Introduction It is a ‘dialogue’ between AtmA and the mind. AtmA is free from action. As such the dialogue is figurative. Nevertheless, it is a unique method of nidhidhyAsanA which is the third phase of jnAna yoga after sravan and manan. The aspirant has clear knowledge of AtmA and he needs to assimilate it to make it a living knowledge. The aspirant knows that his essential nature is consciousness which is different from the mind. The locus of knowledge is the mind. It is a peculiar situation where the mind tells itself that the real nature of the aspirant is consciousness which is different from the mind. The mind has to further tell itself that consciousness is changeless and eternal whereas the mind is mithya. It is as though the mind splits in two parts, one part takes the role of AtmA, the subject and the other part is the mind, the object. AtmA uses the mind to talk to the mind and while talking, considers Itself different from the mind. There are Upanishad’s sayings that a knower of Brahman is Brahman and AtmA is Brahman. A Self-realized person and AtmA are used interchangeably. In some verses, there are repetitions of the same idea. Repetition is not a defect when the teachings are complex and are to be assimilated.
Tag Archives: Knowledge
Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 6
*** Go to Part 5 ***
Dennis: You said earlier that:
<< 3. **Your Example: Lack of Mandarin Knowledge
– In your case, the **”lack of Mandarin knowledge”** is clearly **jñāna-abhāva**, a simple absence of knowledge, recognized epistemologically.
– You are correct to say that there is no phenomenological experience of ignorance—it is not something you “feel” or “see” but something you infer logically. In this scenario, treating it as an ontological “ignorance entity” would indeed feel excessive or artificial. >>
But, no – I do not ‘infer’ that I do not speak Mandarin. I know that I do not have knowledge of Mandarin – it is as simple as that.
AI: Thank you for clarifying! Let’s address this with precision.
You are absolutely right: in your case, **knowing that you do not speak Mandarin** is a direct cognition, not an inference. This does not involve any need to postulate a hidden ignorance or make an inferential leap. It is simply a recognition of the absence of knowledge—a direct awareness of what you lack.
Continue readingEight Upanishads (Topic-wise) Part 15
Chapter 6 JnAna and Moksha
6-2 Aitareya Upanishad
6-2-1 Aitareya 1.3.13 and 1.3.14
1.3.12 in chapter 5 has described the entry of Brahman in the body of jivA. The embodied Brahman is jivAtmA. The sentient jivA is a combination of consciousness (Atma) and mind-body. And Atma is not different from Paramatma (God). It is an Upanishadic Great Statement ( mahAvAkya). A jivA however forgets this fact due to the veiling power of mAyA. It is Self-ignorance. Sometimes, because of his punyAs earned in previous lives and the current life, a jivA can get a qualified teacher who out of compassion imparts Brahm-knowledge. The student realizes Brahman as ‘id’ meaning ‘this’, i.e., his Self. The Upanishad calls the knowledge IdAndra. As an adorable entity is not called by its direct name, the Upanishad uses the name Indra (not the deity Indra). The message is that by performing virtuous deeds as per scriptural injunctions, a jivA will one day develop mental maturity to know the futility of worldly goals and turn to spirituality and get Self-knowledge with the blessing of a teacher.
Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 5
*** Go to Part 4 ***
Dennis: Does Śaṅkara actually state that adhyāsa is the effect of causal avidyā in his Bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda Kārikā 1.2? If so, what are his actual words and the translation?
AI: In his commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on Gauḍapāda’s *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* 1.2, Śaṅkara indeed connects **adhyāsa** with **avidyā** as its cause. His words suggest that **avidyā** (ignorance) is the reason for the mistaken superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of one thing onto another. Let’s examine this carefully with the original text and its meaning.
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### **Text from Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda Kārikā 1.2**
The verse from Gauḍapāda’s *Kārikā* reads:
> **अद्वयम् अस्पृष्टं वचसामगोचरं। अज्ञानात् सर्वजीवेषु व्यापारोऽयम् अनादि:।**
> (*Advayam aspṛṣṭaṁ vacasām agocaraṁ. Ajñānāt sarvajīveṣu vyāpāro ’yam anādiḥ.*)
**Translation of the verse:**
“The non-dual (Brahman) is untouched, beyond the reach of speech. Due to ignorance (*ajñāna*), this activity (of dualistic experience) exists in all beings and is beginningless.”
