“At the beginning of all things, there was neither being nor non-being, and what existed was an impenetrable darkness” – R.V. X 129.

“From the unmanifested (asat) the world of names and forms (sat) is said to arise.” – Taittiriya Up ll.7.1 (S. Radhakrishnan trans.)

(The manifested universe – the world of names and forms – is called sat, and its unmanifested condition asat. The possible or potential is prior to the actual… Asat, non-existent, does not mean absolute non-being. It is a state in which name and form were not manifested: avyakrta-nama-rupam – S. Radh.)

In the Chandogya Up there is this: “in the beginning this was non-being. That was being; it came into existence… “ – CU, lll.19, The Upanishads, trans. & ed. Valerie J. Roebuck (2003). (In Radhakrisnanan trans.: “In the beginning this (world) was non-existent. It became existent. It grew… “)

As Valerie J. Roebuck notes, this is in apparent disagreement with the following:

“In the beginning, good lad, this was being*, one alone without a second. Some say, ‘In the beginning this was not-being, one alone without a second. From that not-being, being was produced’. But, good lad, how could that be?, he said. How could being be produced from non-being? In the beginning, good lad, surely this was being, one alone without a second.

‘It thought, ‘Let me become many; let me be born’” (CU Vl. 2. 1-2)

*Under Note 36, V. J. Roebuck writes: “That was being: Or perhaps, ‘it became being, though the verb used is asit, not abhavat’.

Note. Any thoughts on the above, or is it clearly only an apparent contradiction? Secondly, what does ‘becoming’ mean in an ambience of non-duality, e.g. the unmanifest ‘becoming’ manifested?

Some interesting contrast and parallels can be made between the non-duality of the Indian subcontinent and the philosophical thought of the greatest Western philosopher, Plato. The concept of Becoming is a case in point. This term has, for the latter, both epistemic and ontological connotations. Its primary meaning – as doxa – is opinion, in particular true opinion (epistemology), but it is also akin to the Shankhyan concept of prakrity – underlying matter, material cause, or matrix (ontology).

On the other hand, the Platonic Becoming resembles ‘mithya’ (not true, not false): a mistaken identification, mistaking resemblance (or appearance) for identity, that is, sensible appearance for true reality. Doxa or opinion usually refers, in the Greek philosopher, to a state of indiscriminate cognition, mixing the particular with the ideal or universal, the unreal with the real, reminiscent of the double notion of avidya-adhyasa or mutual superimposition of the unreal and the real of Shankara’s philosophy.

From the stand-point of advaita  Becoming is related to the vyavaharika view-point, where it has practical validity in the empirical realm. It is applicable to the disciplines of psychology, biology, and the process of knowledge/knowing, etc.

What about the notions of apparent transformation (Vivarta-vada) and real transformation (Parinama-vada), which appear to be related to Becoming one way or another? The latter, promoted by Shankhya philosophy, is refuted by Shankara and his followers as a metaphysical theory related to the cause of the world; this leaves aside the frequently quoted example of milk turning into curds of phenomenal reality, which is taken to be a real ransformation.

Concerning change and Becoming, which are practically equivalent metaphysical concepts, the final word lies with Shankara (and Gaudapada): “What is never ceases to be; what is not never comes into being”. At this level of understanding there is neither time, space nor causation.

[Love thoughts]… dissolve the belief systems that had created the false knowledge, in particular the arrogant belief, “I know something, I know things”. All I know is, “I am” and “There is something rather than nothing”. That’s all we know and all we can know; the rest is speculation. (p. 29)

 

Before its encounter with the truth, the old belief system was standing proudly on the beach, pretending to be a castle. Now it is only sand, waiting to be washed away by the wave of truth bearing down on it. (p. 98)

   

‘Truth Love Beauty’, Francis Lucille.

It is interesting to compare the different accounts of ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’ as coming from two traditions that are wide apart, as India and ancient Greece are; though it is known that there was a contact between the two at the time of Alexander the Great (cf. ‘The Questions of king Milinda’ – a debate between a Buddhist (Nagasena) and a Greek savant, namely, the king himself, Menander/Milinda).

‘True belief’ does sound rather awkward (and so it did to Plato’s – or Socrates’ – ears), or unusual, but, in my opinion, is close to shradda and shabda.

