Tag Archives: mithya

Review of article on Shankara – part 6, and final.

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RB (Ramakrishna Balasubrahmanian) continues to take  SSS to task in the final two sections of his article: 5) ‘AVIDYA and MAYA’, and 6) ‘“COMPARATIVE BASHYA STUDIES” AND OTHER SUCH DISEASES’.

Under 5) RB sees an inconsistency in SSS, since the latter had previously stated that avidya and maya are not synonyms, while in another context he had stated that “To avoid confusion, we shall restrict the use of words avidy¯a and m¯ay¯a to denote ignorance and name and form respectively”. The author insists in the equivalence of both terms, as they occur in many texts: “… note that even in these passages avidy¯a is not a “subjective” ignorance, but something which transcends subjectiveness and objectiveness. Otherwise we will be placed in the absurd position of claiming that a subjective error, i.e., avidy¯a, is causing an objective reality, i.e., m¯ay¯a (name and form)”.

By ‘objective reality’ one understands, of course, phenomena, and this is nothing else than mithya, even though RB considers maya as both ontic and epistemic, unlike avidya. In this connection, SSS would agree with his statement: “While the terms are used to mean different things in some contexts, they can also mean the exactly same thing in some other contexts”. Continue reading →

Topic of the Month – Appearance and Reality

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dubrovnik_wallThe topic for June 2014 is Appearance and Reality.

Things are not necessarily how they initially seem to be!

Everything apart from Consciousness (brahman-Atman-turIya) is mithyA; only That is satyam. The metaphors of dreams and rope-snakes are highly relevant!

Please submit your quotes, short extracts or personal blogs on this topic!

Revision of ‘Review of article on Shankara’ – Part 5

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A tarka (reasoning, argumentation) is required for the analysis of anubhava, as both SSS and RB (the author) agree – consistent with Shankara’s position. That is, language and thought, needless to say, have a role to play, chiefly for exposition and analysis.

However, after two long, dense paragraphs RB contends: “If the tarka required to examine anubhava is itself completely dependent on ´sruti, then by no means is anubhava the ‘kingpin’ of pram¯an.as.”

Prior to this, SSS was quoted as maintaining that “for this unique tarka all universal anubhavas or experiences (intuitive experiences) themselves are the support.” The author states that this affirmation involves circular argumentation, and that to say that Shankara interprets the Vedas as being consistent with anubhava is wrong, the truth being the other way around, anubhava is consistent with the Vedas: “it should be clear that according to Sure´svar¯ac¯arya, the direct realization is directly from just ´sruti itself, thus satisfying the criteria for it to be a pram¯an.a…. The direct realization of the self is from ´sruti alone.” Continue reading →

Revision of ‘Critical review of article on Shankara’ – part 2

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‘A New Approach to Understanding Advaita as Taught by ´Sa ˙ nkara Bhagavadp¯ada’ – by Ramakrishnan Balasubrahmanian – 2

We saw in the 1st part of this Review the primary or prior, not to say exclusive, importance that the author, RB, gives to the superimposition of a subject, individual mind or jiva, on the self: “the superimposition of an observer is avidy¯a and is prior to the reverse superimposition” – not mentioning that Shankara does not talk of a ‘reverse process’, as if it was something happening through time, but of mutual superimposition of self and non-self. Period.

As we noted in the first part of this Review, RB ‘half’ concedes the point:  “It is not completely incorrect to say that avidy¯a is the mutual superimposition of the real and unreal. ´ San˙ kar¯ac¯arya and Sure´svar¯ac¯arya do mention this … the superimposition of an observer on the inner-self naturally leads to the reverse process of superimposing the inner-self on the inner organ”. His objective in maintaining this priority of the subject in this ‘act’ seems to be to show that SSS is guilty of circularity (petitio principi, in logic). Even so, and rather surprisingly, he claims that avidya is not something subjective (neither is it ontic nor epistemic – see below). Continue reading →

More on ekajIva vAda

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Rather than add more comments to the ‘mokSha for All’ thread, I thought it better to make this a separate post. It is the same topic but here I posed a question to AchArya Dr. Sadananda of Chinmaya Mission, Washington, whom I have known for a long time. I have interposed comments in his response and his follow-up comments have been added in green.

Dennis:

 Obviously any statement about the ‘nature’ of absolute  reality can only be made from the jIva’s standpoint; i.e. an  ‘as though’ pAramArthika statement made in vyavahAra. Thus, any talk about a world is clearly a vyAvahArika statement;  aham brahmAsmi is an ‘as though’ pAramArthika statement.