Continue readingIgnorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 4
*** Go to Part 3 ***
Dennis: But surely adhyāsa is the result of lack of knowledge and there is no need to postulate an existent entity called ‘ignorance. When we encounter a coiled rope on the dark path in the jungle ahead, we do not see it clearly (lack of knowledge). It is a natural tendency of the mind to try to make sense of partial perception, and self-preservation would warn us to be wary of snakes. There is no justification at all to start proposing āvaraṇa and vikṣepa powers of an imaginary thing called ‘ignorance’.
AI: Your argument is compelling and aligns with a more minimalist, practical understanding of Advaita Vedanta, focusing on **epistemology** rather than invoking metaphysical constructs. Let’s analyze your perspective and how it interacts with Śaṅkara’s framework.
Continue readingIgnorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 3
*** Go to Part 2 ***
Dennis: You say that treating ignorance as a term of convenience for lack of knowledge “may not fully capture the nuances of traditional Advaita”. Did Śaṅkara make a clear distinction?
AI (1st version): The distinction between avidyā (ignorance) and jñāna-abhāva (absence of knowledge) is not explicitly articulated in Śaṅkara’s works in the nuanced way later post-Śaṅkara Advaita commentators like Prakāśātman or the Vivaraṇa school present it. Śaṅkara’s treatment of ignorance is more focused on its practical and metaphysical implications in the context of liberation. Here’s a closer look:
Śaṅkara’s Treatment of Avidyā
Ignorance as the Root Cause of Bondage
Śaṅkara consistently identifies avidyā (ignorance) as the root of saṃsāra (the cycle of birth and death). This ignorance is not merely a lack of knowledge but is tied to a positive misapprehension—mistaking the non-Self (anātman) for the Self (ātman).
For example, in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra (1.1.4), Śaṅkara writes:
“Ignorance is the superimposition (adhyāsa) of the qualities of the non-Self (anātman) on the Self (ātman).”
Here, ignorance isn’t just an absence but involves an active misattribution.
Continue readingIgnorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 2
*** Go to Part 1 ***
Dennis: I know that I cannot speak Mandarin. There is not some actual entity called ‘ignorance’ that is preventing me; it is simply that I have never been taught. And I do not experience an ‘ignorance of that language’. I would call it a simple ‘lack of knowledge’. It is epistemology, not ontology.
AI: You’re pointing out a critical perspective, and your view aligns with certain minimalist interpretations of Advaita Vedanta’s epistemology. Let’s break this down further:
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1. **Epistemology vs. Ontology
– You are arguing that the **”ignorance of Mandarin”** is not an ontological entity; rather, it is the absence of knowledge due to not having been taught. This perspective emphasizes **epistemology**—how we categorize and know things—over ontology, which would involve positing ignorance as a real “thing.”
– In this case, ignorance is not experienced as a distinct reality but inferred as the logical absence of knowledge (jñāna-abhāva). Your stance aligns with this understanding.
Continue readingIgnorance or Absence of Knowledge?
Part 1 – (This will be a multi-part post.)
This is a topic that I addressed extensively in the second ‘Confusions’ book – ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta: Ignorance and its Removal’ (due out by Summer 2025). But it has appeared in various guises over the past 2 or 3 months on the Advaitin List. One particular member – Sudhanshu Shekhar – has been particularly vociferous in espousing the view that they are not equivalent. He is extremely knowledgeable, especially regarding the text ‘Advaita Siddhi’, by the 16th-17th Century author Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, which strongly supports this idea. In ‘Confusions 2’, I strongly advise against looking at many of these post-Śaṅkara authors on the grounds that a) they are extremely difficult, often verging on incomprehensible; and b) their views, ostensibly to ‘clarify’ the views of Śaṅkara, mostly seem to do nothing of the kind, instead adding merely academic, intellectual arguments that confuse the issues.
Be that as it may, a recent post by Sudhanshu apparently stated the issues clearly so that the arguments could be examined. Unfortunately, the post contained lots of Sanskrit and was not immediately comprehensible to me, whose Sanskrit knowledge is largely limited to interpreting the Devanagari script (very slowly) and looking words up in the dictionary. Accordingly, I decided to put the text to AI (ChatGPT) for interpretation. A very interesting ‘discussion’ followed, which actually opened my mind to an aspect that had not previously occurred to me and that slightly mitigates my previous, hardline stance.