How deep is the difference between the two accounts?

 *

 (Shabda. One of the meanings of that term is ‘scriptural authority’.)

“According to Vedanta, implicit belief or faith (shradda) is the acceptance of, or the reliance on, the words of the trustworthy, which need no verification. It is other than credulity or gullibility. It is conviction of truth and tantamount to valid knowledge… Shabda as a source of valid knowledge means agama, authentic word that is free from all defects. It is a canon of knowledge recognized by most Indian systems of thought that the words of such persons as are free from delusion, error, deceit, and defects of the senses and the mind are a source of valid cognition. Thus, reason is implicit in faith. It is not unreasonable to rely on the reliable.” ‘Methods of Knowledge – According to Vedanta’, Swami Satprakashananda. Continue reading →

In the context of the spiritual path one chooses (or is chosen for), love and devotion are parallel to the ‘faith’ or trust one has, or must have, in the validity and benefit attending that path. These are foundational elements or requirements in this regard. Without going into the four prerequisites of sadhana-chatustaya, the two above qualities plus sincerity (alternately, intense desire for liberation, or for the truth), which leads to persistent effort (the ‘skillful means’ of Buddhism) are essential. It is thus not just one or another, but all three of those requirements that must be present. But ‘three is one’, and, if one would have to choose, one would choose mumkshutva or earnestness, which is equivalent to intense desire for the truth.

Sometimes it is said that there is only one path, meaning that the destination is always the same (“all roads lead to Rome”), and that the effort and dedication are also one and the same; but this does not take away from the fact that traditionally three paths are listed, which obeys to the nature of things, or of men. Evidently there are men (and women) more predisposed – vocationally, or by constitution – to follow one rather than another of the three – karma yoga, bhakti yoga, and jñana yoga (there is a fourth one, Raja yoga – the Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali being the classical text –  which requires complete control of the senses and mind, and where deep meditation and samadhi play  important roles).

Traditionally – in different cultures – three types of men have been considered to exist: men of action, men of devotion or passion, and then the intellectual ones (Salvador de Madariaga, Spanish professor of English in Oxford, UK, wrote an interesting book: ‘Ingleses, Franceses y Españoles’, where he described with psychological acumen and powers of observation three types of  – European – men: Englishmen (‘men of action’), Spaniards (‘men of passion’), and French (the intellectual, the ‘thinkers’). But also, in classical Antiquity, the same, or similar, characterization was made: hylic (action), psychic (bhaktic-karmic), and pneumatic (intellectual or contemplative predominantly).

In modern times the German psychiatrist Kretschmer, and the American psychologist Sheldon classified human types into pyknic, athletic, and asthenic or leptosomatic (Kretschmer), and, correspondingly, endomorphic, mesomorphic, and ectomorphic, (Sheldon). The pyknic type can be intellectual or bhaktic, but certainly not given to athletic prowess or performances. A significant correspondence is also: sattva=pneumatic, rajas=psychic, and tamas=hylic or somatic.

It can be seen from the above that the bhaktas are an intermédiate category, the “higher” being pneumatics, and the “lower” psychics. The jñani, in principle, has the quality of a pneumatic. In fact, however, owing to human imperfection (if we may say so), he may “live beneath himself”, and, in the manner of a psychic, may have to make an effort of the will in order to become his “true self”.

If now our happiness consisted in doing, I mean choosing, greater lengths and avoiding smaller, where would lie salvation? In the art of measurement or in the impressions made by appearances? Haven’t we seen that the appearance leads us astray and throws us into confusion….?  Plato – Protagoras, 356 d.

Eikon (image or appearance) is a versatile concept in Plato’s usage, always referring to the external or material – temporal, finite – world (1), as against the ideal – eternal, infinite – one. Eikon is either an image of an image, such as reflections in water or polished surfaces, or the material objects themselves. These latter are images of the only reality there is, that of eide (Ideas or Forms) – the ‘Intelligible world’, the former one being the ‘Sensible world’ – that of appearances or phenomena … (1) Elsewhere time is seen as an ‘image’ of eternity.

(From an unpublished article)   Gitti@pixelio.de (photo)