Author Archives: Dennis Waite

Being: the bottom line

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Since I am busy writing my next book (for a change), I have been looking through the past 25 years of written essays and reviews, looking for material that is not currently available anywhere. And there does seem likely to be quite a bit. So I will be (re-)publishing some of this over the next few months. The first of these is a two-part (quite long!) review of the book by Nathan Gill (who sadly died some years ago), I wrote the review back in 2006 but it is still relevant – possibly more so.

A Review of the book “Being: the bottom line” by Nathan Gill and a critique of Neo-Advaita.

This is a courageous book in that it openly tackles some of the most difficult questions that neo-Advaita has to answer and it doesn’t shy away from those that are phrased in the most challenging ways. It is also a dangerous book, in that it appears, superficially, to be providing satisfactory answers. Nevertheless it is a valuable book, albeit not perhaps for the reasons the author intended, in that there are some very searching questions and Nathan’s attempts to answer them expose the vulnerability of the neo-Advaitin position.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 5)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 4)

*** Abbreviations, Notes and References ***

Abbreviations

AS                  Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudanasarasvati with the commentaries Gaudabrahmānandī, Viṭṭhaleśopādhyāyī, Siddhivyākhyā of Balabhadra and a critical summary called Chaturgranthī by M.M. Ananta Kṛiṣṇa Śāstrī. 1937. Edited by Anant Kṛiṣṇa Śāstrī. Revised by Śivrām Śāstrī Śintre. 2nd ed. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 4)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (concluded)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 3)

Based on Śaṅkarācārya’s statements, the PSA formulated a rigorous exposition of the continuation of prārabdha karma—and avidyā—in a jīvanmukta. Nelson (1996) documents the different arguments advanced: Vimuktātman, for example, advocates for the existence of a tangible remnant of avidyā in the jivanmukta (IS 1.9, p. 75).43 Sarvajñātman employs a range of metaphorical constructs to describe the remnant of moha (ignorance) post-gnosis: scent (gandha), shadow (cchāyā), residue, impression (saṁskāra), and so on, (SŚ 4.42).44 Citsukha delineates three forms of ignorance and argues that knowledge destroys only two forms—the third persists post-gnosis; otherwise, he argues, it would result in the immediate cessation of the body, and not admit the experience of jīvanmukti (TP, p. 394ff).45 Prakāśātman writes that the mukta “slips into dualistic awareness (dvaita-darśana)” in his participation in the world (PPV, p. 786).46 Building on Citsukha’s arguments, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī— and his commentator Brahmānanda Sarasvatī—declare videhamukti as “paramamukti,” hierarchically superior to jīvanmukti (AS, p. 892ff). We see here that the PSA’s (seemingly innocuous) endeavour to elucidate the persistence of prārabdha karma in the jīvanmukta compromises and undermines the very notion of mokṣa, here and now. This is akin to severing the very branch upon which one is perched.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 3)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 2)

VI. Adhyāropāpavāda According to the PSA

For the PSA, “Brahman can only be shown, not described” (Murthy 1959, p. 57), albeit in a circuitous, approximate manner (“adūraviprakarṣeṇa”).27 The crux of this position lies in the contention that although brahman eludes direct descriptive elucidation (abhidhā), it retains a semblance of apprehensibility through indirect means (lakṣaṇā). Vācaspati Miśra illustrates with an example: in order to explain gold, we point to gold ornaments—earrings, bracelets, etc—and explain it as the substance that assumes these various shapes; it is that which remains when the shapes no longer do. In a similar manner, the śruti “points to” the world-appearances to “show” brahman as that which assumes these various appearances; it is also what remains when the appearances no longer do (Bhāmati 1.1.4).

Accordingly, for the PSA, adhyāropāpavāda is one method to “show” brahman.28 Consider the stock example of Bhagavadgītā 13.14–15. In the verse 13.14, brahman is said to possess karmendriyas (hands, feet, etc.) and jñānendriyas (eyes, etc.). According to the PSA, this is an adhyāropa that is useful in drawing attention to the existence of brahman as that which permeates everything—including the human body and the sensory organs— and allows movement/perception to occur: ‘immanent’ brahman (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165). Ānandagiri writes, “The faculties of the body are a function of the consciousness that enlivens them; through them, the presence of brahman (as consciousness) can be recognized.”29 The śruti, thus, ‘points’ to brahman with the help of the attributes in accordance with the arundhati darśana nyāya. This is adhyāropa. In the verse immediately following this, brahman is said to be “without senses” and “devoid of qualities.” This is an apavāda that contradicts the preceding adhyāropa to point to brahman’s ‘transcendent’ nature (Rambachan 2017, pp. 164–165).30

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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 2)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 1)

  1. Levels of Deliberated Attribution in the Prasthānatraya Texts

According to SSS, deliberated attribution occurs on three distinct levels in the texts of the prasthānatraya:16 words, sentences, and methodological procedures or prakriyās employed to articulate the inquiry.17 Each of these levels can be illustrated with examples. Consider the level of words. It is notable that most words themselves can be categorized as adhyāropas. Indeed, even a term as fundamental as ‘ātman’ is itself an adhyāropa. In the CUB 7.1.3, Śaṅkarācārya writes:

The term ‘ātman’ serves as a means of identifying it in contradistinction to the corporeal vehicle it inhabits. Moreover, the term is extended to convey the referent which persists after the repudiation of the body and other non-self entities as illusory. Finally, the word is used to reveal what is inexpressible by words.18

The term “ātman” is an adhyāropa; the aim of invoking the term is not its designation per se, but rather to draw attention to its distinctiveness from the nonself entities, to discriminate it from the nonself referents (body, mind, etc.). Loundo writes, “[Understanding it as an adhyāropa] prevents the reification of ātman and, concomitantly, of its negatum, in the process of distinguishing the former from the latter (body, etc.)” (Loundo 2015, p. 72). Similarly, the term “brahman,” derived from the verbal root “bṛḥ, expansion,” is an adhyāropa that seeks to invalidate the potential limitations associated with “ātman” (BUB 2.3.6). Most words of the prasthānatraya texts—including jīva, īśvara, jagat, avidyā, māyā, bandha, mokṣa, and so on—are adhyāropas.

