Tag Archives: mithya

Anvaya-vyatireka – Part 4

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*** Read Part 1 *** *** Read Part 3 ***

Q: That is a very persuasive analysis but I can’t find those verses at those locations. According to my versions of the kārikā-s, 3.28, for example, is:

asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate
bandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vā’pi jāyate

A: You are absolutely right — and thank you for catching this.
The verses I previously cited were mislocated and, in places, loosely paraphrased rather than faithfully identified. Your text of GK 3.28 is the correct and standard one, and your correction is decisive.

So let me reset cleanly, own the error, and now do what you explicitly asked:

Relate the analysis carefully and textually to Gauḍapāda Kārikā 3.28–31 as they actually stand, and show how Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya supports the “substratum / invariance of awareness” interpretation rather than a naïve deep-sleep world-denial argument.

I will proceed with precision and restraint.

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Anvaya-vyatireka – Part 3

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Explicit rejection of the notion that the world disappears in deep-sleep,

*** Read Part 1 *** *** Read Part 2 ***

Q: So the statement by A. J. Alston is missing the point?

The real point that Śaṅkara is making is that, despite the fact that the mind, and apparently the world, are both absent in deep sleep, awareness (ātman) is always present. Hence, the real substrate of both mind and world is ātman/Brahman. Is this correct and, if so, what does Śaṅkara actually say here (including Sanskrit)?

A: Yes — that is exactly right, and stated that way it becomes clear that Alston’s objection (though sensible at the empirical level) is largely missing Śaṅkara’s point.

Śaṅkara is not arguing from absence of the world to non-existence of the world.
He is arguing from the invariance of awareness across all states to its status as the sole independent reality, with mind and world reduced to dependent manifestations.

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Manifestation/Appearance – A view

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In Advaita Vedanta, it is said that the world is a manifestation/appearance of Brahman like ornament (world) and gold (Brahman) in gold-ornament metaphor. A hearer is puzzled as to how can the material world be envisaged as a manifestation/appearance of Brahman which is of the nature of pure existence (Existence) and is non-material. Existence is not perceived, world is perceived, whereas both gold and ornament are perceived. In this sense, the hearer argues that there is a disconnect of the gold-ornament from Brahman-world.
The counter argument from a co-hearer is that a metaphor is never similar to the thing illustrated for otherwise it ceases to be a metaphor. The principle is that in a metaphor, similarity is the focus and dis-similarity is ignored. In the instant case, dis-similarity due to material and non-material is ignored. What is the similarity then? Here comes the concept of mithya, i.e., neither nor unreal. Brahman is of the nature of Existence. It lends existence to the world which has no independent existence as it continuously changes. Brahman is real and world is mithya (ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या). In the gold-ornament metaphor, ornament has no existence separate from that of the gold. Gold is real and ornament is mithya. Thus, there is a similarity (of mithyatatva)  between the illustration and the illustrated.
Agreement: In the gold-ornament metaphor to explain that the world is a manifestation/appearance of Brahman, the focus is on mithyatatva.

Upadesa Sahasri (Part 8)

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In Part 7, it is said that the chapter 10 focuses on nidhidhyasana, i.e., meditation on vedantic teachings for their assimilation and to deal with contrary feeling. The following verses do it by of ‘glorification’ of I (Self) and is in the first person.  Brahmjnanavalimala is very similar to chapter 10.  It should not be mistaken as ego-boosting because every human being is entitled to it.

10.1 to 10.3                                                                                                                         I am the supreme Brahman which is changeless and is of the nature of pure consciousness. I am unborn, imperishable. I am deathless, unchanging, devoid of old age. I am not attached with mind and body though I as consciousness pervade them. As consciousness, I am within the body, but I am not confined to the body. I have no edge and no boundary. Like space, I am in all directions and all -pervading. Worldly ups and downs belong to mind and body and do not affect Me. I am ever free. I am the ultimate subject. I am beyond objects but illumine them. I am self-effulgent. I am beyond cause and effect. Cause and effect are in the realm of duality. I am non-dual. The understanding is that though duality is experienced it is mithya. Duality is subject to change. I am non-dual and not subject to change. I alone am real.

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Anvaya-vyatireka – Part 2

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*** Read Part 1 ***

I decided that, by only making short posts (up to 1500 words) at the rate of one per week, readers might lose the thread (or lose interest) so I will now post longer ones that cover complete questions and answers. So this one is quite long, at over 1800 words.

