Tag Archives: shankara

Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 6

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*** Go to Part 5 ***

Dennis: You said earlier that:

<< 3. **Your Example: Lack of Mandarin Knowledge

   – In your case, the **”lack of Mandarin knowledge”** is clearly **jñāna-abhāva**, a simple absence of knowledge, recognized epistemologically. 

   – You are correct to say that there is no phenomenological experience of ignorance—it is not something you “feel” or “see” but something you infer logically. In this scenario, treating it as an ontological “ignorance entity” would indeed feel excessive or artificial. >>

But, no – I do not ‘infer’ that I do not speak Mandarin. I know that I do not have knowledge of Mandarin – it is as simple as that.

AI: Thank you for clarifying! Let’s address this with precision.

You are absolutely right: in your case, **knowing that you do not speak Mandarin** is a direct cognition, not an inference. This does not involve any need to postulate a hidden ignorance or make an inferential leap. It is simply a recognition of the absence of knowledge—a direct awareness of what you lack.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 5

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*** Go to Part 4 ***

Dennis: Does Śaṅkara actually state that adhyāsa is the effect of causal avidyā in his Bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda Kārikā 1.2? If so, what are his actual words and the translation?

AI: In his commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on Gauḍapāda’s *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* 1.2, Śaṅkara indeed connects **adhyāsa** with **avidyā** as its cause. His words suggest that **avidyā** (ignorance) is the reason for the mistaken superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of one thing onto another. Let’s examine this carefully with the original text and its meaning.

—

### **Text from Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda Kārikā 1.2**

The verse from Gauḍapāda’s *Kārikā* reads:

> **अद्वयम् अस्पृष्टं वचसामगोचरं। अज्ञानात् सर्वजीवेषु व्यापारोऽयम् अनादि:।** 

> (*Advayam aspṛṣṭaṁ vacasām agocaraṁ. Ajñānāt sarvajīveṣu vyāpāro ’yam anādiḥ.*) 

**Translation of the verse:** 

“The non-dual (Brahman) is untouched, beyond the reach of speech. Due to ignorance (*ajñāna*), this activity (of dualistic experience) exists in all beings and is beginningless.”

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 4

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*** Go to Part 3 ***

Dennis: But surely adhyāsa is the result of lack of knowledge and there is no need to postulate an existent entity called ‘ignorance. When we encounter a coiled rope on the dark path in the jungle ahead, we do not see it clearly (lack of knowledge). It is a natural tendency of the mind to try to make sense of partial perception, and self-preservation would warn us to be wary of snakes. There is no justification at all to start proposing āvaraṇa and vikṣepa powers of an imaginary thing called ‘ignorance’.

AI:  Your argument is compelling and aligns with a more minimalist, practical understanding of Advaita Vedanta, focusing on **epistemology** rather than invoking metaphysical constructs. Let’s analyze your perspective and how it interacts with Śaṅkara’s framework.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 3

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*** Go to Part 2 ***

Dennis: You say that treating ignorance as a term of convenience for lack of knowledge “may not fully capture the nuances of traditional Advaita”. Did Śaṅkara make a clear distinction?

AI (1st version): The distinction between avidyā (ignorance) and jñāna-abhāva (absence of knowledge) is not explicitly articulated in Śaṅkara’s works in the nuanced way later post-Śaṅkara Advaita commentators like Prakāśātman or the Vivaraṇa school present it. Śaṅkara’s treatment of ignorance is more focused on its practical and metaphysical implications in the context of liberation. Here’s a closer look:

Śaṅkara’s Treatment of Avidyā

    Ignorance as the Root Cause of Bondage

        Śaṅkara consistently identifies avidyā (ignorance) as the root of saṃsāra (the cycle of birth and death). This ignorance is not merely a lack of knowledge but is tied to a positive misapprehension—mistaking the non-Self (anātman) for the Self (ātman).

        For example, in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra (1.1.4), Śaṅkara writes:

            “Ignorance is the superimposition (adhyāsa) of the qualities of the non-Self (anātman) on the Self (ātman).”

        Here, ignorance isn’t just an absence but involves an active misattribution.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 2

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*** Go to Part 1 ***

Dennis: I know that I cannot speak Mandarin. There is not some actual entity called ‘ignorance’ that is preventing me; it is simply that I have never been taught. And I do not experience an ‘ignorance of that language’. I would call it a simple ‘lack of knowledge’. It is epistemology, not ontology.

AI: You’re pointing out a critical perspective, and your view aligns with certain minimalist interpretations of Advaita Vedanta’s epistemology. Let’s break this down further:

—

1. **Epistemology vs. Ontology

   – You are arguing that the **”ignorance of Mandarin”** is not an ontological entity; rather, it is the absence of knowledge due to not having been taught. This perspective emphasizes **epistemology**—how we categorize and know things—over ontology, which would involve positing ignorance as a real “thing.”

   – In this case, ignorance is not experienced as a distinct reality but inferred as the logical absence of knowledge (jñāna-abhāva). Your stance aligns with this understanding.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge?

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Part 1 – (This will be a multi-part post.)

