ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 2)

VI. Adhyāropāpavāda According to the PSA

For the PSA, “Brahman can only be shown, not described” (Murthy 1959, p. 57), albeit in a circuitous, approximate manner (“adūraviprakarṣeṇa”).²⁷ The crux of this position lies in the contention that although brahman eludes direct descriptive elucidation (abhidhā), it retains a semblance of apprehensibility through indirect means (lakṣaṇā). Vācaspati Miśra illustrates with an example: in order to explain gold, we point to gold ornaments—earrings, bracelets, etc—and explain it as the substance that assumes these various shapes; it is that which remains when the shapes no longer do. In a similar manner, the śruti “points to” the world-appearances to “show” brahman as that which assumes these various appearances; it is also what remains when the appearances no longer do (Bhāmati 1.1.4).

Accordingly, for the PSA, adhyāropāpavāda is one method to “show” brahman.²⁸ Consider the stock example of Bhagavadgītā 13.14–15. In the verse 13.14, brahman is said to possess karmendriyas (hands, feet, etc.) and jñānendriyas (eyes, etc.). According to the PSA, this is an adhyāropa that is useful in drawing attention to the existence of brahman as that which permeates everything—including the human body and the sensory organs— and allows movement/perception to occur: ‘immanent’ brahman (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165). Ānandagiri writes, “The faculties of the body are a function of the consciousness that enlivens them; through them, the presence of brahman (as consciousness) can be recognized.”²⁹ The śruti, thus, ‘points’ to brahman with the help of the attributes in accordance with the arundhati darśana nyāya. This is adhyāropa. In the verse immediately following this, brahman is said to be “without senses” and “devoid of qualities.” This is an apavāda that contradicts the preceding adhyāropa to point to brahman’s ‘transcendent’ nature (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165).³⁰

Here, the method of adhyāropāpavāda—like the other purported method, lakṣaṇā, does not directly refute ignorance; it ‘indicates’ brahman in a rather positive, if approximate, manner.³¹ It must be noted that barring a few exceptions (VS, for example), the method is not discussed extensively in the texts of the PSA. Ultimately, according to the PSA, ignorance is only ‘destroyed’ with the dawn of ‘akhaṇḍākāravṛttijñāna’—the impartite knowledge of the self, generated by the mahāvākyas, through which brahman is directly perceived.³²

VII. Interpretative Divergences

SSS’ fundamental critique of the PSA lies in their propensity to construct dogmas from the adhyāropas while disregarding their primary objective of negating innate superimpositions. For SSS, an adhyāropa’s significance lies in the negation—not in the assertion—of conceptualizations of brahman (or the jīva/jagat, etc.). According to him, a complex edifice of soteriological theories results in an insubstantial construct that serves no functional purpose except to engender barren intellectual debates. Conversely, the adhyāropas, in and of themselves, effectuate the abrogation of specific natural/undeliberated imputations, thus bringing the seeker closer to the ultimate aim.

To illustrate, consider the discussion on “‘the question of the two Brahmans,’ the lower and the higher, the brahman with qualities and without” (Hirst 2006, p. 117). The PSA acknowledge that “causality/creatorship” in the Upaniṣadic passages is an adhyāropa, its singular purpose to establish kārya-kāraṇa-ananyatva.³³ Notwithstanding, they try to address the “incoherence” it creates, and this leads them down a metaphorical rabbit hole.

“Causality,” implies activity and change—qualities that cannot be logically associated with brahman. To solve this theoretical conundrum, the PSA posit a lower-order brahman—saguṇa brahman/ īśvara—and ascribe “creatorship” to Him, thus “protecting” nirguṇa brahman from the limitations of “creatorship” (Rambachan 2001, p. 14ff). The idea of a lower-order īśvara is absent in Śaṅkarācārya’s works. While the term occurs in countless instances in them, it is indistinguishable from brahman in the absolute sense. It is in the later commentarial tradition—especially post-eleventh century C.E.— that “īśvara” comes to stand hierarchically lower to the absolute brahman (Andrijanić 2022).