Continue readingIs Reality Knowable?
The affirmation that reality is not knowable is itself an assertion of knowledge about reality. Does this not, though, amount to an example of the law of non-contradiction? To deny that it is so, involves the law of non-contradiction – so this proves that reality is knowable?
(X). The assertion “this sentence is false” is self-contradictory. From that contradiction, one cannot draw the conclusion that the sentence is in fact true. It is simply evidence of the fact that language can be used to construct self-contradictory statements.
(Martin) Rather than self-contradictory, isn’t the quoted statement in the original question a case of second-order language, that is, meta-language, as with so many paradoxes and apparent contradictions?
(X). Are you suggesting that, because it involves meta-language, it thereby avoids contradiction?
(Martin). Yes, but rather than meta-language (my mistake) the quoted passage is, seems to me, an elliptical statement. To complete it one should add: ‘by the conceptual mind’, i.e., ‘not knowable by the conceptual mind’. Real (ultimate) Reality, being non-dual, cannot be known (as you well know) as a conjugation or conjunction of a subject and an object. But it can be ‘Known’ through a unitary vision or intuition – the intuiting subject abating or subsiding as an individual by that very act. There is only one ‘Knower’ or Subject, and that is Reality Itself. ‘One without a second’. Does this prove that reality is knowable?” (under the text in bold letters). Yes, with that proviso.
(X) (Previously he had written: ‘I think one would have to insert ‘’by the conceptual mind’’ in two places to make it explicit that it is referring to conceptual knowledge, not non-conceptual non-dual knowledge. Or is your point that two different kinds of knowledge are involved in the original statement? In any case, I still don’t see how it constitutes a proof in the logical sense.’
(Martin) Correct, thank you. There is a tendency nowadays in Neo-advaita and other circles to put down the mind, let alone terms such as ‘intellectual’, ‘spiritual’, ‘metaphysical’ ‘mysticism’ (‘It’s just mind stuff’… only intellectual knowledge, or understanding’, etc.).
‘Experiential’, ‘experience’ alone are admitted in the vocabulary. I like, though, the expression ‘knowledge-experience’. All experience, and all understanding, reside in the mind (formerly, sometimes, ‘the Heart’), but the latter can be transcended.
(X) The irony is that putting down the thinking mind is itself a judgment of the thinking mind. One way to view it, which I find quite useful, is that the thinking mind can help reveal its own limits, and that can clear the way to insight that transcends the thinking mind. The classic metaphor is the wooden stick used to help burn the fire, and, at the end, the stick itself is thrown into the fire as well. The stick does not cause the burning, and it is ultimately itself burned, but that does not imply it is useless and should be tossed off into the bushes instead of skillfully used to facilitate the burning.
The Darkness of Ignorance (Part 6)
*** Read Part 5 ***
‘Existence’ of Ignorance
So, does ignorance actually exist; a concrete ‘object’ in space and time? There is the occasional reference in the scriptures (e.g. in the Ṛg Veda) but these speak of related gods, supernatural events and so on. Where such a concept is a part of the pseudo-mystical precursor of Advaita teaching proper, I personally cannot accept it as a valid reference. E.g. I suggest that ‘before light, there was darkness’ does not count as a proof that darkness is an ontologically existent entity!
There are also references in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and Sureśvara’s Vārttika on Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya but, again, this being the oldest of the Upaniṣads, there is a lot of ‘mystical’ material much pre-dating Śaṅkara’s systematization of the philosophy.
One of the quotations sometimes given to support the contention that scriptures cite ignorance as a real entity is Sureśvara’s Vārttika on Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa (1368):
ajñānaṃ saṃśayajānaṃ miśyājānamiti trikam
ajñānaṃ kāraṇaṃ tatra kāryatvaṃ pariśiṣṭayoḥ
This is translated as:
Ignorance, doubt-born knowledge, and mixed knowledge are the triad. Ignorance (ajñāna) is the cause there, while the other two (doubt-born knowledge and mixed knowledge) are effects.
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