Sada:

Dennis – aham brahmaasmi is statement of understanding of the truth – it is recognition of that paaramaarthika state but expressed using the instruments available in vyavhaaha that is the BMI. It is not just vyaavahaarika statement about paramaarthika state. It is like when I say sugar is sweet – it is statement which may not mean much to a listener who may not know what sweetness means, but it means a lot to one who knows and is the statement born of direct experiential understanding – or aparoxaanubhuti. Continue reading →

Q. 358 – mAyA and avidyA

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Q:
1) If Atman is perfect, how can it ever be deluded by mAyA?

2) What is the source of avidyA? If there is only brahman, how and why does avidyA exist?

Answers are provided by: Ted, Martin, Shuka, and Dennis.

A (Ted):
1) Atman (i.e. pure limitless awareness) is never really deluded by mAyA (i.e. ignorance), but rather only apparently so.  Given the non-dual nature of reality and, thus, the fact that Brahman-Atma is the only thing — though, of course, pure awareness cannot be said to be a “thing” at all due to its attributeless and unobjectifiable nature — that exists, mAyA is nothing other than Brahman-Atma itself.  That is, it is a power inherent in the very nature of Brahman-Atma.  Ironically, if Brahman-Atma, whose nature is limitless, were limited by the inability to apparently delude itself, it would not be limitless and, therefore, would not be Brahman-Atma :-). Continue reading →

Q. 357 – Existence of Objects

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Q.  Dear Dennis,
 
I bought and read two of your ebooks and liked them so much then I looked at your blog and came across this:

http://advaita-academy.org/blogs/DennisWaite.ashx?Y=2010&M=November

You say objects really exists, Advaita is not idealism, it is realism. I don`t understand this, in your book you use dream metaphor, you use “cinema” metaphor you even said in your book:
 
“He goes on to explain that our normal states of consciousness – waking, dream and deep sleep – are at the level of appearance. Reality is the non-dual background to these states. Just as our dreams seem real to the dreamer, so this world-appearance seem real to the waker. But, on waking, it is realized that those dreams are nothing but an illusion generated by the mind.
 
Similarly only on awakening to god-consciousness will you appreciate and realize the staggering truth that there exists nothing other than Brahman everywhere. Until that supreme state is reached, the universe will appear real. Living in your present state of ignorance you will have to accept the world that you experience. But at the same time try to contemplate and realize the truth proclaimed by Self-realized souls that Brahman alone exists.”
 
  So you changed your mind after writing the book and now you say World-appearance is real, Advaita is realism and there is no illusion at all?
 
I`m confused, can you explain? Continue reading →

Difference

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differenceVive la difference!

I am still in the process of writing my next book on the Mandukya Upanishad and kArikA-s. I have just written the following section on the concept of ‘difference’. Since I posted a query to the Advaitin group, relating to what Swami Paramarthananda had said on the topic, I concluded by sending the completed section to the group. Accordingly, I am also posting this here.

In his commentary on this kArikA (2.34), Shankara touches on the logic of this concept of ‘difference’ and Swami Paramarthananda expands upon this. What, he asks provocatively, is the color of the difference between red and blue? Clearly, it is potentially a very important topic since, if it could be proven logically that the idea of ‘difference’ is incoherent on examination, it would effectively demonstrate the non-dual nature of reality. Numerous post-Shankara philosophers have looked into this and formulated involved arguments. There is extensive material in the post-Shankara texts of brahmasiddhi, iShTasiddhi, tattvashuddhi, khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya and chitsukhI/tattvadIpikA but, having looked at these, they seem too impenetrable to study in detail. (No references are given for these – you really don’t want to read them!) Continue reading →

Mithya, Mythology, and Metaphysics – an exchage lll

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I think that all these points or clarifications are important in our discussion, and are directly related to the 5 sections or categories listed above. We can see, in particular, how exoteric monotheism (The Old Testament of Christianity) tends to authoritarianism and rigid views… and persecution of ‘heretics’ and infidels. The same thing applies to Islam (Sufism is “for the few”, and it is peaceful). Pneumatic temperaments are a minority, the majority being either psychic or hilic (or a mixture).

3. “Can the knowledge of good and evil be viveka, the ability to distinguish ātmā from anātmā?” I think the answer is No, from what I said re morality vs. knowledge (jñana).

This leads me to what you write concerning Iswara (section 4): “Īśvara is pure limitless existence-consciousness together with its intrinsic potential for manifestation (māyā)”. It represents all cosmic laws and, clearly, is not the stern, authoritarian God of  Old Testament Christianity, or the God  of Islam, who appears as more generous and loving. Jesus, on the other hand, can be said to represent the logos (buddhi) of Neo-Platonism and Gnostic Christianity. Is Iswara not impersonal, unlike Krishna and Rama? One difference is that God’s laws are decrees and ordinances (commands), whereas Iswara’s laws are cosmic and impersonal; “it is what it is”, as you say; obedience has a different tinge in either case.