Jñānaghanapāda, for example, defines īśvara as the reflection of brahman in ignorance.³⁴ Clearly differentiating īśvara from brahman, Sarvajñātman, in his SŚ 1.20, writes that it is ignorance that conceals the highest ātman, and projects upon it the false phenomena of the world, īśvara and jīva (Andrijanić 2022).³⁵

SSS (Saraswati [1969] 1996, p. 31) demonstrates that the difference between parabrahman and aparabrahman asserted/mentioned in texts like BSB 4.3.7, BSB 4.3.14, Muṇḍakopaniṣad 3.2.9, Praśnopaniṣad 5.2, and so on, is refuted in the same or in a different portion of the text. In the context of BSB 4.3.14, for example, when an interlocutor presents an objection against the postulation of two brahman(s) on the grounds that it would impinge upon the principle of non-duality, Śaṅkarācārya counters with the argument that the purported differentiation between these two entities is only temporary— from a conventional epistemic ground; it must not be reified for it stands sublated elsewhere.³⁶

Unfortunately, after a time, it is almost entirely forgotten that “causality,” “īśvara,” and so on, are adhyāropas. Consider, for instance, Appayya Dīkṣita’s model of soteriology, sarvamukti: Dīkṣita argues that jīvas— reflections of īśvara—do not directly and individually realize their non-dual nature upon gnosis; rather, they attain identity with īśvara. As īśvara, omniscient and omnipotent, they sustain and govern the world until a time when each jīva attains liberation. Finally, all the “liberated” jīvas—as īśvara—together with the entire universe merge into brahman, and the game officially ends (SLS).

This type of elaborate theorization is, according to SSS, erroneous for it (1) detracts from the original purpose of the deliberated adhyāropas, and (2) fails to fulfill any meaningful purpose.³⁷ For SSS, Śaṅkara did not intend to construct a rigorous and precise philosophy of Advaita Vedānta³⁸—this effort was entirely the PSA’s; rather, he aimed at a rigorous and precise method of thinking/reasoning that removed one’s ignorance about ātman/brahman.

VIII. Adhyāropāpavāda in Action

Let us explore how adhyāropāpavāda—as SSS delineates—operates. Consider the issue of jīvanmukti. For the PSA, jīvanmukti is a problematic issue because of its paradoxical nature which entails the knowledge of the eternal, non-dual self while still in a physical body. The physical body is a manifestation of prārabdha karma; it is of the realm of avidyā. The knowledge of brahman—vidyā—on the other hand, annihilates avidyā, and consequently, karma. The fact that the physical body continues to persist even after the attainment of knowledge raises a question: how can there be “avidyā post-vidyā”? (Fort 1998, p. 7).

The PSA offer a variety of answers to it: that the knower is “bodiless” while embodied; that there is a practical significance of jīvanmukti which allows enlightened teachers to remain in a physical form and guide those who are still ignorant; that prārabdha karma—and consequently, a remnant/trace of avidyā—persists even after liberation, and so on.

Despite valiant attempts to clarify the issue, the concept continues to pose a conundrum for the PSA.³⁹ While Śaṅkarācārya has endorsed the different PSA explanations at various instances, SSS argues that his responses are not intended to form a comprehensive theory of jīvanmukti. In this section, I shall demonstrate—as an exemplar—the application of SSS’ method of adhyāropāpavāda in the context of jīvanmukti. Due to the limited scope of the article, I restrict the discussion to the BSB. Here, Śaṅkarācārya discusses—explicitly and implicitly—the state of a jīvanmukta. Let us consider the statements in turn.

A primary question that Śaṅkarācārya addresses is, is the jīvanmukta, in fact, embodied? If yes, how/why? An answer that he furnishes in BSB 4.1.15 is that knowledge does not destroy karma that has begun to fructify: it annihilates anārabdha karma—that which has not begun to fructify; ārabdha karma, on the other hand, must complete its course, and exhaust itself. The continued bodily existence of the jīvanmukta is, therefore, due to the continuation of prārabdha karma: like an arrow following its initial propulsion (BSB 3.3.32), or the potter’s wheel that continues to rotate after the potter ceases his efforts, prārabadha karma endures its momentum until it dissipates.⁴⁰

Śaṅkarācārya substantiates the argument with CU 6.14.2: “For him, the delay is only so long as he is not released; then he attains.” Furthermore, he illustrates the persistence of ignorance in the jīvanmukta with an analogy: much like a person who, after visual correction, continues to see two moons for a period, the jīvanmukta remains in the physical form and continues to apprehend the phenomenal realm despite gnosis (BSB 4.1.15).⁴¹ BS 4.1.19 (bhogena tvitare kṣapayitvā sampadyate) reiterates the idea.⁴²

*** Go to Part 4
Part 5 contains a list of abbreviations and all of the references ***