Tag Archives: Knowledge

Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 3

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*** Go to Part 2 ***

Dennis: You say that treating ignorance as a term of convenience for lack of knowledge “may not fully capture the nuances of traditional Advaita”. Did Śaṅkara make a clear distinction?

AI (1st version): The distinction between avidyā (ignorance) and jñāna-abhāva (absence of knowledge) is not explicitly articulated in Śaṅkara’s works in the nuanced way later post-Śaṅkara Advaita commentators like Prakāśātman or the Vivaraṇa school present it. Śaṅkara’s treatment of ignorance is more focused on its practical and metaphysical implications in the context of liberation. Here’s a closer look:

Śaṅkara’s Treatment of Avidyā

    Ignorance as the Root Cause of Bondage

        Śaṅkara consistently identifies avidyā (ignorance) as the root of saṃsāra (the cycle of birth and death). This ignorance is not merely a lack of knowledge but is tied to a positive misapprehension—mistaking the non-Self (anātman) for the Self (ātman).

        For example, in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra (1.1.4), Śaṅkara writes:

            “Ignorance is the superimposition (adhyāsa) of the qualities of the non-Self (anātman) on the Self (ātman).”

        Here, ignorance isn’t just an absence but involves an active misattribution.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 2

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Dennis: I know that I cannot speak Mandarin. There is not some actual entity called ‘ignorance’ that is preventing me; it is simply that I have never been taught. And I do not experience an ‘ignorance of that language’. I would call it a simple ‘lack of knowledge’. It is epistemology, not ontology.

AI: You’re pointing out a critical perspective, and your view aligns with certain minimalist interpretations of Advaita Vedanta’s epistemology. Let’s break this down further:

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1. **Epistemology vs. Ontology

   – You are arguing that the **”ignorance of Mandarin”** is not an ontological entity; rather, it is the absence of knowledge due to not having been taught. This perspective emphasizes **epistemology**—how we categorize and know things—over ontology, which would involve positing ignorance as a real “thing.”

   – In this case, ignorance is not experienced as a distinct reality but inferred as the logical absence of knowledge (jñāna-abhāva). Your stance aligns with this understanding.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge?

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Part 1 – (This will be a multi-part post.)

This is a topic that I addressed extensively in the second ‘Confusions’ book – ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta: Ignorance and its Removal’ (due out by Summer 2025). But it has appeared in various guises over the past 2 or 3 months on the Advaitin List. One particular member – Sudhanshu Shekhar – has been particularly vociferous in espousing the view that they are not equivalent. He is extremely knowledgeable, especially regarding the text ‘Advaita Siddhi’, by the 16th-17th Century author Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, which strongly supports this idea. In ‘Confusions 2’, I strongly advise against looking at many of these post-Śaṅkara authors on the grounds that a) they are extremely difficult, often verging on incomprehensible; and b) their views, ostensibly to ‘clarify’ the views of Śaṅkara, mostly seem to do nothing of the kind, instead adding merely academic, intellectual arguments that confuse the issues.

Be that as it may, a recent post by Sudhanshu apparently stated the issues clearly so that the arguments could be examined. Unfortunately, the post contained lots of Sanskrit and was not immediately comprehensible to me, whose Sanskrit knowledge is largely limited to interpreting the Devanagari script (very slowly) and looking words up in the dictionary. Accordingly, I decided to put the text to AI (ChatGPT) for interpretation. A very interesting ‘discussion’ followed, which actually opened my mind to an aspect that had not previously occurred to me and that slightly mitigates my previous, hardline stance.

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Is Reality Knowable?

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The affirmation that reality is not knowable is itself an assertion of knowledge about reality. Does this not, though, amount to an example of the law of non-contradiction? To deny that it is so, involves the law of non-contradiction – so this proves that reality is knowable?

(X). The assertion “this sentence is false” is self-contradictory. From that contradiction, one cannot draw the conclusion that the sentence is in fact true. It is simply evidence of the fact that language can be used to construct self-contradictory statements.

(Martin) Rather than self-contradictory, isn’t the quoted statement in the original question a case of second-order language, that is, meta-language, as with so many paradoxes and apparent contradictions?

(X). Are you suggesting that, because it involves meta-language, it thereby avoids contradiction?