Coming to the nitty-gritty – for all the forgoing is as a preamble – I have to make a confession: I have been associated, perhaps for too long, with a Sufi organization led by F. Schuon, whose platform is traditionalism (called perennialism in N. America). The originators were R. Guénon and FS; important figures, among others: Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and Titus Burkhardt. You can check on this, but, evidently, there is an element of romanticism or nostalgia (for times passed), as well as anti-modernism (favoring, among many of its adherents, homeopathy, anti-evolutionism, and anti-Vatican II). Tradition did nothing wrong; the longer you cast your gaze back, the purer, uncontaminated it is (a sort of Arcadia). I don’t want to be ironic (nor repentant), but, simply, I took their views in that realm as quasi-ontological principles, with a heavy emphasis on the ugliness and deviancy of modern civilization. That can explain the quasi-traditional interpretation of the Garden I offered you, relieved by the metaphysical bent within it.

5. I accept the account you give of the Garden in terms of the significance of the serpent, with its promise of knowledge of “good and evil” (what you write about the “awakening of the feminine” is wonderfully inspiring). I think it is correct on the whole, and reminds me of some other instances in mythology to that effect (recently attended a performance of the Ring of the Nibelungs, by R. Wagner, where Faffner, a giant (a dragon or serpent in other Germanic stories), makes its appearance. This being is avaricious but has supra-human abilities, like understanding the songs of birds. The Titans of Greek mythology were also benefactors of mankind. So, knowledge? Yes, but it comes with a price… and a risk. The risk is that  serpents and dragons are ambivalent beings; they are not just friendly, or helpful to man; some danger may lurk hidden in them, like a poison, or a fiery breath. Myths have the characteristic of being polysemic (having several meanings)

The price to pay is that none other than a hero can conquer them before they release their boon/treasure.

Science and technology come at a price, which may be too high; time will tell. I am not in favor or against science and technology; it is here, and is still making in-roads, as something that had to happen: inevitable, given man’s abilities and ambitions: “to conquer Nature”, “discover its secrets”. How many are looking inside themselves, would be followers of Jesus, or of the dharma? A few are. The final point I wanted to make is to ponder on the meaning of the Greek word ‘hubris’, and I would leave you there. But before that, I would also make a plea for exoteric religion, including the bhakti way: from what we saw before, it is not all negative; it is, for a majority of people, the only way of advancement in a meaningful, spiritual way, and it brings cohesion, as well as beautiful art (painting, music, mystical poetry, etc.)

 

 

Mithya, Mythology, and Metaphysics – an exchange, ll

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13.5.2013

“All that now exists will die” (The goddess Erda, in Wagner’s opera Das Rheingold, 4th scene)

M: P, I have to commend you for the exacting work and research you have done on The Terrestrial Garden in such a short time. I am in substantial agreement, as you will see, with much of what you are saying, but take some exception with respect of part of the methodology (parallelisms mostly, rather than contrasts) you use, which has consequences to me either excessive or unwarranted. Also, agree that it is  “pointless to look for the single Truth in this story”. I start with some observations in the way of contrasts (rather than parallelisms or analogies): ‘unlike’, rather than ‘like’, realizing that I am not actually discovering anything new to you.
1. Mythology vs. Mithya

2. Monotheist exoterism (Moses, Old Testament) vs. Esoterism (Jesus,
New Testament)

3. Right and wrong (ethics & morality; or ‘moralism’) vs. sat-asat
(metaphysics or spiritual science)

4. (Christian) God vs. (Hindu) Ishvara

5.  a) Knowledge, empirical, religious, philosophical (‘categorial’) vs.
KNOWLEDGE (reality, realization)

5b) doctrine (theory) vs. method (practice)

1. We could consider, I think, The Garden of Eden, or Terrestrial
Garden, as a myth, like that of Prometheus, or the deeds of heroes –
as much in the East as in the West (puranas, sastras, sagas). They are
illustrative, imaginative stories applicable to man and society (or
collectivities). Not so mithya, which belongs to the spiritual or
metaphysical science of the Indian tradition exclusively, as you know
(that is, esoteric or sapiential: jñana). They (myth and mithya) are
quite different; though there is an overlap in the way we can make use
of them in order to bring out a deeper understanding of something
which may only be implicit in them. I think this is what phenomenological
analysis consists of (briefly, ‘the contents of consciousness’ – to be
elicited). Also, myth and mithya are in the same relationship as pratibhasika and vyavaharika – the first of each pair being merely illusory, subjective, imaginary. Continue reading →