahārika dṛṣṭi—a thoroughly false and strategic argument that is intended to negate certain inadvertent misconceptions about brahman. By positing jīvanmukta—his existence and experience—Śaṅkarācārya counters the erroneous notion that mokṣa can be truly attained only after the cessation of bodily existence (Saraswati [1971] 2008, pp. 131–139).⁴⁷ This adhyāropa stands sublated elsewhere. Consider, for example, Śaṅkarācārya’s commentary, BSB 1.1.4; he raises the prima-facie view:

Pūrvapakṣa: Disembodiment is a state achieved after the fall of the body, not before. Śaṅkara: No. But for the erroneous association with the physical body, there exists no other embodiment of the ātman.⁴⁸

After a protracted argument, Śaṅkarācārya establishes that given the misconception driven nature of embodiment, it logically follows that the wise, even while inhabiting a physical form, are in fact disembodied in essence.⁴⁹ He writes, “Mokṣa, [also/and] disembodiment, is eternal” (BSB 1.1.4);⁵⁰ “Liberation is simultaneous with right insight, and is directly and indubitably experienced here” (BSB 3.3.32).⁵¹ Furthermore, “Knowledge arises of itself and cancels ignorance, and on account of that, this entire world of names and forms together with its inhabitants, which had been superimposed by ignorance, vanishes away like the world of a dream” (BSB 3.2.21).⁵² These statements function as apavāda (contradictions) to Śaṅkarācārya’s earlier deliberated imputations of a jīvanmukta’s experience. Both statements—the adhyāropa and the apavāda—must be read in conjunction with each other, not as two distinct levels of reality. Each serves to restrain the incorrect connotations of the other and work in concert to eliminate misconceptions about the nature of brahman.

Here, it must be remembered that apavādas are themselves adhyāropas—as false and deliberated as the statements they contradict. To take them at face value and conclude that the world literally “fades away akin to a dream” post-gnosis would be incorrect—it would imply that (1) gnosis is a real occurrence that results from/in the elimination of ignorance, (2) that ignorance is a genuine entity to be obliterated, and so on; this would contravene the basic tenet of Advaita Vedānta that the “goal” is eternally attained. Thus, the discourse on jīvanmukti ought not to be construed as an affirmation or negation of jīvanmukti; rather, it is a mechanism to dissipate delusions surrounding the concept of mokṣa.

Furthermore, the BSB also discusses “videhamukti.” Śaṅkarācārya writes, “Thus, the inevitability of the destruction of the bondage of merit and demerit due to the power of knowledge is necessarily ascertained. When the body of the enlightened one falls away, liberation is certainly attained” (BSB 4.1.14).⁵³ But elsewhere, in a lucid statement, Śaṅkarācārya elucidates: “Upon the demise of an enlightened individual, there is no transition into a novel state that is different from their prior existential state (while in the body). The phrase, ‘dissolving in the absolute,’ connotes nothing more than the absence of transmigration” (BUB 4.4.6).⁵⁴ Here, in no uncertain terms, Śaṅkarācārya states that the purpose of imputing videhamukti is to negate the wrong notion of transmigration of ātman. SSS writes,

Failing to see that the convention of the eschatological mukti is only a concession to the Vyāvahāric view that man has a body, the Vyākhyāna schools have succumbed to the belief that release is really an event in time to be attained after exhausting all karmas. (Saraswati [1973] 1998, p. 43)

IX. Conclusion

SSS’ argument for adhyāropāpavāda as the sole pedagogical method of śruti raises a question: can there be a single, inflexible pedagogical method of śruti? Often, the differences between the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmati traditions— while readily acknowledged—are understated for they are construed as equally legitimate approaches toward apprehending the same brahman. Śrīrāma Śāstrī, for example, writes, “The intention of both the Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa traditions is to establish the ultimate non-dualistic doctrine; their differences lie in their elucidation of the empirical realm, which is only a means to this end.” (PPV, Introduction, p. 116).⁵⁵

In defense of his assertion, SSS cites Śaṅkarācārya’s refutation of his predecessors who, while advocating brahmātmaikya, espoused differing accounts of certain core tenets (e.g., Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, Prasaṃkhyānavādins, etc.). Sureśvarācārya, too, dedicated substantial portions of his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi and Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārttikam to counter the differences in the delineation of brahmātmaikya. SSS argues that their efforts to refute—not tolerate—the differences in interpretations point to the existence of a precise explication of advaita. This, he writes, is the method of adhyāropāpavāda (Saraswati 1964, I.6, pp. 5–6):

Nor was it at all the case that the commentator on the Sūtras (Śaṅkara) and the author of the Vārtika (Sureśvara) merely set their minds at rest with the reflection ‘All those theorists had Advaita as their final message’ and then remained silent. On the contrary, they stated their own method, supporting it with Vedic quotations and dialectical reasoning, and refuted the methods adopted by others as not being the right way to establish Non-Duality. For even Vedic texts are not adjudged to be an authoritative means of knowledge when they appear to be mutually contradictory and have not been brought into harmony, what to say of mere arguments. Of the various mutually contradictory theories, only one could constitute the right path. For, just as paths going in contrary directions cannot lead to the same spot, so there cannot be alternative correct views about a reality. (trans. Alston [1989] 1997, p. 14)⁵⁶

A more profound rationale for SSS’ assertion lies, I think, in the nature of the problem itself: of articulating what cannot be articulated. Articulation necessitates a concession to our empirical experience. This is—unavoidably, inescapably—adhyāropa. Adhyāropas must necessarily be retracted lest they be misconstrued to be true. This is—unavoidably, inescapably—apavāda.⁵⁷ It is therefore that SSS maintains, “The method employed throughout all the classical Upaniṣads is one in essence, [but it] assumes many different forms,” (Saraswati 1964, Introduction, p. 136).⁵⁸

It must be mentioned that SSS refrains from a categorical dismissal of the entire commentarial tradition, and cautions against such an extreme stance.⁵⁹ That he recognizes the commentators’ contributions—clarifications that enriched his own comprehension of Śaṅkarācārya—is evident in his writings. His chief—if only—concern is reification that ultimately undermines advaita.

While SSS has not offered clear reasons for the divergences in the commentarial tradition, he suggests that the PSA, (perhaps) in their attempt to meet the challenges from their philosophical adversaries, fixated (disproportionately) on elucidating the nature of constructs such as the jīva—its nature, its relationship with brahman—īśvara, avidyā, and so on, to a point of endowing them with almost an autonomous reality of their own.⁶⁰ Also, the influence on the PSA of other variants of philosophy cannot be discounted.⁶¹ Most importantly, there is perhaps an inherent inclination of the human mind towards reification; SSS hints at this when he writes, “Innate tendency of the human mind, however, soon asserted itself, and Advaita Vedanta succumbed to the in-roads of realism in the garb of Advaita itself,” (Saraswati 1966, p. 5). To avoid reification, then, would necessitate a sustained vigilance against it, and for this reason, I think SSS’ characterization of the method of adhyāropāpavāda as a “rahasya” (secret) technique of the Upaniṣads (Saraswati 1964) stands justified: not on account of its ‘concealment,’ deliberate or otherwise, but on account of the inherent complexity in its rigorous application. As such, further exploration and clarification of the role and purpose of adhyāropāpavāda in Advaita Vedānta is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of this complex and nuanced philosophical system.

*** End of Part 4 and Text.
Part 5 contains a list of abbreviations and all of the references ***