(Martin). Yes, but rather than meta-language (my mistake) the quoted passage is, seems to me, an elliptical statement. To complete it one should add: ‘by the conceptual mind’, i.e., ‘not knowable by the conceptual mind’. Real (ultimate) Reality, being non-dual, cannot be known (as you well know) as a conjugation or conjunction of a subject and an object. But it can be ‘Known’ through a unitary vision or intuition – the intuiting subject abating or subsiding as an individual by that very act. There is only one ‘Knower’ or Subject, and that is Reality Itself. ‘One without a second’. Does this prove that reality is knowable?” (under the text in bold letters). Yes, with that proviso.

(X) (Previously he had written: ‘I think one would have to insert ‘’by the conceptual mind’’ in two places to make it explicit that it is referring to conceptual knowledge, not non-conceptual non-dual knowledge. Or is your point that two different kinds of knowledge are involved in the original statement? In any case, I still don’t see how it constitutes a proof in the logical sense.’

(Martin) Correct, thank you. There is a tendency nowadays in Neo-advaita and other circles to put down the mind, let alone terms such as ‘intellectual’, ‘spiritual’, ‘metaphysical’ ‘mysticism’ (‘It’s just mind stuff’… only intellectual knowledge, or understanding’, etc.).

‘Experiential’, ‘experience’ alone are admitted in the vocabulary. I like, though, the expression ‘knowledge-experience’. All experience, and all understanding, reside in the mind (formerly, sometimes, ‘the Heart’), but the latter can be transcended.

(X) The irony is that putting down the thinking mind is itself a judgment of the thinking mind. One way to view it, which I find quite useful, is that the thinking mind can help reveal its own limits, and that can clear the way to insight that transcends the thinking mind. The classic metaphor is the wooden stick used to help burn the fire, and, at the end, the stick itself is thrown into the fire as well. The stick does not cause the burning, and it is ultimately itself burned, but that does not imply it is useless and should be tossed off into the bushes instead of skillfully used to facilitate the burning.

The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 6)

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*** Read Part 5 ***

‘Existence’ of Ignorance

So, does ignorance actually exist; a concrete ‘object’ in space and time? There is the occasional reference in the scriptures (e.g. in the Ṛg Veda) but these speak of related gods, supernatural events and so on. Where such a concept is a part of the pseudo-mystical precursor of Advaita teaching proper, I personally cannot accept it as a valid reference. E.g. I suggest that ‘before light, there was darkness’ does not count as a proof that darkness is an ontologically existent entity!

There are also references in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and Sureśvara’s Vārttika on Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya but, again, this being the oldest of the Upaniṣads, there is a lot of ‘mystical’ material much pre-dating Śaṅkara’s systematization of the philosophy.

One of the quotations sometimes given to support the contention that scriptures cite ignorance as a real entity is Sureśvara’s Vārttika on Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa (1368):

ajñānaṃ saṃśayajānaṃ miśyājānamiti trikam
ajñānaṃ kāraṇaṃ tatra kāryatvaṃ pariśiṣṭayoḥ

This is translated as:

Ignorance, doubt-born knowledge, and mixed knowledge are the triad. Ignorance (ajñāna) is the cause there, while the other two (doubt-born knowledge and mixed knowledge) are effects.

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The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 5)

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*** Read Part 4 ***

Tamas

‘Darkness’ is also used in the sense of the ‘primordial condition’ of the universe prior to creation. In this sense, it is not metaphorical but part of the ancient Hindu cosmology. It appears, for example, in Ṛg Veda 10.129: “In the beginning, there was darkness (tamas) hidden in darkness. All this was one undifferentiated water.” And the stage of pralaya, when the universe returns to unmanifest form, is sometimes described as darkness. A number of Puranic references could be quoted, e.g. the Vishnu Purana (Book 1 Chapter 1): “At the end of the previous kalpa, there was only one vast ocean, enveloped in darkness (tamas). The universe was in total dissolution, and nothing but the incomprehensible God, Vishnu, existed.” The darkness also symbolized the formlessness prior to creation.

This usage as an existent entity is not really the same as the metaphorical usage in which it symbolizes ignorance or ‘absence of knowledge’.

Darkness as Metaphor

In the context of discussions on ignorance, then, darkness is not intended to be considered as a real entity but as a metaphor for ignorance. We can see how this is both useful and potentially misleading. If we think of the common ‘concealing’ usage of the word – e.g. we could not see the stalactite in the cave because it was ‘covered by’ darkness – then we are in trouble. If we simply rephrase this to say that, because there was no light in the cave, we could not see the stalactite, there is no problem.

