The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 4)

*** Read Part 3 ***

Observations triggered by Ghaṭa bhāṣya

If X is ‘bhāvarūpa’ – really existing, that ought to mean that it exists ‘in all three periods of time’. I would have said that, by that definition, like every other worldly perception or conception, darkness is not real. Every perception or conception is ‘mithyā’, neither ‘real’ (sat), nor ‘unreal’ (asat).

When Śaṅkara talks about ‘pot-absence’, it is obvious that he doesn’t mean that it is a really existing thing, in the way that a chair in the room ‘really exists’. What he means is that, in a discussion in a particular context such as this, we can treat something as ‘effectively existing’ when we both know what we are talking about and there is no confusion.

Suppose that you and I are having an argument about the pot that we believe to be on the table in room X of the museum. Suppose a third person comes in and tells us he has seen this pot on the table in room Y. This being the case, if I go into room X, I could say that I become aware of the absence of the pot. In that sense, it has a sort of meaning to say that the pot-absence exists in room X. But why anyone would want to talk in this way eludes me. I would just say that the pot isn’t in room X so I am prepared to accept the third person’s claim that it is in room Y.

Continue reading

The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 3)

*** Read Part 2 ***

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.2.1

Absence

What is ‘absence’? It is simply a word we use to refer to the fact that something is not here. Suppose that the teacher realizes that little Johnny is not in the class again. He reports this to the head who says: “His absence has been noted”. What does this mean exactly?

Does it simply refer to whatever the headmaster has written in his little black book? Is it something belonging to Johnny that he ought to get rid of or leave at home when he comes into school? Presumably he cannot bring it with him to school because then he would no longer have it!

Obviously ‘absence’ in this context refers to Johnny himself. If Johnny’s absence is noted at the school, then clearly Johnny himself is not there. The two are mutually exclusive.

But all of this simply relates to the often baffling way in which language develops. All that we are talking about is whether or not Johnny is present at the school. When he isn’t there, we use this catch-all word to refer to the situation. The way in which we use it is as an adjective describing Johnny – ‘absent Johnny’ (again). We cannot use it as a non-qualified noun and say ‘there is absence’, because no one would know what we were talking about. It has to be connected to a noun and simply refers to the ‘non-presence’ of that noun.

Continue reading

The reification of ignorance

The reification of ignorance or the One-percent Brigade

There has recently been a brief spate of posts relevant to this topic on the Advaitin List. I rarely post there these days for fear of getting involved in long arguments with members committed to opposing views. But, after someone claimed that 99% of Advaitins accepted that ‘ignorance’ was a really existent entity, I posted to assert my membership of the ‘1% Brigade’, explaining that “I mainly wanted to reassure those readers who were dismayed to think that they were in the 1% and apparently did not understand Advaita!”

What I said was:
“(In volume 2 of ‘Confusions’), one of the aspects that I specifically address is the notion of avidyā as a really existent entity and I am afraid that I have to conclude, using reason and common sense, as well as the quotations, that what is meant by ‘ignorance’ is simply ‘lack of knowledge’. Essentially, it is a language problem. So, yes, there is certainly ignorance in the deep-sleep state, simply because the mind is resolved and incapable of having knowledge about anything. But there is no mūlāvidyā, I’m afraid. And I hope that many will be convinced if they read all of the arguments.”

Continue reading