The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 4)

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Observations triggered by Ghaṭa bhāṣya

If X is ‘bhāvarūpa’ – really existing, that ought to mean that it exists ‘in all three periods of time’. I would have said that, by that definition, like every other worldly perception or conception, darkness is not real. Every perception or conception is ‘mithyā’, neither ‘real’ (sat), nor ‘unreal’ (asat).

When Śaṅkara talks about ‘pot-absence’, it is obvious that he doesn’t mean that it is a really existing thing, in the way that a chair in the room ‘really exists’. What he means is that, in a discussion in a particular context such as this, we can treat something as ‘effectively existing’ when we both know what we are talking about and there is no confusion.

Suppose that you and I are having an argument about the pot that we believe to be on the table in room X of the museum. Suppose a third person comes in and tells us he has seen this pot on the table in room Y. This being the case, if I go into room X, I could say that I become aware of the absence of the pot. In that sense, it has a sort of meaning to say that the pot-absence exists in room X. But why anyone would want to talk in this way eludes me. I would just say that the pot isn’t in room X so I am prepared to accept the third person’s claim that it is in room Y.

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The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 3)

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Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.2.1

Absence

What is ‘absence’? It is simply a word we use to refer to the fact that something is not here. Suppose that the teacher realizes that little Johnny is not in the class again. He reports this to the head who says: “His absence has been noted”. What does this mean exactly?

Does it simply refer to whatever the headmaster has written in his little black book? Is it something belonging to Johnny that he ought to get rid of or leave at home when he comes into school? Presumably he cannot bring it with him to school because then he would no longer have it!

Obviously ‘absence’ in this context refers to Johnny himself. If Johnny’s absence is noted at the school, then clearly Johnny himself is not there. The two are mutually exclusive.

But all of this simply relates to the often baffling way in which language develops. All that we are talking about is whether or not Johnny is present at the school. When he isn’t there, we use this catch-all word to refer to the situation. The way in which we use it is as an adjective describing Johnny – ‘absent Johnny’ (again). We cannot use it as a non-qualified noun and say ‘there is absence’, because no one would know what we were talking about. It has to be connected to a noun and simply refers to the ‘non-presence’ of that noun.

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The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 2)

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Brahmasūtra 2.2.28

Darkness as a Physical Entity

It is true that it is possible to conclude that Śaṅkara regarded darkness as an actual entity. One of the passages in support of this is his bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 2.2.28. As already noted, he is arguing with the Buddhists and talking about ‘creation’ and the existence of the world. At one point he says:  

tamaso darśanāt, prāgabhāva iva tamaso darśanaṁ dṛṣṭi-pratyakṣatvāt.

Because of the perception of darkness, it is like the perception of prior non-existence, as darkness is perceived by the sense of sight.

Here, the ‘perception’ of darkness is not, in the empirical sense, like seeing a table in the room but in a metaphorical sense, as in the way the carpenter might visualize the table before setting about making it. Thus, just as we might say that ‘darkness prevents us from seeing the table in the room’ (after it has been made!), we say that ‘ignorance prevents us from realizing that we are Brahman’. But the truth of the situation is that there is no light in the room, and no one has put the knowledge into our mind.

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