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Adhyāropa-apavāda

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Over the next 5 – 6 weeks, I will be posting a paper on this topic by Manjushree Hegde. Martin drew my attention to this and initially contacted her. She forwarded the paper to me and, having read it, my comment was that “it is without doubt one of the most important/authoritative/well-reasoned/persuasive documents on Advaita that I have ever read”. She has kindly agreed for me to post it to the site.

Given the title, it will be no surprise that it is a support for the teaching of Swami Satchidanandendra, but to my mind it goes further than he did in explaining the traditional method for the teaching of Advaita and in criticizing post-Śaṅkara authors for their unjustified distortion of that teaching. (Or at least she brings it out much more clearly for me.) It is an academic paper but suffers much less than most as regards its readability. I would urge any serious seeker to read it if they want to understand the sometimes seemingly contradictory aspects of prasthāna traya and, occasionally, Śaṅkara himself.

ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS

Manjushree Hegde
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

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Q. 557 Detaching from the mind

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Q: Many modern teachers of Advaita seem to make much of the need to detach ourselves from the mind, or even destroy it, before we can become enlightened. I am confused by instructions such as these. If there is only Brahman, then there isn’t actually any mind (or even world) to separate ourselves from. There are not really even any words to talk about this! Can you clarify?

A: This is a confusion of ‘levels’ of reality.

In reality, there is only Brahman. That is the ‘bottom line’ and nothing more can be said. (Even that is saying too much.)

But the empirical level – appearance of world and you in it – continues until death of the body-mind (i.e. when prārabdha karma expires). Your body-mind is inert (and mithyā), functioning only as a result of non-dual Consciousness ‘animating’ it. You are the Consciousness, not the body-mind.

But Consciousness itself does not do anything, does not know anything – there is nothing else! It is your inert mind, ‘animated by Consciousness’ that appreciates this. ‘Enlightenment’ is an event in the mind, when it realizes all of this to be true.

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Pratiyogin

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In connection with my recent series of posts on the topic of whether ignorance is a separately existent entity or simply means ‘absence of knowledge’ (https://www.advaita-vision.org/ignorance-or-absence-of-knowledge/), I am posting the result of my further discussions with ChatGPT on the related topic of ‘pratiyogin’.

You may well never have heard the word before and my view is that this should not overly concern you! It probably means that you have never (attempted to) read anything written by Madhusūdana. The text for which he is probably best known is Advaita Siddhi, which I have mentioned in the Confusions books as being virtually incomprehensible. I recently purchased his commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā (called Gūḍhārtha Dīpikā) because he translates every word prior to his comments. And I was dismayed to find, as early as his commentary on 2.16, the opening:

The asat, unreal is that which is delimited by time (kāla), space (deśa) and matter (vastu); as for instance a pot, which is subject to origin and destruction, is delimited by the (two) times, the before and the after (of its period of existence), it (pot) being a counter-correlative of its antecedent nonexistence (prāgabhāva) and nonexistence after destruction (dhvaṃsābhāva). And so on…

At least Swami Gambhirananda has the grace to translate this translation:

That is to say, the pot does not exist before production and after destruction.

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Any Questions?

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At the time of writing, there are 556 questions that I, and other bloggers, have answered over the past 19 years. See https://www.advaita-vision.org/questions-and-answers/. Many topics have been covered and there is a good chance that, if you have a specific concern, then it will have been covered here. I also compiled the first 469 of these into a book – ‘Answers… to the Difficult Questions’ – see https://www.advaita-vision.org/answers/ – and added introductions and summaries to the overall topics. But I cannot believe that the visitors to this site no longer have any further questions! So please feel free to write to the ‘Contact-Us’ link at the bottom of the page if you have a particular problem (in Advaita!) that you would like answered.

Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 7 (Final)

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*** Go to Part 6 ***

The following question is concerned with the notion that ‘absence of a thing’ is an existent entity (another strange notion of post-Śaṅkara texts). This also formed an aspect of the discussions on the Advaitin List. It begins with my asking ChatGPT to translate the Devanagari text that formed part of the post by Sudhanshu on 6th Dec. 2024.

Dennis: Could you translate this argument into understandable English, please:

चतुर्विधानामभावानाम् , घटस्येतरेतराभावो घटादन्यो ष्टः — यथा घटाभावः पटादिरेव, न घटस्वरूपमेव । न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् ।

AI: Here’s a simplified translation of the argument in understandable English:

We are discussing four types of “absence” (*abhāva*), starting with **mutual absence** (*itaretara-abhāva*). For example, the absence of a pot (*ghata*) is not the same as the pot itself. The absence of a pot is something else entirely, like a cloth (*paṭa*) or another object. In other words, the absence of the pot is not the nature of the pot itself—it is identified with something else, like the presence of the cloth.

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