This is a topic that I addressed extensively in the second ‘Confusions’ book – ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta: Ignorance and its Removal’ (due out by Summer 2025). But it has appeared in various guises over the past 2 or 3 months on the Advaitin List. One particular member – Sudhanshu Shekhar – has been particularly vociferous in espousing the view that they are not equivalent. He is extremely knowledgeable, especially regarding the text ‘Advaita Siddhi’, by the 16th-17th Century author Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, which strongly supports this idea. In ‘Confusions 2’, I strongly advise against looking at many of these post-Śaṅkara authors on the grounds that a) they are extremely difficult, often verging on incomprehensible; and b) their views, ostensibly to ‘clarify’ the views of Śaṅkara, mostly seem to do nothing of the kind, instead adding merely academic, intellectual arguments that confuse the issues.

Be that as it may, a recent post by Sudhanshu apparently stated the issues clearly so that the arguments could be examined. Unfortunately, the post contained lots of Sanskrit and was not immediately comprehensible to me, whose Sanskrit knowledge is largely limited to interpreting the Devanagari script (very slowly) and looking words up in the dictionary. Accordingly, I decided to put the text to AI (ChatGPT) for interpretation. A very interesting ‘discussion’ followed, which actually opened my mind to an aspect that had not previously occurred to me and that slightly mitigates my previous, hardline stance.

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Q. 556 Unmanifest

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Q: I am trying to understand what is meant by ‘unmanifest’. Is it:

  1. an upādhi like deep sleep; i.e. a ‘state’ or a ‘subtle object’? Or, if it is not an upādhi, then presumably
  2. it is pure Brahman, with a label ‘māyā’ for the purpose of discussing creation. i.e. it is not a state or subtle object.

I think it’s #2, but I have heard that deep sleep can be equated with māyā upādhi (at the micro level) or the unmanifest. This seems a bit confusing to me as I view the deep-sleep experience as an occurrence within manifestation.

I believe the Gīta says something like… When Brahma-ji awakes it is manifestation and when he sleeps it is un-manifestation. This makes me think maybe it is like deep sleep. If this is the case, then what about before Brahma-ji? This would indicate that there is something other than or standalone from the unmanifest or prior to the unmanifest (Brahma-ji’s sleep state).

Some clarification would be greatly appreciated!

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The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 5)

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*** Read Part 4 ***

Tamas

‘Darkness’ is also used in the sense of the ‘primordial condition’ of the universe prior to creation. In this sense, it is not metaphorical but part of the ancient Hindu cosmology. It appears, for example, in Ṛg Veda 10.129: “In the beginning, there was darkness (tamas) hidden in darkness. All this was one undifferentiated water.” And the stage of pralaya, when the universe returns to unmanifest form, is sometimes described as darkness. A number of Puranic references could be quoted, e.g. the Vishnu Purana (Book 1 Chapter 1): “At the end of the previous kalpa, there was only one vast ocean, enveloped in darkness (tamas). The universe was in total dissolution, and nothing but the incomprehensible God, Vishnu, existed.” The darkness also symbolized the formlessness prior to creation.

This usage as an existent entity is not really the same as the metaphorical usage in which it symbolizes ignorance or ‘absence of knowledge’.

Darkness as Metaphor

In the context of discussions on ignorance, then, darkness is not intended to be considered as a real entity but as a metaphor for ignorance. We can see how this is both useful and potentially misleading. If we think of the common ‘concealing’ usage of the word – e.g. we could not see the stalactite in the cave because it was ‘covered by’ darkness – then we are in trouble. If we simply rephrase this to say that, because there was no light in the cave, we could not see the stalactite, there is no problem.

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The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 4)

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*** Read Part 3 ***

Observations triggered by Ghaṭa bhāṣya

If X is ‘bhāvarūpa’ – really existing, that ought to mean that it exists ‘in all three periods of time’. I would have said that, by that definition, like every other worldly perception or conception, darkness is not real. Every perception or conception is ‘mithyā’, neither ‘real’ (sat), nor ‘unreal’ (asat).

When Śaṅkara talks about ‘pot-absence’, it is obvious that he doesn’t mean that it is a really existing thing, in the way that a chair in the room ‘really exists’. What he means is that, in a discussion in a particular context such as this, we can treat something as ‘effectively existing’ when we both know what we are talking about and there is no confusion.

Suppose that you and I are having an argument about the pot that we believe to be on the table in room X of the museum. Suppose a third person comes in and tells us he has seen this pot on the table in room Y. This being the case, if I go into room X, I could say that I become aware of the absence of the pot. In that sense, it has a sort of meaning to say that the pot-absence exists in room X. But why anyone would want to talk in this way eludes me. I would just say that the pot isn’t in room X so I am prepared to accept the third person’s claim that it is in room Y.

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The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 3)

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*** Read Part 2 ***

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.2.1

Absence

What is ‘absence’? It is simply a word we use to refer to the fact that something is not here. Suppose that the teacher realizes that little Johnny is not in the class again. He reports this to the head who says: “His absence has been noted”. What does this mean exactly?

Does it simply refer to whatever the headmaster has written in his little black book? Is it something belonging to Johnny that he ought to get rid of or leave at home when he comes into school? Presumably he cannot bring it with him to school because then he would no longer have it!

Obviously ‘absence’ in this context refers to Johnny himself. If Johnny’s absence is noted at the school, then clearly Johnny himself is not there. The two are mutually exclusive.

But all of this simply relates to the often baffling way in which language develops. All that we are talking about is whether or not Johnny is present at the school. When he isn’t there, we use this catch-all word to refer to the situation. The way in which we use it is as an adjective describing Johnny – ‘absent Johnny’ (again). We cannot use it as a non-qualified noun and say ‘there is absence’, because no one would know what we were talking about. It has to be connected to a noun and simply refers to the ‘non-presence’ of that noun.

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