Tag Archives: satyam

Being: the bottom line (Conclusion)

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(Read Part 1)

Another misleading claim is that “there’s no one bound and therefore no liberation from bondage.” This sounds very clever and obvious and is very likely to be accepted without question by the listener, adding still more to the ammunition against the traditional Advaitin position. But everything should be questioned! Advaita is a supremely logical and scientific philosophy if followed correctly and glib statements such as the above must be looked at carefully. (And it is acknowledged that ‘glib’ here is a ‘loaded epithet’!) Traditional Advaita does not, in fact, claim that there can be liberation from bondage. In fact, it is stated openly that there is not actually anyone bound. What is said is that there can be the realisation that there is no one who is bound – and that is liberation.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 4)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (concluded)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 3)

Based on Śaṅkarācārya’s statements, the PSA formulated a rigorous exposition of the continuation of prārabdha karma—and avidyā—in a jīvanmukta. Nelson (1996) documents the different arguments advanced: Vimuktātman, for example, advocates for the existence of a tangible remnant of avidyā in the jivanmukta (IS 1.9, p. 75).43 Sarvajñātman employs a range of metaphorical constructs to describe the remnant of moha (ignorance) post-gnosis: scent (gandha), shadow (cchāyā), residue, impression (saṁskāra), and so on, (SŚ 4.42).44 Citsukha delineates three forms of ignorance and argues that knowledge destroys only two forms—the third persists post-gnosis; otherwise, he argues, it would result in the immediate cessation of the body, and not admit the experience of jīvanmukti (TP, p. 394ff).45 Prakāśātman writes that the mukta “slips into dualistic awareness (dvaita-darśana)” in his participation in the world (PPV, p. 786).46 Building on Citsukha’s arguments, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī— and his commentator Brahmānanda Sarasvatī—declare videhamukti as “paramamukti,” hierarchically superior to jīvanmukti (AS, p. 892ff). We see here that the PSA’s (seemingly innocuous) endeavour to elucidate the persistence of prārabdha karma in the jīvanmukta compromises and undermines the very notion of mokṣa, here and now. This is akin to severing the very branch upon which one is perched.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 3)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 2)

VI. Adhyāropāpavāda According to the PSA

For the PSA, “Brahman can only be shown, not described” (Murthy 1959, p. 57), albeit in a circuitous, approximate manner (“adūraviprakarṣeṇa”).27 The crux of this position lies in the contention that although brahman eludes direct descriptive elucidation (abhidhā), it retains a semblance of apprehensibility through indirect means (lakṣaṇā). Vācaspati Miśra illustrates with an example: in order to explain gold, we point to gold ornaments—earrings, bracelets, etc—and explain it as the substance that assumes these various shapes; it is that which remains when the shapes no longer do. In a similar manner, the śruti “points to” the world-appearances to “show” brahman as that which assumes these various appearances; it is also what remains when the appearances no longer do (Bhāmati 1.1.4).

Accordingly, for the PSA, adhyāropāpavāda is one method to “show” brahman.28 Consider the stock example of Bhagavadgītā 13.14–15. In the verse 13.14, brahman is said to possess karmendriyas (hands, feet, etc.) and jñānendriyas (eyes, etc.). According to the PSA, this is an adhyāropa that is useful in drawing attention to the existence of brahman as that which permeates everything—including the human body and the sensory organs— and allows movement/perception to occur: ‘immanent’ brahman (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165). Ānandagiri writes, “The faculties of the body are a function of the consciousness that enlivens them; through them, the presence of brahman (as consciousness) can be recognized.”29 The śruti, thus, ‘points’ to brahman with the help of the attributes in accordance with the arundhati darśana nyāya. This is adhyāropa. In the verse immediately following this, brahman is said to be “without senses” and “devoid of qualities.” This is an apavāda that contradicts the preceding adhyāropa to point to brahman’s ‘transcendent’ nature (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165).30

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 2)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 1)

  1. Levels of Deliberated Attribution in the Prasthānatraya Texts

According to SSS, deliberated attribution occurs on three distinct levels in the texts of the prasthānatraya:16 words, sentences, and methodological procedures or prakriyās employed to articulate the inquiry.17 Each of these levels can be illustrated with examples. Consider the level of words. It is notable that most words themselves can be categorized as adhyāropas. Indeed, even a term as fundamental as ‘ātman’ is itself an adhyāropa. In the CUB 7.1.3, Śaṅkarācārya writes:

The term ‘ātman’ serves as a means of identifying it in contradistinction to the corporeal vehicle it inhabits. Moreover, the term is extended to convey the referent which persists after the repudiation of the body and other non-self entities as illusory. Finally, the word is used to reveal what is inexpressible by words.18

The term “ātman” is an adhyāropa; the aim of invoking the term is not its designation per se, but rather to draw attention to its distinctiveness from the nonself entities, to discriminate it from the nonself referents (body, mind, etc.). Loundo writes, “[Understanding it as an adhyāropa] prevents the reification of ātman and, concomitantly, of its negatum, in the process of distinguishing the former from the latter (body, etc.)” (Loundo 2015, p. 72). Similarly, the term “brahman,” derived from the verbal root “bṛḥ, expansion,” is an adhyāropa that seeks to invalidate the potential limitations associated with “ātman” (BUB 2.3.6). Most words of the prasthānatraya texts—including jīva, īśvara, jagat, avidyā, māyā, bandha, mokṣa, and so on—are adhyāropas.

