Tag Archives: epistemology

Summary of the Discussion on ‘Enlightenment and Liberation’ Terms

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My two-part ‘Terms and Definition’ post on ‘Enlightenment and Liberation’ triggered considerable, sometimes ‘heated’ discussion. Part 1 had 11 comments and Part 2 so many that WordPress does not seem able to cope and does not provide the ‘speech bubble’ with number of comments against the title. (I believe it was around 35.) Since it would take a reader considerable time to work through all of these, I am providing here a summary of the discussion, constructed with the help of ChatGPT.

Towards the end of those discussions, Ramesam referred to the 3-part article by P. Neti on the topic of jīvanmukti. Ramesam posted this to Advaita Vision just over 3 years ago. It begins at https://www.advaita-vision.org/on-jivanmukti-shri-p-neti-1-3/. This article plays a part in subsequent comments (so even more for those interested to read!)

Herewith, then, is the AI-assisted summary of our discussions following the terms and definition posts. Following this summary, I am going to re-post the last of Ramesam’s comments on Part 2. This is because I closed comments before responding to that. Then I will post a further comment that Ramesam sent to me privately. Finally, I will post my overall comments on the P. Neti article and Ramesam’s two comments.

I hope you can follow all of that! To recap, there is this summary, two comments from Ramesam, posted by myself, and my response to everything so far. After that is anyone’s guess as comments will again be open to all.

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Enlightenment and Liberation (Part 2)

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*** Read Part 1 ***

Note that there has been some discussion on Part 1 and there may be some overlap with this new (concluding) part.

Reasoning

The reasoning behind the differentiation (between enlightenment and liberation) is straightforward:

  • The scriptures tell us that we are already Brahman.
  • Since Brahman is eternally free, so must we be.
  • Initially, the jīva does not know this.
  • Consequently, the teaching of a qualified guru is needed.
  • If it were something that is ‘produced’ (i.e. not existing before), it could not be permanent.
  • Mokṣa is ‘nitya siddha’, ever accomplished. It is automatically ‘acknowledged’ when the knowledge triggers akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti.
  • It is not ‘produced’ by the teaching, since mokṣa is already the case and something that is permanent cannot be produced. ‘Liberation’ is a figurative concept in the sense that there is never any real bondage.
  • The notion that we are bound is a mistaken superimposition (adhyāsa) that is sublated (bādha) by the teaching.

There is extensive support for these definitions, from both scriptures and Śaṅkara bhāṣya-s, emphasizing that the realization of our already existing reality as Brahman (liberation) comes only from knowledge. It is the efficacious attainment of that knowledge that is called ‘enlightenment’ as explained by the metaphor of the ‘tenth man’.

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Enlightenment and Liberation (Part 1)

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This ‘terms and definitions’ post is in two parts (there are, after all, two terms!). The style is quite different from earlier posts. The earlier ones were derived from my books and earlier writing; I wrote this following a recent discussion. It contains many quotations from Śaṅkara in support, together with carefully constructed reasoning.

Mokṣa is not produced by any action (as argued in depth by Sureśvara in his Naiṣkarmya Siddhi chapter 1); it is nitya-siddha – already accomplished – and the knowledge gained from scriptures and teacher reveals this fact.

There is much confusion amongst seekers regarding these terms, which are often used interchangeably, or even in the wrong manner. This is because the same confusion exists amongst many writers and teachers. I want to clarify the correct usage of them with support from Śaṅkara’s own writing.

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Anvaya-vyatireka – Part 4

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*** Read Part 1 *** *** Read Part 3 ***

Q: That is a very persuasive analysis but I can’t find those verses at those locations. According to my versions of the kārikā-s, 3.28, for example, is:

asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate
bandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vā’pi jāyate

A: You are absolutely right — and thank you for catching this.
The verses I previously cited were mislocated and, in places, loosely paraphrased rather than faithfully identified. Your text of GK 3.28 is the correct and standard one, and your correction is decisive.

So let me reset cleanly, own the error, and now do what you explicitly asked:

Relate the analysis carefully and textually to Gauḍapāda Kārikā 3.28–31 as they actually stand, and show how Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya supports the “substratum / invariance of awareness” interpretation rather than a naïve deep-sleep world-denial argument.

I will proceed with precision and restraint.

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Anvaya-vyatireka – Part 3

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Explicit rejection of the notion that the world disappears in deep-sleep,

*** Read Part 1 *** *** Read Part 2 ***

Q: So the statement by A. J. Alston is missing the point?

The real point that Śaṅkara is making is that, despite the fact that the mind, and apparently the world, are both absent in deep sleep, awareness (ātman) is always present. Hence, the real substrate of both mind and world is ātman/Brahman. Is this correct and, if so, what does Śaṅkara actually say here (including Sanskrit)?

A: Yes — that is exactly right, and stated that way it becomes clear that Alston’s objection (though sensible at the empirical level) is largely missing Śaṅkara’s point.

Śaṅkara is not arguing from absence of the world to non-existence of the world.
He is arguing from the invariance of awareness across all states to its status as the sole independent reality, with mind and world reduced to dependent manifestations.

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Anvaya-vyatireka – Part 2

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*** Read Part 1 ***

I decided that, by only making short posts (up to 1500 words) at the rate of one per week, readers might lose the thread (or lose interest) so I will now post longer ones that cover complete questions and answers. So this one is quite long, at over 1800 words.

