Tag Archives: adhyasa

Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 2)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 1)

  1. Levels of Deliberated Attribution in the Prasthānatraya Texts

According to SSS, deliberated attribution occurs on three distinct levels in the texts of the prasthānatraya:16 words, sentences, and methodological procedures or prakriyās employed to articulate the inquiry.17 Each of these levels can be illustrated with examples. Consider the level of words. It is notable that most words themselves can be categorized as adhyāropas. Indeed, even a term as fundamental as ‘ātman’ is itself an adhyāropa. In the CUB 7.1.3, Śaṅkarācārya writes:

The term ‘ātman’ serves as a means of identifying it in contradistinction to the corporeal vehicle it inhabits. Moreover, the term is extended to convey the referent which persists after the repudiation of the body and other non-self entities as illusory. Finally, the word is used to reveal what is inexpressible by words.18

The term “ātman” is an adhyāropa; the aim of invoking the term is not its designation per se, but rather to draw attention to its distinctiveness from the nonself entities, to discriminate it from the nonself referents (body, mind, etc.). Loundo writes, “[Understanding it as an adhyāropa] prevents the reification of ātman and, concomitantly, of its negatum, in the process of distinguishing the former from the latter (body, etc.)” (Loundo 2015, p. 72). Similarly, the term “brahman,” derived from the verbal root “bṛḥ, expansion,” is an adhyāropa that seeks to invalidate the potential limitations associated with “ātman” (BUB 2.3.6). Most words of the prasthānatraya texts—including jīva, īśvara, jagat, avidyā, māyā, bandha, mokṣa, and so on—are adhyāropas.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda

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Over the next 5 – 6 weeks, I will be posting a paper on this topic by Manjushree Hegde. Martin drew my attention to this and initially contacted her. She forwarded the paper to me and, having read it, my comment was that “it is without doubt one of the most important/authoritative/well-reasoned/persuasive documents on Advaita that I have ever read”. She has kindly agreed for me to post it to the site.

Given the title, it will be no surprise that it is a support for the teaching of Swami Satchidanandendra, but to my mind it goes further than he did in explaining the traditional method for the teaching of Advaita and in criticizing post-Śaṅkara authors for their unjustified distortion of that teaching. (Or at least she brings it out much more clearly for me.) It is an academic paper but suffers much less than most as regards its readability. I would urge any serious seeker to read it if they want to understand the sometimes seemingly contradictory aspects of prasthāna traya and, occasionally, Śaṅkara himself.

ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS

Manjushree Hegde
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

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Pratiyogin

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In connection with my recent series of posts on the topic of whether ignorance is a separately existent entity or simply means ‘absence of knowledge’ (https://www.advaita-vision.org/ignorance-or-absence-of-knowledge/), I am posting the result of my further discussions with ChatGPT on the related topic of ‘pratiyogin’.

You may well never have heard the word before and my view is that this should not overly concern you! It probably means that you have never (attempted to) read anything written by Madhusūdana. The text for which he is probably best known is Advaita Siddhi, which I have mentioned in the Confusions books as being virtually incomprehensible. I recently purchased his commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā (called Gūḍhārtha Dīpikā) because he translates every word prior to his comments. And I was dismayed to find, as early as his commentary on 2.16, the opening:

The asat, unreal is that which is delimited by time (kāla), space (deśa) and matter (vastu); as for instance a pot, which is subject to origin and destruction, is delimited by the (two) times, the before and the after (of its period of existence), it (pot) being a counter-correlative of its antecedent nonexistence (prāgabhāva) and nonexistence after destruction (dhvaṃsābhāva). And so on…

At least Swami Gambhirananda has the grace to translate this translation:

That is to say, the pot does not exist before production and after destruction.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 7 (Final)

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*** Go to Part 6 ***

The following question is concerned with the notion that ‘absence of a thing’ is an existent entity (another strange notion of post-Śaṅkara texts). This also formed an aspect of the discussions on the Advaitin List. It begins with my asking ChatGPT to translate the Devanagari text that formed part of the post by Sudhanshu on 6th Dec. 2024.

Dennis: Could you translate this argument into understandable English, please:

चतुर्विधानामभावानाम् , घटस्येतरेतराभावो घटादन्यो ष्टः — यथा घटाभावः पटादिरेव, न घटस्वरूपमेव । न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् ।

AI: Here’s a simplified translation of the argument in understandable English:

We are discussing four types of “absence” (*abhāva*), starting with **mutual absence** (*itaretara-abhāva*). For example, the absence of a pot (*ghata*) is not the same as the pot itself. The absence of a pot is something else entirely, like a cloth (*paṭa*) or another object. In other words, the absence of the pot is not the nature of the pot itself—it is identified with something else, like the presence of the cloth.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 6

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*** Go to Part 5 ***

Dennis: You said earlier that:

<< 3. **Your Example: Lack of Mandarin Knowledge

   – In your case, the **”lack of Mandarin knowledge”** is clearly **jñāna-abhāva**, a simple absence of knowledge, recognized epistemologically. 

   – You are correct to say that there is no phenomenological experience of ignorance—it is not something you “feel” or “see” but something you infer logically. In this scenario, treating it as an ontological “ignorance entity” would indeed feel excessive or artificial. >>

But, no – I do not ‘infer’ that I do not speak Mandarin. I know that I do not have knowledge of Mandarin – it is as simple as that.

AI: Thank you for clarifying! Let’s address this with precision.