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The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 4)

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Observations triggered by Ghaṭa bhāṣya

If X is ‘bhāvarūpa’ – really existing, that ought to mean that it exists ‘in all three periods of time’. I would have said that, by that definition, like every other worldly perception or conception, darkness is not real. Every perception or conception is ‘mithyā’, neither ‘real’ (sat), nor ‘unreal’ (asat).

When Śaṅkara talks about ‘pot-absence’, it is obvious that he doesn’t mean that it is a really existing thing, in the way that a chair in the room ‘really exists’. What he means is that, in a discussion in a particular context such as this, we can treat something as ‘effectively existing’ when we both know what we are talking about and there is no confusion.

Suppose that you and I are having an argument about the pot that we believe to be on the table in room X of the museum. Suppose a third person comes in and tells us he has seen this pot on the table in room Y. This being the case, if I go into room X, I could say that I become aware of the absence of the pot. In that sense, it has a sort of meaning to say that the pot-absence exists in room X. But why anyone would want to talk in this way eludes me. I would just say that the pot isn’t in room X so I am prepared to accept the third person’s claim that it is in room Y.

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Q. 553 – Mind and Causality

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Q: Does the mind play a causal role in enlightenment? If not, then it seems that no change can actually happen. But then we say that there is now Self-knowledge where before there was ignorance. If the mind is neither cause nor instrument, then surely there can be no Self-knowledge because no change can have occurred.

Furthermore, if the mind isn’t a factor, preparatory practices can be dispensed with and ultimately the understanding isn’t something which takes place in time. Is that what’s meant by the mind having no causal role? That realization isn’t something which happens in time? Am I missing something here please?

A: I think that your problem here is failing to differentiate absolute and empirical reality. The bottom line is that there is only Brahman or Consciousness. And you cannot say anything more. (Even that is too much.)

From the standpoint of empirical reality (vyavahāra), there certainly is causality. Enlightenment is the ‘event’ in the mind when the above is realized to be true beyond any shadow of a doubt. And there are certainly causes for this. The first of these is the preparation of the mind – sādhana catuṣṭaya sampatti. Then there is śravaṇa – listening to a qualified teacher or reading very good books; and manana – clarifying doubts by asking someone who knows the answers to your questions. These are all causes, hopefully leading to eventual enlightenment. Being enlightened is having knowledge of the Self. Not being enlightened is not having that knowledge. (Beware of thinking that there is a positive thing called ‘ignorance’ – I have just written a book about this.)

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Q.552 – Teaching and Seeking

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Q: I’m currently reading ‘Back to the Truth’ and I can see you have presented a holistic view of Advaita. But I am curious. In your journey, having investigated all these schools, which do you prefer? Which teachers or schools do you think are best or have been most helpful to you? Or if you could choose just one school, book or guru to study, which would it be?  Also, what is your main spiritual practice? What aids have been most helpful to you?

Do you think that, reading books on Advaita becomes at a certain point not so helpful anymore; after you realize the only thing to truly do as ego is just self-enquiry and turning within?

A: I wrote ‘Back to the Truth’ nearly 20 years ago. I considered writing a second edition, in which quite a bit would change, but my publisher wasn’t interested. Instead, I began a series of books on ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta’. The scriptures (Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita and Brahmasutras) are the source of the teaching. Many modern ‘teachers’ are either unaware of this or simply do not bother to read them. Traditional teaching is the ONLY reliable, consistent, reasonable, proven method. This teaching was systematized by Adi Śaṅkara but, even here, many subsequent ‘traditional’ teachers have distorted, mistranslated or misrepresented him.

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Eight Upanishads (Topic-wise) Part 2

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Part 1

Chapter 1 General Introduction

1-2 PramAna  VedAnta accepts six sources of knowledge called PramAna. Direct perception: Sense organs directly perceive and give information. Inference: It is an indirect knowledge of something not in the range of direct perception. There is knowledge of fire when smoke is seen. Presumption: Knowledge about something in the past by directly perceiving something different in the present. On seeing a wet street in the morning, there is knowledge of rain in the night. Comparison: It is knowledge of something derived by comparison. There is knowledge of a wild buffalo in the forest because it resembles the buffalo seen in the village. Non-cognition: Knowledge of the absence of something by non-cognition. Seeing a chair in a room gives the knowledge of the absence of an elephant in the room. Testimony: It is knowledge derived from written or spoken words. I read a Physics book Physics to get the knowledge of laws of motion.

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