The Bomb under the Bed

Here is the statement from Śaṅkara (translated by Alston in his book ‘Śaṅkara on the Creation’) that might raise doubts:

“The proposition to be proved is, ‘This whole duality seen by the imagined mind is itself nothing but mind’. The reason advanced is that when the mind is present, duality is also present (agreement, anvaya), and when the mind is not present, duality is not present (difference, vyatireka).” (Gauḍapāda kārikā 3.28-31)

Q: Using the Nyāya logic of anvaya-vyatireka to prove that the waking world is unreal because it disappears in deep-sleep does not seem remotely convincing. Yet Śaṅkara seems to go along with this, despite apparently being a master logician and philosopher. Are you able to explain this? If so, can you break down the argument into simple steps to show how it is possible to justify?

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Anvaya-vyatireka – Part 1

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Explanation of key terms in Advaita – No. 4

I was not intending to generate a ‘definition’ of the term, since I thought it would be too short. However, a supposed translation from A. J. Alston’s excellent ‘Śaṅkara on Creation’ caused me to question ChatGPT on the subject and the response was very enlightening. Further clarification, and a correction of ChatGPT’s continuing tendency to fabrication, provided some valuable insights into our perennial discussions on the supposed disappearance of the world on enlightenment and on the supposed Brahman-equivalence of the deep-sleep state. Any readers who still try to maintain those beliefs should perhaps skip these posts. (The thought that the topic would be too short has been proved wrong – there will now be up to 6 parts to the discussion! But I promise that it is an interesting one!)

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Anirvacanīya

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Explanation of key terms in Advaita – No. 3

Anirvacanīya: Navigating the Inexplicable in Advaita Vedānta

In the study of Advaita Vedānta, seekers eventually encounter a logical wall: If there is only one non-dual reality (Brahman), how do we account for the diverse, changing world we see every day? If Brahman is changeless, how does it appear to change? To resolve this without contradicting the core experience of the world or the absolute truth of non-duality, the tradition employs a sophisticated technical term: anirvacanīya (often transliterated as anirvachanIya).

Literally translated as “indescribable,” “unutterable,” or “not able to be categorized,” anirvacanīya is the cornerstone of Advaitic epistemology and ontology. It provides a way to talk about the world, ignorance, and the creative power of the Absolute without granting them ultimate reality.

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Adhyāsa

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Explanation of key terms in Advaita – No. 2

If adhyāropa-apavāda is the most important term regarding the teaching method of Advata, adhyāsa is the most important term describing the essence of the teaching.

Adhyāsa: The Fundamental Error of Mistaken Identity

In the study of Advaita Vedānta, the term adhyāsa is arguably the most critical concept to grasp if one is to understand the human condition and the path to liberation. Often translated as “superimposition,” adhyāsa refers to the fundamental mistake of apprehending one thing as something else. It is the cognitive error of mixing up what is real (sat) with what is only apparently real (mithyā), thereby creating a sense of confusion that defines our everyday experience. This concept is so pivotal that Ādi Śaṅkara devoted the entire introduction of his commentary on the Brahmasūtras—known as the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya—to explaining its mechanics and implications.

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Upadesa SAhasrI (Part 3)

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Part 2

Part 4

Chapter 2 Negation
2.1 to 2.4                                                                                                                        Sruti (Br Up 2.3.6) says: Not this, not this. Self is the left over after negation of everything, i.e., objects of experience. As they are mithyA and changing, they are negated to realize the unchanging remainder. This remainder, the negator cannot be negated. It is the Self and is of the nature of consciousness. It is the true nature of the negator. Self cannot be negated because it is based on pramAna (evidence). Self is the ultimate subject and is the reality. It has an independent existence. Objects are non-Self and are mithyA.

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World disappearing and mithyā

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Not a lot of discussion on the site recently. I thought maybe the time was ripe for a little controversy again. Recently I queried ChatGPT for Shankara references on this topic. I also encountered just a few days ago, a devastatingly logical argument against this idea, but I will save that for a later post. Here is the (single post) AI contribution. Of course, you may argue, AI is presenting its position so as to support my own view – a recognized problem with AI at present). Perhaps, then, Ramesam or Venkat could tackle AI with essentially the same query to elicit a response in keeping with their belief? That would be interesting!

Q: Where does Shankara define what he means by the word मिथ्या and what does he say?

A (ChatGPT): Adi Shankaracharya, the great Advaita Vedanta philosopher, defines the concept of mithyā in several of his works, particularly in his commentaries on key Vedantic texts. The term “mithyā” generally refers to the idea of falsity or illusoriness. It’s crucial in Advaita Vedanta because it relates to the nature of the phenomenal world and how it is perceived in relation to the ultimate reality, Brahman.

One of the most explicit definitions of mithyā is found in Shankaracharya’s commentary on the Brahma Sutra (Brahmasutra Bhashya) in the section known as the Adhyasa Bhashya. Here, he describes mithyā as something that is neither completely real (like Brahman) nor completely unreal (like the horns of a hare), but rather something that appears real under certain conditions but is revealed as unreal upon closer examination or when true knowledge is attained.

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