You are absolutely right: in your case, **knowing that you do not speak Mandarin** is a direct cognition, not an inference. This does not involve any need to postulate a hidden ignorance or make an inferential leap. It is simply a recognition of the absence of knowledge—a direct awareness of what you lack.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 5

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*** Go to Part 4 ***

Dennis: Does Śaṅkara actually state that adhyāsa is the effect of causal avidyā in his Bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda Kārikā 1.2? If so, what are his actual words and the translation?

AI: In his commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on Gauḍapāda’s *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* 1.2, Śaṅkara indeed connects **adhyāsa** with **avidyā** as its cause. His words suggest that **avidyā** (ignorance) is the reason for the mistaken superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of one thing onto another. Let’s examine this carefully with the original text and its meaning.

—

### **Text from Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda Kārikā 1.2**

The verse from Gauḍapāda’s *Kārikā* reads:

> **अद्वयम् अस्पृष्टं वचसामगोचरं। अज्ञानात् सर्वजीवेषु व्यापारोऽयम् अनादि:।** 

> (*Advayam aspṛṣṭaṁ vacasām agocaraṁ. Ajñānāt sarvajīveṣu vyāpāro ’yam anādiḥ.*) 

**Translation of the verse:** 

“The non-dual (Brahman) is untouched, beyond the reach of speech. Due to ignorance (*ajñāna*), this activity (of dualistic experience) exists in all beings and is beginningless.”

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 4

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*** Go to Part 3 ***

Dennis: But surely adhyāsa is the result of lack of knowledge and there is no need to postulate an existent entity called ‘ignorance. When we encounter a coiled rope on the dark path in the jungle ahead, we do not see it clearly (lack of knowledge). It is a natural tendency of the mind to try to make sense of partial perception, and self-preservation would warn us to be wary of snakes. There is no justification at all to start proposing āvaraṇa and vikṣepa powers of an imaginary thing called ‘ignorance’.

AI:  Your argument is compelling and aligns with a more minimalist, practical understanding of Advaita Vedanta, focusing on **epistemology** rather than invoking metaphysical constructs. Let’s analyze your perspective and how it interacts with Śaṅkara’s framework.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 3

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*** Go to Part 2 ***

Dennis: You say that treating ignorance as a term of convenience for lack of knowledge “may not fully capture the nuances of traditional Advaita”. Did Śaṅkara make a clear distinction?

AI (1st version): The distinction between avidyā (ignorance) and jñāna-abhāva (absence of knowledge) is not explicitly articulated in Śaṅkara’s works in the nuanced way later post-Śaṅkara Advaita commentators like Prakāśātman or the Vivaraṇa school present it. Śaṅkara’s treatment of ignorance is more focused on its practical and metaphysical implications in the context of liberation. Here’s a closer look:

Śaṅkara’s Treatment of Avidyā

    Ignorance as the Root Cause of Bondage

        Śaṅkara consistently identifies avidyā (ignorance) as the root of saṃsāra (the cycle of birth and death). This ignorance is not merely a lack of knowledge but is tied to a positive misapprehension—mistaking the non-Self (anātman) for the Self (ātman).

        For example, in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra (1.1.4), Śaṅkara writes:

            “Ignorance is the superimposition (adhyāsa) of the qualities of the non-Self (anātman) on the Self (ātman).”

        Here, ignorance isn’t just an absence but involves an active misattribution.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 2

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*** Go to Part 1 ***

Dennis: I know that I cannot speak Mandarin. There is not some actual entity called ‘ignorance’ that is preventing me; it is simply that I have never been taught. And I do not experience an ‘ignorance of that language’. I would call it a simple ‘lack of knowledge’. It is epistemology, not ontology.

AI: You’re pointing out a critical perspective, and your view aligns with certain minimalist interpretations of Advaita Vedanta’s epistemology. Let’s break this down further:

—

1. **Epistemology vs. Ontology

   – You are arguing that the **”ignorance of Mandarin”** is not an ontological entity; rather, it is the absence of knowledge due to not having been taught. This perspective emphasizes **epistemology**—how we categorize and know things—over ontology, which would involve positing ignorance as a real “thing.”

   – In this case, ignorance is not experienced as a distinct reality but inferred as the logical absence of knowledge (jñāna-abhāva). Your stance aligns with this understanding.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge?

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Part 1 – (This will be a multi-part post.)

This is a topic that I addressed extensively in the second ‘Confusions’ book – ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta: Ignorance and its Removal’ (due out by Summer 2025). But it has appeared in various guises over the past 2 or 3 months on the Advaitin List. One particular member – Sudhanshu Shekhar – has been particularly vociferous in espousing the view that they are not equivalent. He is extremely knowledgeable, especially regarding the text ‘Advaita Siddhi’, by the 16th-17th Century author Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, which strongly supports this idea. In ‘Confusions 2’, I strongly advise against looking at many of these post-Śaṅkara authors on the grounds that a) they are extremely difficult, often verging on incomprehensible; and b) their views, ostensibly to ‘clarify’ the views of Śaṅkara, mostly seem to do nothing of the kind, instead adding merely academic, intellectual arguments that confuse the issues.

Be that as it may, a recent post by Sudhanshu apparently stated the issues clearly so that the arguments could be examined. Unfortunately, the post contained lots of Sanskrit and was not immediately comprehensible to me, whose Sanskrit knowledge is largely limited to interpreting the Devanagari script (very slowly) and looking words up in the dictionary. Accordingly, I decided to put the text to AI (ChatGPT) for interpretation. A very interesting ‘discussion’ followed, which actually opened my mind to an aspect that had not previously occurred to me and that slightly mitigates my previous, hardline stance.

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