The Bomb under the Bed

Here is the statement from Śaṅkara (translated by Alston in his book ‘Śaṅkara on the Creation’) that might raise doubts:

“The proposition to be proved is, ‘This whole duality seen by the imagined mind is itself nothing but mind’. The reason advanced is that when the mind is present, duality is also present (agreement, anvaya), and when the mind is not present, duality is not present (difference, vyatireka).” (Gauḍapāda kārikā 3.28-31)

Q: Using the Nyāya logic of anvaya-vyatireka to prove that the waking world is unreal because it disappears in deep-sleep does not seem remotely convincing. Yet Śaṅkara seems to go along with this, despite apparently being a master logician and philosopher. Are you able to explain this? If so, can you break down the argument into simple steps to show how it is possible to justify?

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Use of the word ‘mithyā (Part 2)

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*** Read Part 1 ***

The key conclusion made in the discussion below was that, according to AI search: “I have not seen a single place in the prasthāna-traya bhāṣyas where Śaṅkara uses mithyā to label the world or jagat in that ontological sense.”

Q: Vani Vilas will be fine. Your suggested presentation sounds good!

A (ChatGPT5): Excellent—I’ll proceed using the Vani Vilas (1910) Sanskrit editions, and I’ll present three strong, verifiable examples where Śaṅkara himself uses a mithyā- compound in the clear metaphysical sense you described. For each example, I’ll provide:

  • A scan of the original page from the Vani Vilas PDFs with the term highlighted, complete with the file identifier and precise page number.
  • The exact Devanāgarī text (including the mithyā- compound and ± one line of context), transcribed verbatim.
  • My own literal, word-for-word English translation and a brief explanation of how the context conveys the “illusory but Brahman-dependent” sense.
  • Full bibliographic citation: volume number (per Works of Śaṅkara 1910), PDF or DJVU page number, and Internet Archive identifier.
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Adhyāropa-apavāda (Part 2)

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ADHYĀROPĀPAVĀDA: REVISITING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF SVĀMI SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATĪ AND THE POST-ŚAṄKARĀDVAITINS (continued)
by Manjushree Hegde
(Read Part 1)

  1. Levels of Deliberated Attribution in the Prasthānatraya Texts

According to SSS, deliberated attribution occurs on three distinct levels in the texts of the prasthānatraya:16 words, sentences, and methodological procedures or prakriyās employed to articulate the inquiry.17 Each of these levels can be illustrated with examples. Consider the level of words. It is notable that most words themselves can be categorized as adhyāropas. Indeed, even a term as fundamental as ‘ātman’ is itself an adhyāropa. In the CUB 7.1.3, Śaṅkarācārya writes:

The term ‘ātman’ serves as a means of identifying it in contradistinction to the corporeal vehicle it inhabits. Moreover, the term is extended to convey the referent which persists after the repudiation of the body and other non-self entities as illusory. Finally, the word is used to reveal what is inexpressible by words.18

The term “ātman” is an adhyāropa; the aim of invoking the term is not its designation per se, but rather to draw attention to its distinctiveness from the nonself entities, to discriminate it from the nonself referents (body, mind, etc.). Loundo writes, “[Understanding it as an adhyāropa] prevents the reification of ātman and, concomitantly, of its negatum, in the process of distinguishing the former from the latter (body, etc.)” (Loundo 2015, p. 72). Similarly, the term “brahman,” derived from the verbal root “bṛḥ, expansion,” is an adhyāropa that seeks to invalidate the potential limitations associated with “ātman” (BUB 2.3.6). Most words of the prasthānatraya texts—including jīva, īśvara, jagat, avidyā, māyā, bandha, mokṣa, and so on—are adhyāropas.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 7 (Final)

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*** Go to Part 6 ***

The following question is concerned with the notion that ‘absence of a thing’ is an existent entity (another strange notion of post-Śaṅkara texts). This also formed an aspect of the discussions on the Advaitin List. It begins with my asking ChatGPT to translate the Devanagari text that formed part of the post by Sudhanshu on 6th Dec. 2024.

Dennis: Could you translate this argument into understandable English, please:

चतुर्विधानामभावानाम् , घटस्येतरेतराभावो घटादन्यो ष्टः — यथा घटाभावः पटादिरेव, न घटस्वरूपमेव । न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् ।

AI: Here’s a simplified translation of the argument in understandable English:

We are discussing four types of “absence” (*abhāva*), starting with **mutual absence** (*itaretara-abhāva*). For example, the absence of a pot (*ghata*) is not the same as the pot itself. The absence of a pot is something else entirely, like a cloth (*paṭa*) or another object. In other words, the absence of the pot is not the nature of the pot itself—it is identified with something else, like the presence of the cloth.

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Ignorance or Absence of Knowledge? – 6

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*** Go to Part 5 ***

Dennis: You said earlier that:

<< 3. **Your Example: Lack of Mandarin Knowledge

   – In your case, the **”lack of Mandarin knowledge”** is clearly **jñāna-abhāva**, a simple absence of knowledge, recognized epistemologically. 

   – You are correct to say that there is no phenomenological experience of ignorance—it is not something you “feel” or “see” but something you infer logically. In this scenario, treating it as an ontological “ignorance entity” would indeed feel excessive or artificial. >>

But, no – I do not ‘infer’ that I do not speak Mandarin. I know that I do not have knowledge of Mandarin – it is as simple as that.

AI: Thank you for clarifying! Let’s address this with precision.

You are absolutely right: in your case, **knowing that you do not speak Mandarin** is a direct cognition, not an inference. This does not involve any need to postulate a hidden ignorance or make an inferential leap. It is simply a recognition of the absence of knowledge—a direct awareness of what you lack.

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