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Q.526 MithyA

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Q: In your comment on the article by Arun Kumar, I was confused but intrigued that you define Mithya as something that simply explains the fundamental nature of the Brahman in life and its objects. I have not so far found any dictionary that defines mithya as anything other than false or illusory nor discovered any major scholar-philosopher who thought that Shankara viewed this world as a reality – as real as the ornament in your metaphor. You say that Shankara himself by discriminating between the waking and dream states suggests that novel meaning of Mithya. Is this your own interpretation or does Shankara himself link the ability to differentiate between those states to explain mithya?

You raise the example of how jumping into the middle of traffic would help one realize why this world is NOT an illusion… but it is not convincing enough. Potentially, both a person jumping in front of a truck and his consequent “death” could be perceived as illusory events too. The real question I have is whether Shankara himself viewed this world as illusion and used Mithya to convey that or not. And, if it was an illusion for him, what did he think the meaning of life was? If on the other hand life was Not an illusion to him, as you seem to suggest, what was its purpose in that case?

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bAdha versus nAsha

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The following was posted to the Advaitin List by Satyan Chidambaran, who has agreed for me to record it here.

There is a distinction between bAdha (sublation) and nAsha (destruction) that the tradition makes.

To know that a Pot is not real, and only clay alone is real, one shouldn’t need to destroy (engage in nAsha of) the Pot appearance. One just needs to know clearly that the Pot is just a name and form and Clay alone really exists. Therefore, even when seeing a Pot, a “Clay j~nAnI” knows clearly that the Pot is mithyA nAma rUpa and Clay alone is satyam. This is bAdha of the Pot.

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Q. 514 Some thoughts on ‘Truth’

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Q: Are true and false relative opposites, like fast and slow?

A: Wow – a difficult one!

To some extent, I think both depend upon context (so would have to be ‘relative’). Fast and slow are a good analogy. These still have an ‘absolute’ sense: ‘Fast’ (with capital letter) must be speed of light; ‘Slow’ must be stationary. Similarly, most statements can be construed as true or false ‘to a degree’, can’t they?

Here is the opening from the Philosophy Foundation website on ‘Truth-Falsity’:

Are these a) true, b) false, c) neither or d) both?

    ‘I am 20.

    ‘I am me.’

    ‘The Simpsons is a really good programme.’

    ‘I am shopping in Lewisham’ (when the speaker is shopping, but not in Lewisham)

    ‘This cake is made of jelly’ (when it is half jelly and half something else).

    ‘2 + 2 = 4’

    ‘Unicorns only have one horn.’

    ’10 grains of sand make a heap.’

    ‘This sentence is false.’

    ‘Aliens exist.’

Makes you think, doesn’t it?!

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Q.494 Brahman and the World

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Q: There is potential confusion between ‘knowing about it’ and actually ‘being it’; between ‘self-realization’ and ‘self-actualization’. ‘Knowing about it’ is in the mind, whereas ‘being it’ has nothing to do with the mind. Along these lines is why Nisargadatta always said that who-we-really are is prior to the body-mind and Consciousness and to leave them alone.

What are your thoughts about all this?

A: Basically, we are already Brahman. The problem is that we do not know it. Remove the ignorance and we realize the truth. You cannot ‘experience’ or ‘perceive’ Brahman. You can only realize that we are it. Hence, the term ‘anubhava’ is misunderstood and modern teachers have been propagating a misunderstanding of the teaching. The term ‘self-actualization’ is definitely a modern one, I think, and can mean nothing. How can you ‘make actual’ what is already the case? Continue reading →

Q.492 Consciousness and consciousness

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Q: Shankara often wrote the descriptor “pure Consciousness” to point to Brahman.
1. What does “pure Consciousness” have to do with conventional consciousness, as in “I’m conscious of this or that?” Does chidabhasa explain it?

A: chidAbhAsa is the best metaphor, I think, (it is pratibimba vAda and associated with vivaraNa). The other main one is avachCheda vAda, associated with bhAmatI, which uses the idea of upAdhi-s. Consciousness (big ‘C’) is typically used to refer to non-dual reality; ‘c’onsciousness is the manifestation of ‘C’onsciousness in the mind of man.

2. Is there a difference between Consciousness (as-if paramartha level) and existence?

A: As you know (!) you cannot define or say anything objective about Consciousness. Ideally  you should read the long Shankara commentary on satyam j~nAnam anantam brahma in Taittiriya Upanishad 2.1. That explains how such ‘descriptions’ work. The adjectives qualify-support-limit each other so that you do not take any single one as in any way a descriptive attribute. If you want, you could say that Brahman is limitless-existence-consciousness. But at the pAramArthika level, you cannot say anything at all about Brahman!

3. If there is a difference, which is more fundamental: Consciousness or existence? I.e. which gives rise to which? Why (not the other way)?

A: I cannot really add anything to the previous answer.

Q.446 satyam, j~nAnam anantam brahma

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Q: Does the phrase satyam j~nAnam anantam brahma means truth-knowledge limitless or Existence-consciousness limitless? (The latter is the definition given by Swami Dayananda in one of the summer camp tapes.)

A: Strictly speaking, sat means real, existence or being; sattA means being or existence; satya means truth or being. If you look up ‘existence’, you will probably find asti or astitvam. If you look up ‘sat’ in Monier-Williams, one of the meanings is ‘that which really is, entity or existence, essence, the true being or really existent’. If you look up ‘sattva’, you get ‘being, existence, entity, reality, true essence’.

So the answer is that both are used in either context and there is no clear meaning associated with either (and I have come across both being used in both meanings. I am fairly sure that Swami D has used both to mean ‘existence’ and both to mean ‘truth’. Sanskrit is a very versatile language! (But, if you ever come across me using it clearly in one way and Swami D using it in another, take Swamiji’s meaning! He knew Sanskrit inside out; I don’t!) Continue reading →